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ABSTRACT
“GOSH I MISS THE COLD WAR”: POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY
MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 1989-1995
by Samantha Alisha Taylor
August 2017
The end of the Cold War created a dilemma for American foreign policymakers
as the strategy to contain the spread of communism became obsolete. The presidencies of
George H. W. Bush and William “Bill” Jefferson Clinton were forced to create grand
strategies for American national security and foreign policy to replace the forty-plus year
strategy of containment that continued to rely on traditional themes and principles of US
foreign policy. Both men had to overcome lingering Cold War attitudes about the United
States role in the world and its national security interests. As they struggled to do this,
they faced an American public that was supportive of and reluctant of American
participation in conflict resolution around the world.
This dissertation argues that even hat even as the international context changed
following the end of the Cold War and during the early post-Cold War period, presidents
George H. W. Bush and William “Bill” Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy
and national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a noncontainment grand strategy. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign
policies returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and
regional institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened
to world security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold
War technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and
ii

electronic email increased public opinion’s and the mass media’s ability to influence
foreign policy decisions. This dissertation focuses on the intranational or intra-state
conflicts the United States intervened in between 1989 and 1995.
Using Bush and Clinton’s national security strategies, presidential documents,
documents from the National Security Council, US State Department, and Central
Intelligence Agency this dissertation examines the development and execution of Bush
and Clinton’s grand strategies. The dissertation also uses public opinion polls, newspaper
editorials, and archived television news reports understand public opinion and its
responses to mass media and presidential framing and agenda setting.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
Overview
The unanticipated end of the Cold War concluded the forty-year ideological
conflict between communism and democratic capitalism and the rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union. It also ended the raison d’etre for US involvement in
international crises around the world. For forty years, the United States had intervened
around the world to prevent the expansion of communism and Soviet power. The collapse
of the Soviet Union ended this overarching justification for American international
activism. Without this overarching justification, US policymakers struggled to create a
unifying post-Cold War strategy that could duplicate the strategy of containment. This
made it difficult for policymakers to present a coherent strategy of American
interventions to the American public to get public support for those operations. As postCold War conflicts increasing occurred within states, policymakers faced a difficult time
explaining to the American public what threats those intranational conflicts posed threats
to the United States and its interests. Another issue was the increased publicity of policy
debates in the media where the public could view them, which informed public opinion to
support or oppose policy decisions. This forced American policymakers and the president
to sell their strategies and decisions to the American public. The increased publicity of
foreign policy debates also put American policymakers in a competition with the mass
media to frame international events and set the public agenda for America’s response.
This dissertation argues that even as the international context changed following
the end of the Cold War and during the early post-Cold War period, presidents George H.
W. Bush and William “Bill” Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and
1

national security strategies from the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment
grand strategy. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign policies
returned to cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional
institutions to respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world
security and stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War
technological advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and
electronic email increased public opinion’s and the mass media’s ability to influence
foreign policy decisions. The technological advances of the late 1980s and 1990s enabled
the popularity of cable television and the rise of twenty-four-hour news channels like
CNN and email. This dissertation focuses on the intranational or intra-state conflicts the
United States intervened in between 1989 and 1995. It also explores the evolution of
American national security and foreign policies during this period in response to the rise
of intranational crises and decline of international ones. This dissertation will show that
international changes occurring after the Cold War challenged American policymakers
understanding of American interventions and how policymakers explained those
decisions to gain public support. It will also show that changes in public opinion and
mass media influences, starting as early as 1960s, changed the relationship between the
president, the media, and the public about the way foreign policies were created.
Opinion polls during the 1990s, revealed a growing divide between the American
public and policymakers about the direction of America’s post-Cold War foreign policy.
While most policymakers including Presidents Bush and Clinton wanted to maintain
America’s leadership role around the world, the public was divided on whether the
United States needed to fulfill such a role. Also, most Americans preferred the United
2

States engage in multinational or multilateral interventions, and maintaining America’s
military presence around the world.1 This divergence occurred at a time when the mass
media’s and the American public’s influence was growing, and media reports presented
perspectives that differed from the president’s desired narrative. It also occurred as the
occurrences of international conflicts, like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, decreased and
intranational or intrastate conflicts, like the coup in Haiti, emerged as the dominate threat
to global stability.
These intranational conflicts created crises that did not directly threaten the
United States, but because American policymakers believed in US global leadership they
attempted to justify American participation in the interventions to resolve the crises. The
policy decisions made regarding these intra-state imbroglios revealed two trends
regarding US policy. For example, during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Bush successfully
justified US participation to defend the Persian Gulf from Iraqi aggression, convinced the
American public to support his policy decisions, and established a frame that the mass
media mirrored. On the other hand, during the Bosnian War Bush and Clinton struggled
to justify their policy to the American public, failed to establish a convincing frame for
the conflict. Additionally, the media presented its own frame that focused on the
humanitarian aspect of the crisis and countered the president’s frame. Bush and Clinton’s
failure to convincingly justify their policy to the American public created divisions within
public opinion and increased public opposition to the presidents’ decisions. It was during

Richard J. Cattani, “America In the World,” Public Perspectives, 3, no. 3 (March/April 1992): 35. https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/33/33003.pdf
1
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the Bosnian War that pressure from American public and media encouraged Clinton to
make policy changes that led to the Dayton Accords in December 1995.
This dissertation consists of several cases studies: the reunification of Germany,
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, the coup in
Haiti, and genocide in Rwanda. These examples illustrate the interdependency of public
opinion, mass media, and presidential policymaking in the post-Cold War foreign policy
process. Since the 1970s, the president’s ability to determine foreign policy debates
without significant opposition and to rely on bipartisan consensus had declined
considerably. These post-Cold War conflicts occurred at a time when advances in
telecommunications technology enabled real-time communications, expanded the
popularity of cable television, and made the rise of twenty-four-hour cable news
networks like CNN possible. These advances democratized television for the American
public, which had previously been limited to the three broadcast networks, ABC, CBS,
and NBC. These changes created an environment where Bush and Clinton had to publicly
debate foreign policy while considering their position, the position of other Washington
elites, the American public, and the mass media. Thus, in the early post-Cold War period,
understanding public opinion became an important factor to successfully implement US
foreign policy. It also required Bush and Clinton to work harder to make their
interpretation and conception of these intranational crises the accepted frame, otherwise
the mass media’s frame would become the publicly accepted understanding of events.
This dissertation gets its title from a statement Bill Clinton made on 15 October
1993 during an interview with the Washington Post. Following the withdrawal of US
forces from Somalia, Clinton said, “Gosh, I miss the Cold War. We had an intellectually
4

coherent thing. The American people knew what the rules were.”2 Clinton’s statement
was partly in response to the failed military operation to capture Somali warlord
Mohamed Farah Aideed and the publicized images of the Somalis mistreating the bodies
of fallen US soldiers. It was also partially a reply to questions the failure raised about
Clinton’s foreign policy agenda among the international community, the US Congress,
and the American public. It was partly a reaction to the increased influence of the
American public on foreign policy debates and decisions, and the publics ability to force
the government to change policy in response to a negative result of a policy decision, and
mass media’s growing influence in foreign policy debates due to technological advances.
Lastly, it was also a response to Clinton’s struggle to establish a widely supported grand
strategy to replace the simple, general, and long-enduring strategy of containment during
a period where a concise message to explain and justify US responses to intranational
conflicts remained elusive.
George H. W. Bush
Before he was elected president in 1988, Bush had served as Vice-President to
Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1988. He had also served as US ambassador to the UN, the
head of the CIA, and as a Naval flyer during World War II. Bush’s professional
experiences differed greatly from his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, who had gained fame
as a Hollywood actor and later entered politics as governor of California in 1966 before
becoming president in 1980. During his presidency, Reagan produced a foreign policy

Ann Devroy and Jeffrey R. Smith, “Clinton Reexamines a Foreign Policy Under Siege,”
Washington Post, October 17, 1993,
https://secure.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/doc/307677847.html?FMT=FT.
2
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agenda with a nationalist outlook that exuded confidence in the rightness of US
objectives and America’s ability to achieve those objectives. Also, Reagan did not
believe that the Soviet system could change. He viewed the Soviet Union as eternally and
implacably hostile to the West. Reagan’s hostile view of the Soviet Union and the world
that led to a diplomatic style that had a propensity for simplicity.3
On the other hand, Bush was less ideologically oriented than Reagan, and his
rhetoric was often less antagonistic towards the Soviet Union and leftist regimes. Bush
was also less likely to make hyperbolic declarations or rely on clichés in speeches and
interviews. He focused on pragmatic diplomatic negotiations and sought cooperation with
friends and opponents. While Reagan was “the Cold Warrior,”4 Bush, on the other hand,
had diplomatic experience from his assignments as US Ambassador to the UN and as
vice president, and he could negotiate with the Soviet Union and take advantages of the
changes in the East-West relationship.5 Bush’s temperament fit the period of improved
relations between the United States and Soviet Union. This was especially needed as
Mikhail Gorbachev carried out his reform policies that emboldened democratic
movements in the Warsaw Pact nations and weakened Soviet influence in Eastern
Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1990 allowed Bush to create a
foreign policy that did not focus on containing or rolling back Soviet expansionism as
Reagan’s policy had. It also allowed Bush to undertake plans to reduce the size of the US

3
Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 1 (1988/1989): 1-27,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043881.
4

Christopher Maynard, Out of the Shadow: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War,
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press) xi.
5

Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 1-5.
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military because he believed that the end of the Cold War eliminated the need for a large
US military force.
During Bush’s 1988 presidential campaign, the Republican party’s foreign policy
agenda focused on ensuring the continuation of US leadership in the world and
encouraging free nations to promote global peace. The Republican party’s main objective
remained defending the United States, its interests, and its citizens while preserving
peace, stability, and security around the world by fostering democratic self-determination
and economic prosperity. The Republican party also intended to have the United States
engage enemies and friends from a position of strength.6
During his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination Bush
incorporated the republican foreign policy platform into his campaign pledge. He
promised to pursue peace through strength, to continue working to reduce the US and
Soviet conventional and strategic weapons. He also pledged to support America’s
modernization and technological edge, and to speak and stand for freedom in the East and
West.7 He continued this in his inauguration speech when he stated that the United States
would stay strong to protect peace. He also promised to work to continue America’s new
relationship with the Soviet Union as consistent with US security.8 During his presidency,

6

Republican Party Platform, "Republican Party Platform of 1988," August 16, 1988, Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846.
George Bush, “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National
Convention in New Orleans,” August 18, 1988, Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955.
7

George Bush, “Inaugural Address, January 20, 1989,” Public Papers of the President of the
United States: George Bush, 1989 Book 1—January 20 to June 30, 1989, 3 (Washington, D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1990).
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Bush attempted to implement the Republican Party’s foreign policy platform by
continuing the SALT talks with the Soviet Union, and adjusting US relations with
NATO. However, not all of Bush’s policy decisions after the Cold War adhered to the
Republican platform. Bush’s decision to support conflict resolution efforts by regional
organizations during the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Haiti did not reflect
American leadership. Bush’s actions during these conflicts created an image of American
withdrawal from the world. This contradicted his New World Order that had called for
US leadership in international collaborative efforts to resolve and end conflicts around
the world. Nonetheless, Bush’s presidency provided the initial steps away from Cold War
attitudes and the strategy of containment. He helped the nation learn to respond to postCold War conflicts, and understand the costs of continuing to hold onto Cold War beliefs
and strategies. As Clinton succeeded Bush as president, Clinton’s ability to learn from
Bush’s successes and failures in the post-Cold War period foreign policy making would
determine Clinton’s ability to establish a successful post-Cold War grand strategy.
However, Clinton would face more conflicts like Bosnia and Haiti and few like Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait. The spread of intranational conflicts would emerge as the largest
challenge to Clinton’s ability to establish and implement his post-Cold War strategies and
policies.
William “Bill” Clinton
Upon taking office in 1993, Clinton became the first post-Cold War American
president. The Soviet Union was no longer an ideological or military threat to the United
States, and the Cold War rules of containment were no longer applicable. In the wake of
democracy’s “victory” over communism, the United States stood as the world’s sole
8

superpower. Thus, Clinton tried to develop a grand strategy to guide US foreign policies
that would promoted US engagement with the world and promoted global prosperity. He
also wanted the United States to defend and enlarge the number of democratic
governments around the world. While Bush had faced a blend of international and
intranational conflicts like the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of Yugoslavia,
Clinton faced intranational crises during the first two years of his presidency. The
growing occurrence of intranational conflicts like illegal government changes, political
opposition, ethnic violence, and genocide forced the United States to reevaluate its
willingness to intervene in internal state conflicts that threatened regional stability and
security even if it meant violating another countries sovereignty.
As Clinton created his national security strategy and foreign policies he contended
with mixed public opinions about US post-Cold War foreign policies that Bush had.
Public opinion polls taken just before Clinton started his presidency revealed that that 75
percent of Americans wanted to focus on domestic issues over foreign affairs. At the
same time the public was split over letting the world get along as best it could without US
interventions.9 Thus, Clinton faced complex public attitudes that increased the difficulties
he faced gaining public support for his foreign policy decisions. The American public’s
disenchantment with American activism abroad was shared by the mass media and added
to Clinton’s struggle to keep the United States engaged in the post-Cold War world.
Unlike his predecessor, Clinton lacked military and diplomatic experience. While Bush
had been a young Navy pilot during WWII, Clinton had moved to Canada to avoid the

Richard Cattani “America In The World,” Public Perspectives 3 no. 3 (March-April, 1992): 6-9,
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/public-perspective/ppscan/33/33006.pdf.
9

9

Vietnam draft. Whereas Bush had this experience from serving as the US Ambassador to
the UN and as head of the CIA, Clinton had worked as a lawyer and local politician most
of his career before running for president. Clinton’s lack of diplomatic experience
became apparent when he attempted to explain his foreign policy to the public even
though Clinton was a charismatic speaker. Clinton’s lack of foreign policy experience
dampened his public confidence and his charisma making it difficult for Clinton to
convincingly establish foreign policy frames and agendas during his first two years.
During the 1992 presidential campaign, while Bush trumpeted his foreign policy
successes, Clinton focused on domestic issues which resonated with the American
public’s demand for greater attention at home than abroad. The Democratic party
criticized Bush’s foreign policy for not acting assertively or tough enough to global
crises, “What the United States needs is not the Bush Administration’s Cold War thinking
on a smaller scale.”10 The Democratic Party argued US foreign policy needed to restore
America’s global leadership position by helping the world prevent crises, deter dictators,
respond assertively to aggression, punishing human rights abusers, protecting the
environment, and honing America’s competitive edge in the global economy to the
national security strategy and foreign policies. The Democratic Party noted, “The
collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger to our interests.” 11 Democrats
contended that US post-Cold War foreign policy and national security required
restructuring the US military while maintaining its strength and America’s ability to

Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610.
10

Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610.
11
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defend itself. This included maintaining a nuclear presence capable of deterring any
nuclear threat, shifting conventional military power to where national interests were
threatened, reducing military size while maintaining international obligations and
improving the ability to rapidly deploy, maintaining American superior personnel and
technology, and improve intelligence capabilities to provide more timely and accurate
analyses of situation that can cause conflicts.12
Methodology
This dissertation relies on an interdisciplinary approach that combines traditional
diplomatic history with mass communications studies to understand the development of
post-Cold War foreign policies as policymakers navigated a new international
environment and greater public influence in the policymaking process because of the
advances in telecommunications technology that introduced twenty-four-hour news
channels, the internet, and email. This dissertation uses the mass communications
theories of framing, agenda setting, cascading activation, and the “CNN factor” on policy
making.
The mass communications theory of framing refers to the way an issue is
characterized I news reports can influence how the audience understands the issue.
Agenda setting is that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis mass media puts
on issues and events through newspaper placement or the amount of coverage they give
to those issues and events, and how important the public assumes those issues and events
are. Framing and agenda setting focus on the ways the media reports on the issues and the

Democratic Party Platform, “1992 Democratic Party Platform,” July 13, 1992. Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/?pid=29610.
12
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influence reporting styles and methods have on American understanding of events, and
thereby what the public feels would be the proper response to those events.13
Robert M. Entman’s cascading activation theory describes the interweaving
influence on official views of events from the President to policy elites to the media then
to the public, and back up, and how that effects policy decisions. Entman’s cascading
activation reveals the contest between the president, his supporters, and critics for
political leverage theory, and shows that implementing foreign policy requires the
president to reckon with the media when proposing to use of military forces and the
American public as well as Washington elites. Lastly the CNN effect argues that
following the Cold War, Western media has been a driving force pushing Western
governments, including the United States, to undertake untenable humanitarian
interventions. The CNN effect focuses on how much power the media possesses to
convince governments to intervene militarily in humanitarian crises through their use of
images and rhetoric that sways the audience’s opinion of the crises, and pressure the
government to act.14
Scholars have shown that the president and mass media have influence on the
public opinion, and that public attitudes can influence the direction of mass media and the
policymakers. This interdependence is an important factor for my analysis of early postCold War foreign policy, because after the Cold War this relationship had a growing

Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The
Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,” Journal of Communication 57 no. 1, (Mar 2007): 11.
http://lynx.lib.usm.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cms&AN=24074
978&site=ehost-live
13

14
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influence on the ways that policymakers explained international situations and justified
policy decisions to the American public.15 The presidential rhetoric and the president as
media explores presidential agenda setting through public statements on policy agendas
that and the president’s ability to make the public more aware of those policy areas, and
support his decisions. Jeffery E. Cohen’s study on presidential State of the Union
addresses shows that increased presidential attention to economic, foreign, and civil
rights policies led to increased public concern towards those policies. Cohen continues
that even sparse statements of policy areas could elicit a public response especially on
foreign policy.16 Since televised presidential speeches are the president’s main means to
express their positions to the public, I examine how presidential rhetoric and the president
as media through broadcast and cable television influenced public opinion, and the
president’s ability to sway public support for policy decisions through public statements
about each crisis.
Along with presidential rhetoric and the president as media, this dissertation
explores public opinion and its influence on foreign policy decisions during German
reunification, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, collapse of Yugoslavia, Bosnian War, 1991
coup in Haiti, and genocide in Rwanda. This research included public opinion polls,
editorials, letters to the editor, and letters to the president of the United States.
15
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Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms intranational and intra-state
interchangeably to reference the multiple types of internal conflicts that states faced
including humanitarian disasters, civil wars, ethnic fighting, genocide or ethnic cleansing,
and illegitimate regime changes. Since intra-state imbroglios became the dominant form
of conflict in the early post-Cold War period prevention and intervention methods
became significant parts of Bush and Clinton’s security and foreign policy strategies.17
Justifications
This dissertation consists of six foreign policy case studies and a chapter on postCold War mass media, public opinion, and presidential rhetoric. In this dissertation, I will
analyze the reunification of Germany, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the dissolution of
Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War, the 1991 military coup of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. I chose the timeframe so that it included
Bush’s transition from the Cold War and the adjustments he had to make to US foreign
policy for post-Cold War international situation. Following Bush’s transition into
Clinton’s first two years as a post-Cold War. This period provided a balanced period to
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explore Bush and Clinton’s policies toward the post-Cold War period. The years after
1995 represent a subsequent break as the later post-Cold War period was increasingly
marked by international terrorism which required a different national security strategy
and foreign policies. Although it falls into my chronology I did not include the crisis in
Somalia because of classification restrictions on Clinton’s National Security Council
documents. I am hoping that in time more of these documents will become available so
that I will be able to carry out a comparison of Bush’s and Clinton’s policies in the future.
I chose to begin the dissertation with a chapter on the reunification of Germany
because Bush’s diplomatic efforts contained elements of the strategy of containment, and
American diplomatic and security strategies from WWII. This included cautious
cooperation with Soviet leaders while standing ready to prevent any Soviet attempts to
expand communism or initiate repressive policies in Eastern Germany or Eastern Europe.
This was a significant turn at the end of the Cold War and indicated that improved
international cooperation was possible in the future. The reunification of Germany was
the last crisis the United States responded to while abiding by the strategy of
containment. It also occurred as the right dominated American politics while the left
dominated American culture, which created a conflict between political conservatism and
secular multicultural worldviews. As democratic revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe
started to undermine Soviet influence Bush contended the same changes occurring in the
United States internationally.
My second chapter explores the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that
began on August 1, 1990. I will refer to this crisis as the Persian Gulf Crisis as it was
referred to in the media. My use of the Persian Gulf Crisis only refers to the Iraq invasion
15

of Kuwait between August 1990 and January 1991. It does not include the Gulf War from
January 1991 to April 1991. I made this decision to focus on Bush’s efforts to create and
lead the international response and coalition against Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and
because it was the last international crisis that involved the Soviet Union as a world
superpower. As Bush and his administration began to recognize that the Cold War was
ending while the Soviet Union collapsed between 1990 and 1991, it was during the
Persian Gulf Crisis that Bush began developing and espousing his post-Cold War
strategy. I also chose the Persian Gulf Crisis to study Bush’s efforts to gain public
opinion and control the frame for the Persian Gulf Crisis. Lastly, the Persian Gulf Crisis
was the last international imbroglio the United States participated in as it transitioned to
the post-Cold War period. After the Cold War, the United States participated in more
intranational peace efforts, thus including this chapter allows me to compare Bush’s
policies towards intranational conflicts as compared to international ones.
I examine the dissolution of Yugoslavia for several reasons. First, because the
collapse of Yugoslavia was the first crisis the United States dealt with after the Cold War
ended, whereas the Persian Gulf Crisis and the reunification of Germany occurred during
the end of the Cold War. Second, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was a direct result of the
end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, international economic aid
evaporated, and political and ethnic disagreements pushed the country toward collapse.
The way Bush and the media framed Yugoslavia’s collapse influenced public opinion and
by extension, Bush’s policy decisions. In particular, the media’s focus on “ancient ethnic
hatreds” made justifying an intervention for any side difficult. Yugoslavia’s dissolution
tested Bush’s New World Order vision and his ability to apply cooperative security
16

arrangements as a response to intra-state conflicts. As the Bosnian War resulted from the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, I examine it in the chapter following the Yugoslavia. This
chapter is the first to analyze and compare Bush’s and Clinton’s strategies and policy
decisions in the post-Cold War period, as well as their views on US leadership and
intervention in intranational conflicts.
In the next chapter I analyze the 1991 coup of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, which reveals both presidents post-Cold War commitment to defend and support
democratic governments threatened by illegal government change and political
opposition from enemies other than communists. Haiti also reveals the influence of race
politics on US post-Cold War foreign policy, especially as the 1990s were a period where
debates about racial equality and racial discord were important factors. Throughout US
diplomatic historians African Americans had attempted to influence US foreign policy
and US policymakers had used African Americans to further national security and foreign
policy goals. In the post-Cold War period, the Congressional Black Caucus emerged as
strong lobbying force in the government and foreign policy. Their efforts to change US
policies towards Haiti under Bush and Clinton demonstrate the Congressional Black
Caucus’s growing influence in Washington, and the changing nature or race in US
foreign policy after the Cold War.
I examine the genocide in Rwanda as another ethnic conflict and intranational
conflict to show changes that began to occur in Clinton’s foreign policy regarding UN
peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. The genocide occurred as the
American public and politicians became increasingly wary of US participation in
peacekeeping efforts that dragged the United States into quagmires that had little
17

connection to US interests and offered little reward. The Rwandan genocide tested
Clinton’s re-evaluation of US participation in peacekeeping missions, and his ability to
establish foreign policy frames and agendas without relying on those first established by
George Bush.
Explanation of Sources
This dissertation relies on research that includes National Security Council and
administration records from the Bush and Clinton Presidential libraries, U.S. State
Department and CIA Freedom of Information Act websites, the United Nations Archive,
and UN online records to analyze foreign policy and national security strategy. I use
archived news broadcasts from ABC, CBS, NBC, C-Span, and CNN from the Vanderbilt
University Television News Archive; newspaper articles and editorials from the New
York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal; and public statements by George
H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton to understand the contest between the president and media
over the frames and agendas for each crisis. I also use newspaper editorials and public
opinion polls by Gallup and the Pew Research Archives to get to public opinion about the
conflicts and related policy decisions. Lastly, I use the White House Office of Records
Management from the Bush and Clinton presidencies to access public correspondence to
the presidents related to each conflict. Due to the size of the WHORM collections, this
dissertation uses a sample of the letters available from the Bush and Clinton libraries. For
example, the letters I gathered from the Clinton Archive on the Yugoslav conflict are
mostly from 1995, with only few letters from the public before 1995. Part of this is due to
public reaction or lack or response to the Bosnian crisis before 1995. The letters used on
the Persian Gulf Crisis are a sampling of the 198,600 pages of correspondence Bush
18

received during Persian Gulf Crisis. The sample comes from letters that arrived around
the time of major events during the Persian Gulf War from 1990-1991. Much of the
letters in the sample are from the period between August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait
and January 1991 when Bush, with UN support, made the decision to go to war.
The mass media portions of this dissertation come from research in the New York
Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal archives. By conducting keyword
searches in the Vanderbilt Universities Television News Archive datable of broadcast
news reports from August 1968 by ABC, CBS, and NBC I gained statistical information
about news broadcasts on each crisis. These searches provided key terms that were used
to describe each debate as well as the length of each broadcast. Analysis of archived
videos come from Alexander Street and C-Span archives available. I have gained public
opinion poll data from The Gallup Poll Monthly and the Pew Research Center website.
Literature Review
The post-Cold War environment was set up as early as the mid1960s when the
United States faced social and political changes that included the civil rights movements,
the 1964 Goldwater campaign, and the rise of the religious right in the 1970s. These
changes configured the United States for the Ronald Reagan presidency which Sean
Wilentz argues was a defining period for the conservative movement in the United States
against liberal domestic policies. Though Reagan was mostly unsuccessful rolling back
the New Deal and civil rights movements he opened avenues to undermine them.18 The
domestic and foreign polices Reagan carried out occurred at a time the United States and
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much of the West was culturally moving to the left while politics moved to the right.19 In
this Reagan’s foreign policy also pointed to a retrenchment of US Cold War attitudes
including the belief that the United States and Russia were eternal enemies.20 Reagan’s
domestic and foreign policies and the cultural changes occurring the in United States
during the 1980s were both critical and complex. When Bush succeeded Reagan, he
faced a diverging political and cultural situation at the same time the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev’s leadership was re-focusing its influence and power in Europe. The rise of
personal computers, a more globalized economy, and the rise of MTV further pulled
American society away from Cold War attitudes even as foreign policy remained
dedicated to containment.
As the Cold War ended the United States faced many conflicts that occurred
because the Cold War rivalry led the United States to implement regime change to
contain communism. David Schmitz exploration of America’s late-Cold War support for
right wing dictatorships shows that United States instilled anti-American attitudes in
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere to contain Soviet expansion.21
While Schmitz touches on the consequences of America’s late-Cold War actions,
Chalmers Johnson shows that these policies overextended US resources and planted the
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seeds for post-Cold War conflicts.22 In the post-Cold War period, the Iraq invasion of
Kuwait, collapse of Yugoslavia, and other conflicts were connected with the changes
created by the end of the Cold War and the changes in US foreign policy and national
security strategy. This left the US policymakers with few options to resolve those
conflicts.
One change that did not occur in the post-Cold War period was of America’s
military presence around the world. Lloyd Gardner argues that during and after the Cold
War American policymakers believed the United States could encourage progress and
introduce democratic governments while eliminating anti-American attitude by using
American military power.23 These attitudes supported the continued deployment of
American forces around the world. However, America cannot maintain its global military
presence without consequences. In American Empire, Andrew Bacevich argues the
continued global deployment of America's military power in the post-Cold War period
threatens America’s position in the long term. He contends that US policymakers’
inability to create a post-Cold War grand strategy for the world’s only superpower forced
the United States to maintain its global military presence.24 Bush and Clinton’s continued
reliance on America’s military power around the world in the post-Cold War period did
ensure post-Cold War stability and security. Repeatedly during the Cold War, Bush and
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Clinton demonstrated reluctance to deploy US military forces to respond to a conflict
than to use it to end a conflict.
Part of this reluctance was due to strategy debates in both administrations about
the framework for post-Cold War international relations: was the period unipolar or
multipolar, and should the United States response unilaterally or multilaterally. In Nigel
Thalakada and Christopher Layne show that while the post-Cold War period emerged as
a unipolar situation, it quickly became multipolar. Thalakada argues that the post-Cold
War period reversed the power dynamic of America’s Cold War alliances giving
America’s allies opportunities to manage and influence American power. He also shows
this led American policymakers to move away from unipolarity and embrace
multipolarity by encouraging America’s allies to share the burdens of maintaining
international stability.25 This move towards cooperative security revealed a short unipolar
moment and the return to a multipolar system that had existed before the Cold War. As
Layne argues this shift occurred as other states began to counterbalance America’s power
through soft balancing – the use of diplomacy and international institutions, and hard
balancing – the buildup of military power to directly challenge the United States.26
Throughout the post-Cold War period, the consequences of America’s global military
presence was balanced against the rise of regional powers which pushed the United States
towards multilaterally and cooperative security arrangements. However, this did not
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cause the United States to lose it superpower status. While the United States remains the
world’s only super power, Joseph Nye argues the United States can only maintain that
status through multilateral diplomacy.27 He shows that without the Cold War threat of
communism the United States lacks the ability to act unilaterally around the world.
Richard N. Hass also shows that the United States can best defend its interests by relying
on international organizations and multilateral undertakings.28 As America’s ability to
deploy its military power around the world changed, so too did the influences that drove
foreign policy decisions.
US post-Cold War foreign policy relies on more than debates over unipolarity and
multipolarity and the consequences of America’s global military presences. It also
includes debates about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy making. James
M. Scott and a group of international relations scholars and diplomatic historians show
that after the Cold War the American President, Congress, and public each influence the
development of post-Cold War foreign policies. The authors show that each group had
different levels of influence, and that policymakers after the Cold War must take greater
care to study the preferences of each group has for a policy can determine the level of
support or opposition.29 As Bush and Clinton attempted to create post-Cold War grand
strategies and foreign policies to respond to the rise of intranational conflicts. Hal Brand
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contends that Bush’s New World Order and Clinton’s democratic enlargement struggled
to calculate US goals and priorities in a changing international system.30 While Bush’s
and Clinton’s non-containment policies were unable to completely respond to the rise of
intra-state conflicts, their efforts attempted to adjust to the growing multipolar
international system after forty years of a bipolar one.
Other studies of American foreign policy have focused on how the post-Cold War
presidents themselves have attempted to define U.S. foreign policy. Christopher
Maynard’s Out of the Shadow and James D. Boys' Clinton’s Grand Strategy are two
works that look at Bush and Clinton’s roles shaping of America’s post-Cold War foreign
policy grand strategy. Maynard’s work explores Bush’s presidency as he transitioned to
United States to the post-Cold War period. Throughout the book, Maynard reveals Bush’s
and his administration’s thought processes as they responded to global changes between
1989 and 1993. Maynard reveals that Bush was a foreign policy realist, not an idealist.
He contends that Bush’s foreign policies were not a continuation of Ronald Reagan’s
policies and Bush’s policies rested on his aggressive personal diplomatic style.31 In A
World Transformed Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, detailed
their memories and thoughts about the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the Tiananmen Square protests, and the Gulf War. The diary reveals the
inner thought process for Bush and his top advisor as he responded to global crises as
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after the Cold War.32 Bush’s foreign policy attitudes and his responses to the challenges
established the post-Cold War system that Clinton inherited and would continue to adapt
US foreign policy to. Boys argues the core components of Clinton’s foreign policy were
national security, prosperity promotion, and the promotion of democracy. He contends
that Clinton’s responses to the Somalia and Balkan crises, economic challenges in
Mexico and Europe, and the emergence of the European Union, North American Free
Trade Agreement, and World Trade Organization were crucial to the development of
world politics at the start of the twenty-first century.33 They also reveal the dual nature of
Clinton’s foreign policy of promoting democracy and global economic prosperity as
means to promote and defend US interests after the Cold War. Bush and Clinton’s
responses to the post-Cold War period were based on assumptions made about global
security and stability without the US-Soviet rivalry.
In an edited collection by Ellen Schrecker, scholars explore how the United States
“defeat” of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a distorted discourse on the Cold War’s end,
prevented a postwar reassessment of the U.S.-Soviet conflict, and a final accounting of
the Cold War’s impact on American society. The authors reveal that post-Cold War
triumphalism misrepresented the emerging period and hindered efforts to respond to the
period.34 Derek Chollet shows that liberals and conservatives attempted to reconcile
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themselves to the post-Cold War period.35 While Philip Wegner shows that the 1990s was
a period of full of debates about globalization, neoliberalism and the end of history, the
rapid growth of the internet, and the rise of anti-globalization. He shows that these
debates increasingly dominated the political and social climate as the post-Cold War
period continued.36 The political and social debates of the 1990s increasingly made their
influence on foreign policy decisions after the Cold War. The ways the media reported on
and discussed domestic and foreign affairs further influence public opinions about
America’s place in the world and its responsibilities.
As the United States debated its policy choices the contest between the president,
policy elites, the media, and the public affected the direction that foreign policy took. The
media’s role in the post-Cold War reporting on crises and explaining them to the public
influenced public opinion and public support or opposition to presidential foreign policy
decisions. In Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts, Philip Hammond examines how the
British media interpreted post-Cold War conflicts. He argues that the British media’s
framing of the Balkan conflict as an ancient ethnic conflict influenced Western
government’s determination to resolve the crisis.37 As the Bosnian War occurred
telecommunications technology had improved allowing for instantaneous news on wars
and catastrophes. Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin’s War and Media argue that the
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media’s role depicting wars and other crises with new telecommunications technology
created a global awareness for the audience. They show that these changes affected the
audience's understanding of war, and desensitized the audience to the images of war.
They argue that the mediatization38 of war diffuses the relationship between the causes
and effects of war, and increases uncertainty for policymakers.39 In a period, where
intranational conflicts became increasingly common the media’s ability to provide
constant updates about conflicts and to desensitize the audience to those conflicts,
changed the way public opinion responded to televised conflicts.
The media is not the sole source of information to drive public opinion. In
“Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,” Jeffery E. Cohen argues that the more
attention the president gives to policy areas in their State of the Union Addresses
increases public concern about those areas even if temporarily.40 However, the rise of
cable television altered the way president’s increased public concern about foreign
affairs. Matthew A. Baum and Samuel Kernell argue that the increased popularity and
availability of cable television allowed the American public to choose whether to watch
presidential addresses. They continue that this ability to choose to watch led to decreased
the ratings for presidential addresses, which led networks to decrease their coverage of
presidential addresses, and this encouraged presidents to reduce the number of addresses
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they gave to consolidate their rhetorical influence.41 Continuing along this line Gary
Young and William B. Perkins argue that the rise of cable networks did not negatively
affect presidential rhetoric on foreign policy. They also note that the rise of cable
television did not significantly diminish the president’s ability to influence public
concern about foreign policy.42 As the Bush and Clinton competed with the media over
public opinion to support foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War period, they also
attempted to develop foreign policies that could respond to the international changes by
relying on older foreign policy and national security frameworks. Their efforts led to a
return to cooperative security arrangements and multipolar world to ensure stability and
security after the Cold War.
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CHAPTER II – BUSH AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY
Introduction
Of the dramatic changes that occurred in Eastern Europe because of Mikhail
Gorbachev's leadership and reforms, the most striking was the opening of the Berlin Wall
in November 1989. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the
Communist Party and the Soviet Union. From that point, he implemented perestroika—a
series of political reforms—within the Communist Party that opened it to liberalism,
democracy, and helped bring about the end of the Soviet Union. Between 1985 and the
opening of the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev’s perestroika produced radical political reforms in
the Soviet Union that severely diminished the authoritarian power of the Communist
Party. Gorbachev’s policies started political competition between liberal-democrats,
traditional communists, and reform-minded communists for control over Soviet policies.
Additionally, Gorbachev's foreign policies led to a lessening of tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union, and his refusal to abide by the Brezhnev doctrine43
led to successful democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, ending
long-held beliefs the Cold War would continue indefinitely.44
From the Berlin Airlift to John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech to
Reagan’s call for Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall,” the United States
repeatedly attempted to remove the barrier between communism and democracy. On 9
November, a miscommunication from a Soviet official announced that the border was
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open, and from that moment East and West Germans began reuniting.45 With the opening
of the wall came joy and hope that Cold War divisions were finally coming to an end, and
a period of coexistence was beginning. The opening also started discussions on reuniting
East and West Germany and integrating Eastern and Western Europe.46
The reunification of Germany revealed that while Cold War tensions, attitudes,
and practices warmed, they would not end overnight. It also revealed that Bush had led
the United States and the international community through these changes. This chapter
argues that Bush’s strategy for the reunification of Germany was the initial step to create
a post-Cold War grand strategy and foreign policies for the United States. By using
earlier foreign policy methods, Bush reintroduced cooperative security strategies to
American foreign policies. America presidents had used these policies throughout the
Cold War as part of the strategy of containment, they had not use these policies to
prevent or end international crises. The United States last used a cooperative security
strategy during WWII, when Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman
attempted to cooperate with the Soviet Union and Western Europe. However, the depths
of mistrust revealed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences led to the division of Europe
and the world between democratic capitalism and communism. Over forty years this
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distrust entrenched, so that in 1989 entrenched Cold War beliefs limited Bush’s ability to
adjust US policies to the changing situation in Eastern Europe. These limitations
prevented Bush from expanding his policies beyond countering Soviet suggestions, even
as he cooperated with the Soviet Union and Western European leaders to reunite
Germany.
Political Changes and Border Openings
Since no one was expecting the developments that occurred in the late-1980s,
efforts to reunify Germany were caught in an environment of changing international
political and security arrangements. These changes included the weakening of the Cold
War dichotomy, and improved US-Soviet relations. The spread of successful democratic
revolutions in Eastern Europe created instability that many, including the United States,
feared would derail the reintegration of Eastern and Western Europe, and force the Soviet
Union to use repressive tactics. The reunification of Germany was a microcosm of this
environment. As the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France worked with the
two Germanys the conflicts between Soviet desires and internal problems repeatedly
required Bush to negotiate solutions that did not worsen Soviet instabilities.
Following the opening of the Berlin Wall, the political situation in East Germany
became unstable: increasing numbers of East Germans relocated to West Germany, GDR
citizens forced their ways into previously secured government buildings, the public
stormed secret police offices searching for files, and the government lost its monopoly
over the news leading to reports on environmental damage and economic issues in the
GDR. These events caused the GDR communist party to lose power, and forced the GDR
to establish an interim all-party government in the communist party’s place. This new
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government set a 6 May 1990 date for free elections to occur in East Germany to create a
new government.47 The events occurring in GDR were similar to those occurring in
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The combination of these revolutions led the
United States and the Western European governments to fear the instability would lead to
Soviet repression in Eastern Europe. These fears ensured that Bush and his administration
remained wary of Soviet actions and statements throughout the reunification process. It
also led to constant analysis reports before and during the reunification procedures about
possible ways the Soviet Union might undermine or prevent Germany’s reunification.
In February 1990, with the momentum for reunification increasing, Helmut Kohl,
Chancellor of FRG, announced plans to begin talks with GDR leaders to bring the GDR
economy under the control of the FRG central bank. On 10 February, Chancellor Kohl
and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met with Gorbachev in Moscow.
During the meeting, Gorbachev informed the men that the Soviet Union supported
German unity under the condition that the combined borders of the GDR, FRG, and
Berlin became the permanent borders for a reunified Germany. Gorbachev’s decision to
support German reunification provided Bush with the space necessary to establish the
method that Germany would reunify.
This process involved convincing the British, French, and Soviet Union to accept
a conference that only involved the Four Powers48 and the two Germanys. Bush would
defend this plan because only the Four Powers had the authority to prevent Germany’s
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reunification. However, Bush was only focused on uniting Germany, he did not intend to
discuss German economic and security arrangements with the rest of Europe.49 This
allowed Bush to focus on maintaining cooperation between the six parties which was a
more manageable task that gaining consensus with all of Europe. It also allowed Bush to
focus priorities on monitoring the Soviet Union and its responses to developments in
Germany and Eastern Europe.
US Planning for German Reunification
As developments in the two Germanys revealed that German reunification would
not be slowed, the Bush administration focused on understanding the attitudes and
positions of Europe on German reunification. Through intelligence reports, the
administration learned that many countries in Europe were uncomfortable with a quick
path to German reunification, and many believed that a reunited and militarized Germany
posed a threat to their national security. Bush and his staff recognized that opposition to a
reunified Germany in Europe would increase tensions, and focused their efforts on
establishing a consensus among the Four Powers, rather than all of Europe.50
After the opening of the Berlin Wall, East and West German relations steadily
improved, increasing German desires for reunification. As these attitudes increased Bush
and the United States emerged as the main proponents of German reunification. Bush
developed a three-pronged strategy capable of responding to Western Europe and the
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Soviet Union concerns, and maintaining a cooperative environment between all six
parties. The first part of Bush’s strategy required him to convince Britain and France to
support reunification and overcome security concerns. Secondly, Bush and his
administration had to determine what the Soviet Union would gain and lose with
Germany’s reunification, and how those gains and losses would affect Soviet responses
and policies. The second step required Bush and his administration to focus on cautious
cooperation, while limiting any Soviet gains that threatened US interests in Europe. The
third part of Bush’s strategy focused on maintaining cohesion between the United States,
Britain, and France both as a bulwark against Soviet desires, and to limit internal
conflicts among the three Western Allies.51
Bush’s policies towards German reunification did not follow the stark divisions of
the Cold War. Instead Bush’s actions resembled Roosevelt’s negotiations with the British
and Soviet Union during WWII. Bush began by creating a consensus with his the British
and the French, as this was the easier to accomplish even though the three governments
did not completely agree German reunification. However, they shared similar views of
the Soviet Union and what the reunification of Germany meant for reducing tensions in
Europe and reducing the Soviet sphere of influence. Bush also cautiously negotiated with
the Soviet Union while keeping containment in reserve should Soviet actions threaten the
process to reunification or if Soviet desires challenged US interests to greatly. Like
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Roosevelt, Bush’s prioritized compromise with the Western European powers over
cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Bush’s strategy for the reunification of Germany closely the diplomatic efforts
during the Yalta and Potsdam conferences on post-war Europe. During these conferences,
the United States attempted to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the make-up of
postwar Europe. The United States cautiously cooperated with the Soviet Union while
attempting to limit Soviet expansion in Europe while aligning close with the Western
allies. In 1945, this strategy led to the division of Europe. However, between 1989 and
1990, it provided the opportunity to reunify Germany and start reintegrating Eastern and
Western Europe.
As Bush and his administration began strategizing on how to reunify Germany,
their first step was to determine what was legally required to reunite Germany. Since the
end of WWII, the Four Powers had divided Germany between the Soviets and the
Western Allies. Thus, the administration determined that German reunification required
Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union to renounce their occupational
authority over Germany. It also required settling German WWI and WWII debts,
establishing permanent German borders, and determining Germany’s status in the EC,
NATO, and other international institutions.52 By knowing the issues ahead of time, Bush
begin developing methods to get the Four Powers to compromise on their conflicting
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interests without undermining Germany’s reunification. He could also prepare responses
for the most difficult issues.
Of these issues, the most pressing were establishing Germany's border, and East
Germany’s ties to the Soviet Union. The issue with Germany’s border was caused by
German territorial claims in Poland. Bush learned that most European states would
require this issue resolved before Germany reunified. The second concern was a reunited
Germany’s position in Europe’s security infrastructure. Since FRG was a NATO member
and GDR was in the Warsaw Pact, the United States had to convince the Soviet Union to
accept Germany’s membership in NATO even if it did not join the Warsaw Pact. Bush’s
ability to get the Soviet Union to accept a reunified Germany in NATO presented the
largest obstacle to German reunification. This was especially true if Bush could not
provide sufficient remuneration for Soviet military and economic loses after the GDR
dissolved. This encouraged Bush to implement a strategy of cautious cooperation with
the Soviet Union, and to observe the changing situation in Eastern Europe and the
influences it had on Soviet policy decisions.53
With this knowledge, the Bush administration undertook studies understand the
role of warming US-Soviet relations in the reunification process. This was necessary as
the democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were pushing the
Soviets to relinquish control and influence, and Bush did not want to jeopardize their
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revolutions as Germany reunified.54 Bush’s administration recognized that the United
States could not afford a misstep in the reunification process or it risked threatening, if
not undoing, the democratic revolution in those other states. In this situation, maintaining
a cautious cooperation with the Soviet Union was key to prevent any act of Soviet
repression in Eastern Europe. Bush also determined that German unification was not
worth endangering the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, especially if reuniting
Germany would provoke the Soviet Union to initiate repressive measures to regain
control and influence. Bush’s ability to determine which interests in Europe were most
important to American security would determine the how far he was willing to cooperate
with the other parties involved in Germany’s reunification. It would also help him decide
what interests he was willing to compromise on, and how far that compromise would
reach.55
The first hurdle Bush faced reunifying Germany was figuring out the best way to
end Allied occupation powers over the two Germanys. The Bush administration
determined that there were three ways to accomplish this. First, the Four Powers could
stand aside and allow the Germanys to reunify since there was no legal precedent that
required Allied approval for German reunification. While Bush could possibly persuade
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Britain and French to accept this method, the Soviet Union would require Allied approval
for German reunification.56
The second option was for the Four Powers to individually renounce their powers.
However, doing so came with one major disadvantage. While the United States could
convince the British, and French to renounce their occupational powers, the Soviet Union
would only renounce their powers after making a separate settlement with the Germanys
on security and economic issues. The administration determined that any separate SovietGerman settlement could undermine Western interests in Germany and NATO.57
The third option was to hold a conference to resolve any issues surrounding
Germany’s reunification. However, the administration did not prefer this method because
it gave the Soviet Union an opportunity to make demands that could stall or prevent the
Germanys from reuniting. Yet, developments revealed that the third option was preferred
by the Soviets, Britain, France, and most of Europe. Therefore, Bush prepared to
participate in a conference knowing that he would have to negotiate competing
interests.58
Therefore, it was paramount that Bush maintain cooperation between the
countries to prevent Cold War antagonisms from derailing the reunification of Germany.
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Bush’s ability to manage and reach compromises among the conflicting desires would
determine the success of Germany’s reunification. With the fluid situation in Eastern
Europe, Bush’s successes and failures maintaining international cooperation during
German reunification would set a standard for future cooperative security engagements
after Germany’s reunification.59
To decrease the chances of disagreements undermining the conference, Bush and
his administration decided to limit the talk’s agenda. The Bush administration decided
that the agenda would focus on getting the Four Powers to agree to a method to end
occupation powers over Germany. Then they would discuss Allied troop deployments in
the Germany and Berlin. They would also establish Germany’s permanent borders and
resolve German territorial claims in Poland. The administration’s decision to limit the
conference to these points was to limit the obstacles the conference would encounter that
could stop the reunification process.60
The administration also explored the main sources of tension that would emerge
during the talks. Bush’s staff contended that American desires to keep a reunified
Germany in NATO would clash with Soviet desires for Germany to remain in the
Warsaw Pact or make Germany a neutral country.61 The administration believed that the
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Soviet Union would present the most obstacles to American desires, while the British and
French were more likely to follow America’s lead so long as they received satisfactory
guarantees to their concerns. This would require Bush maintain America’s presence in
Europe as it re-evaluated its security arrangements as a counterbalance to reunited
Germany.62
Therefore, Bush’s efforts to successfully reunite Germany would rely on his
ability to get Soviet cooperation and compromises with American goals. It would also
require Bush to cooperate and compromise with the British and French on their security
concerns, while ensuring that none of compromises Germany made threatened German
sovereignty. Even as Bush cooperated with the Four Powers, he aligned more with the
Western Europeans because the Cold War had not ended. This ensured that Bush looked
upon Soviet proposals warily while he attempted to maintain the warm US-Soviet, and
while ensuring that American and German desires were met.
Bush’s ability to navigate the competing desires of American allies, the
Germanys, and the Soviet Union would determine the success or failure of German
reunification. At the same time, the pressure that European concerns placed on the United
States revealed the growing independence of America’s Cold War from US leadership in
matters of their own security. While Bush contended that the United States still had
important interests in Europe, the changing dynamic of the Cold War also changed USWestern European relations. Bush’s ability to cooperate with a changing Europe
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demonstrated his flexibility that would after the Cold War, and how he could use
cooperative security arrangements to respond to larger international crises.
Bush’s desire to preserve the spread of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe,
meant the United States would find that the most difficult aspect of reunification would
be the other Four Powers. They recognized that each country had individual concerns
about Germany’s position in Europe, and all shared fears that a reunified Germany would
threaten Europe again. The administration recognized that Bush’s ability to steer the
reunification process, get all four countries to agree, and avoid any issues or debates that
could stop the reunification process would test his leadership and diplomatic skills. It
would also test how well the administration could work with the Soviet Union without
endangering the improvement in US-Soviet relations, and avoid pushing the Soviet Union
out of the process.63 The administration’s ability to predetermine the challenges it would
face in the reunification process enabled Bush to develop responses publicly and
diplomatically that could limit or reverse those obstacles. These studies also prepared the
administration to undertake similar studies on conflicting interests among US allies when
participating in a multilateral intervention in the post-Cold War period. By understanding
its allies contradicting interests the Bush and American policymakers could better ensure
international cooperation.
Along with observing the Soviet Union, Bush and his administration also
monitored Western Europeans concerns about German reunification. The Bush

Memorandum, “The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights” n.d., folder Gray C.
Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File, OAID CF01824-016 “Germany – Reunification” White
House Counsel’s Office George H. W Bush Presidential Library.
63

41

administration decided the best way to complete Germany’s reunification was to
cooperate more with the Western governments towards obtaining a consensus to limit
Soviet influences in the talks. This included convincing Germany to voluntarily accept
constraints and commitments that would satisfy European concerns, while also
convincing the Western European leads to accept a reunified Germany with full
sovereignty. This required Bush to negate Britain and France security concerns by
guaranteeing American assistance against German aggression to create a united front that
would discourage Soviet opposition.64
NSC Policy Evaluations of Eastern Europe
The continued adherence to Cold War attitudes among Bush’s staff and advisors
hindered the administration’s ability to adjust policies to European crises and conflicts.
While this was true of much of Bush’s administration and less so of Bush who practiced
diplomatic realism, some of Bush’s policymakers recognized the need for more of the
administration to adapt US policies to the changing situation in Europe. Those that
suggested policy changes that changing US policies would prevent the United States from
endangering improved US-Soviet relations, and worsening the instabilities in Eastern
Europe. Robert Blackwill, special assistant to the president for European and Soviet
Affairs, and Condoleezza Rice, director of NSC Soviet and East European Affairs

Memorandum Germany Task Force “Settlement of the German Question” n.d. folder Gray, C.
Boyden Files Confidential Alpha Subject File OAID CF01824-016 “Germany – Reunification” White
House Counsel’s Office George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
64

42

department, were among those members of the Bush’s administration that supported
implementing policies that were more attentive to the situation in Europe.65
In a letter to Brent Scowcroft, Blackwill wrote that many in the administration
failed to recognize the repercussions of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union on the Cold War status quo and US policies. He wrote, “I am confident that
we are as critically in need of such a reconceptualization/action plan as we were in the
spring of last year.”66 Blackwill pointed to ending the administration’s fixation on
traditional Cold War strategies and interests, and urged the administration to begin
formulating policies based on the existing situation.67
Condoleezza Rice joined Blackwill in proposing the NSC adjust US policies and
national security interests in response to changes in Eastern Europe. Condoleezza Rice
argued that much of the administration lacked general knowledge of the Soviet Union,
and the changes that perestroika had brought. Rice continued:
“The U.S. government is shaping policy toward the Soviet Union from functions
and regional perspectives rather than from the point of view of the overall
relationship. More importantly, these policies are developed with little
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understanding of the deep chaos into which the Soviet Union is sinking or the
impact our policies have on a very unstable situation there.”68
She argued that as the Soviet Union grew more unstable the Kremlin would become
overwhelmed by internal matters, and the United States would pay a heavy price for an
inattentive policy towards the Soviet Union.69 Rice and Blackwill revealed that the
administration needed to adjust its policies toward the Soviet Union in ways that reflected
the turmoil occurring there. The changing dynamics in the Soviet Union required a policy
and strategy reassessment to avoid exacerbating the instabilities in the Soviet Union. The
move to reunify Germany was one of many causes of Soviet instability, and if the
administration failed to correctly analyze the strains on Soviet leaders then the Bush
administration risked Soviet cooperation during Germany’s reunification. Since the
reunification of German required the cooperation of the Four Powers, Bush could ill
afford to implement policies that would undermine US-Soviet relations and the
reunification talks. Rice’s and Blackwill’s critique of the administration’s policy
weaknesses point to entrenched Cold War ideologies that were preventing policy
changes.
Despite the changes occurring in Eastern Europe, the United States could not
ignore that the Soviet Union remained the only other nation in the world capable of
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matching American military strength, and possessed the most powerful European
military. This fact drove the administration’s policies during the reunification of
Germany as much as Cold War attitudes. In a letter to Kohl before the Two-Plus-Four
talks began Bush wrote:
“Even if, as we hope, the Soviet Union withdraws all its troops from Eastern
Europe, it will still remain far and away the most powerful single military power
in Europe. U.S. troops in Germany and elsewhere on the continent, backed by a
credible deterrent, must in my view continue to help preserve the security of the
West…As our two countries journey together through this time of hope and
promise, we can remain confident of our shared ability to defend the fruits of
freedom.”70
Bush’s letter reveals that his administration continued to fear the Soviets would resort to
military repression and resume expansionist polices in Eastern Europe in response to
instability and its declining influence. If the Soviet’s resorted to military force to regain
control in Eastern Europe it would eliminate any improvement in US-Soviet relations, or
the possibility of reuniting Germany. Despite the Soviet’s continued military threat, Bush
understood that he could not avoid working with the Soviets, and that his best strategy
was to convince the Soviet’s to acquiesce to Western preferences.
NSC Suggestions to Ensure German Reunification
Beginning in 1990, the NSC posited that the United States could develop policies
that were not limited to the strategy of containment, and included policies that supported
Soviet restraint in Eastern Europe and improved US-Soviet relations. The NSC contended
Gorbachev’s reforms had given the United States an opportunity to promote integrating

70

Letter George Bush to Helmut Kohl, n.d. folder Blackwill, Robert D Files Subject Files OAID
CF00182-020 “[German Reunification 11/89-6/90]” National Security Council, George H. W. Bush
Presidential Library.

45

the Soviet Union into the international system. This did not mean that the United States
would not continue to monitor the Soviet Union. Instead, the NSC decided “the United
States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue, and institution by
institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that the Soviet leadership
itself has enunciated.”71 The NSC determined the best policy the US could take towards
the Soviet Union was to support and encourage additional reform policies. However, for
this strategy to succeed the NSC contended the policy needed to recognize that
Gorbachev’s reforms came at high cost to Soviet economic and political systems,
regardless of the benefits to the United States. The NSC continued that the changes
Gorbachev initiated contradicted the Soviet objective for the past forty years, and if his
policies create too much instability it would provide Gorbachev’s opponents with an
opportunity to remove him from power.72 If this occurred it was highly likely that the
Soviet Union would resume repressive policies to maintain influence in Eastern Europe,
including restoring the communist party to power in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and GDR.
The NSC believed that if German reunification caused the Soviet Union too many
problems or the GDR became too unstable, the Soviets might militarily intervene. Should
the Soviet intervene in the GDR it was more likely the Soviets would also intervene in
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The NSC contended that a Soviet intervention in
Eastern Europe would threaten improved East-West relations and US-Soviet relations.
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This did not mean that the other allies were not threats the reunification of Germany, but
that the British and French were the less likely to act if they disapproved of the direction
reunification took.73
Soviet Questions
On 19 December 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze posed seven
questions to the European Parliament that expressed Soviet conditions to begin the
reunification of Germany. These questioned included guarantees against future German
aggression, the roles a reunited Germany would have in Europe, and how German would
establish its permanent border and resolve its territorial claims in Poland. He raised issues
about the structure and mission of Germany’s military, and the possibility of a
demilitarized and neutral Germany with restructured ties to Eastern Europe. He
questioned what attitudes Germany had about Allied troop presence after reunification
and the 1971 quadripartite agreement. Shevardnadze also raised questions about the
reunification process. He questioned if German reunification would abide by the Helsinki
process, if it would lead to constructive developments that overcame the division of
Europe, and if the Germans were willing to include other European interests and
collective action as part of the process.74
Shevardnadze’s questions came from many influences that included European
fears of Germany’s past and the threat a reunified Germany posed to European security

Memorandum, Brent Scowcroft to George Bush, “Responding to Soviet Calls for a German
Peace Conference” n.d., folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414-004 “German
Reunification [2]” National Security Council George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
73

Memorandum, Directorate of Intelligence “An Analysis of Shevardnadze’s Seven Questions on
German Unification” December 29, 1989, folder Hutchings, Robert L. Files Country File OAID CF01414003 “German Reunification [1]” National Security Council, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
74

47

and peace. There were also economic concerns as a reunified Germany would resume its
place as the largest economy in Europe which would require the Western states to adjust
their economic policies. From these seven questions, the administration recognized how
strongly the Soviets feared the repercussions of German reunification, and that the
Soviets would be less inclined to oppose German reunification if these concerns and
interests were addressed during the talks conducted. They also realized that the Soviets
were ambiguous about how far they would push a reunited Germany security and
economic concerns.75 Shevardnadze’s questions provided the Bush administration with a
foundation to understand where any Soviet opposition would occur and an opportunity to
prepare solutions that would prevent the Soviet Union from hindering the process. It also
made it easier for Bush to avoid any problems that would inhibit cooperation between the
former, and to resolve any problems that occurred.
Following Shevardnadze’s speech, the administration recognized that the Soviet
Union opposed a quick reunification in preference for a phased eight to ten-year
reunification process. However, with euphoria and internal support growing, the Germans
were highly likely to oppose efforts to impose a lengthy timeframe for Germany’s
reunification, demilitarization, or neutrality. Additionally, Soviet desires to keep
Germany out of NATO would be opposed by the United States and Western Europe, as
they would view it as a threat to their security.76 Thus the administration had to convince
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the Soviets to cooperate on measures that it opposed, while maintaining cohesion with the
British and French. This required Bush and his staff to understand the web of
contradicting interests and desires among its former WWII allies, which would prove
crucial once the Two-Plus-Four talks began in the summer of 1990.
Conflicting Western European Interests
While the administration was focused on the conditions and proposals the Soviets
might make, they also analyzed the interests the other countries involved had in the
reunification process. The administration noted that FRG would prefer a treaty that
ratified an agreement between the two Germanys. The administration posited it could
convince the FRG to accept a peace conference if some Soviet conditions were
acceptable, and the conditions placated the rest of Europe. In the GDR, the administration
noted that the GDR would use the talks to prolong its existence as it was most likely that
the FRG would absorb the GDR to create a single German state.
The administration noted that while the British and French did not agree with all
the Soviet’s proposals, there were some proposals those two countries agreed with. This
included resolving reunification through an international conference, especially one that
was slow and organized. However, neither country would publically announce their
support for these proposals, and they would only support them if the FRG did. Outside of
the main six, Poland expected the conference to resolve Germany’s territorial claims on
its territory. Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe also expected the conference to avert
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Soviet repressive measures that would thwart their democratic movements.77 While not
every country that was analyzed was participating in Germany’s reunification, Bush
needed this information to cooperate with the other Four Powers to successfully resolve
the issued around Germany’s reunification. Bush would have to juggle multiple agendas
to achieve as many US objectives as possible.
The administration’s analysts contended that it was in US interests for the Four
Powers to resolved the German situation. Additionally, analysts proposed waiting until
after FRG elections in December 1990 to begin any conference between the Germanys
and the Four Powers on Germany reunification. However, they recognized that if the
FRG agreed with Gorbachev on a peace conference it would be impossible to delay the
conference until after the elections. They continued that a FRG and Soviet agreement on
a peace conference should not prevent the United States from rejecting Soviet proposals
for reunified Germany that was not a member of NATO. It defended this assertion that:
“Given the difficulties of managing a peace conference proposal issued by a
desperate Gorbachev, our aim should be to ensure that such a Soviet initiative
never comes to pass. This means using such influence as we have to slow down
artfully the reunification process this year and bring some order and predictability
to it—for our sake as well as Gorbachev’s.”78
The CIA added that West Europeans were worried about integrating East
Germany into the EC and the monetary union. They pointed to Europeans fears that a
rushed reunification would create new problems or worsen existing ones in the EC. The
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CIA contended that though the British and French could not slow down the move toward
German reunification, the two countries might try to delay it, especially if Germany
appeared insensitive to EC concerns. Along with Britain and France, Eastern European
nations wanted a managed reunification process that could be used later to integrate their
states into Western Europe. The CIA concluded that they expected legal reunification to
complete within one year.79 Despite these concerns from US allies and other friendly
states, a unified Germany served US interests in Europe. It served US security interests as
a member of NATO because it strengthened NATO, whereas a neutral Germany
weakened NATO and threatened European security. In addition, reunifying Germany
served a significant lessening of East-West tensions, and further opened the Iron Curtain.
With this information, Bush and his administration entered negotiations with its former
WWII allies to reunify Germany.
Last Minute Concerns
On 30 January 1990, the CIA reported that there were scenarios that would hinder
the move toward German reunification. The CIA based its scenarios on the unstable
political climate in Eastern Europe that could become a source of tension in East-West
relations. The CIA argued that the scenarios were: if GDR freely elected a government
that achieved impressive economic growth and resisted political and economic
domination by FRG; the FRG hesitated to move forward on reunification due to popular
resentment over associated costs; the four powers required a neutral Germany as a

Memorandum, “Update on European Views of German Unification and the Two-Plus-Four
Dynamic” April 4, 1990, folder Blackwill, Robert D Files Subject File, OAID CF00182-021 “[German
Reunification 11/89-6/90] [2]” National Security Council, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
79

51

prerequisite of reunification or Kohl was replaced; the Soviet Union intervened or
threatened to intervene militarily; Moscow used international methods to obstruct
German reunification; or refused to withdraw its troops after a settlement, especially if
Gorbachev lost power. The CIA postulated these were highly unlikely to occur, but due
to the political climate in Europe felt that the administration should be aware of them
while preparing for the Two-Plus-Four.80 Even as Bush prepared to convince the other
Four Powers, their cooperation was constantly threatened by the changing environment in
Europe and Cold War tensions. As the Soviet Union was withdrawing around the world,
Soviet leaders desired to maintain some influence in Eastern Europe. However, Bush was
unwilling to allow Soviet desires to affect Germany’s future in Europe or American
interests there.
In a memorandum that updated the situation in Europe and Germany’s
reunification, the CIA reported that the East German election had strengthened Kohl’s
negotiating position, and dashed French, British and most of Europe’s hopes that the
election would slow the move toward German reunification. In addition, the FRG and
GDR had agreed to use Article 2381 of the FRG Basic Laws (constitution) to integrate the
GDR into the FRG. It noted that the French and British supported this decision because
Article 23 created an orderly path to reunification, kept Germany in NATO, and
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preserved Allied influence in future talks on German reunification. The CIA also reported
that despite the successful vote, the Germans still needed to pacify Western European
nations on their stances toward the EC and border issues with Poland. This was
particularly important as many European states were concerned about Germany’s
territorial claims in Poland, despite Kohl’s public announcements renouncing those
claims.82 These final developments in Germany, set the situation that Bush would
negotiate with the Four Powers to reunify Germany. These events also answered many of
the questions regarding the way that reunification would occur and a created a clearer
picture of everyone’s interests in Germany’s reunification. This included knowing that
the fiercest debates would be with the Soviet Union over Germany’s role in integrated
European economic and security institution. With this knowledge, Bush set out to
cooperate with the other Four Powers on German reunification.

Two-Plus-Four and German Reunification
In February 1990, Secretary Baker and Bush had meetings with the foreign
ministers of Britain, France, and West Germany. During these talks, Bush and Baker
convinced the others that the Four Powers should resolve Germany’s reunification. Upon
gaining a Western consensus, Baker met with Shevardnadze and gained Soviet support
for a Four Powers conference on Germany’s reunification. After this, Bush and Baker
convinced the British, French, and Soviets that the two Germanys should be involved in
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the conference from the beginning, and not brought in after the Four Powers had
established the initial policies for reunification.83
Bush and Baker also convinced the others that only the two Germanys and Four
Powers should formally participate in the discussions. They argued that only the Four
Powers had the legal authority to reunify Germany and the FRG opposed NATO or
CSCE involvement. In between meetings at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa,
Canada, the Bush administration finalized the framework for the Two-Plus-Four talks.
Baker confirmed the framework for the Two-Plus-Four Talks, and gained Gorbachev’s
consent that the Two-Plus-Four Talk would occur after the GDR elections in March.
They also agreed to format the Two-Plus-Four Talks as a series of monthly meetings to
resolve all international questions by November 1990 in time for the FRG to have allGerman elections.84
Bush and Baker’s ability to get the Four Powers and Germanys to cooperate relied
on the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These changes
warmed US-Soviet relations, and enabled democratic movements to reintegrate Eastern
Europe with the West. These changes did not eliminate Cold War attitudes, as the Bush
and his administration continued to worry that the Soviet Union would resume repressive
tactics in Eastern Europe. However, the negotiations that Bush and Baker conducted with
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the Soviet Union demonstrated that US-Soviet cooperation was possible. Like the Yalta
and Potsdam conferences ideological differences limited cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Yet determining Eastern and Western Europe’s future was
more pressing than ideological differences, especially when political changes threatened
instability and European security.
Two-Plus-Four Talks
The six parties met in Bonn, FRG on 14 March 1990 to establish protocols for the
following meetings, before the first Two-Plus-Four meeting was held in Berlin on 5 May.
During this preliminary meeting, the participants agreed to hold all meetings on German
soil alternating between the FRG and GDR. The participants concurred that all decisions
would occur through consensus, and no other country could formally join the talks
though Poland would be invited to participate when the talks discussed the GermanPolish border. They also assented that the talks would resolve the occupational powers
for the Four Powers.85 These steps set the stage for cooperation during the talks.
Despite these agreements, the six still held significant differences on important
issues that could undermine Western cohesion. The British and French wanted to resolve
the German-Polish border before the talks progressed too far. There was also a
disagreement on the form of the final settlement. The FRG opposed calling the resolution
a peace treaty because they viewed a peace treaty as humiliating and that it insinuated
that the war was not over. On the other hand, the Soviets approved describing the
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solution a peace treaty because the Four Powers were relinquishing their occupation
powers over Germany. The Four Powers also disagreed about the scope of the talk’s
agenda. The Bush wanted to focus solely on ending occupation authority and legally
reunifying Germany, while the Soviets wanted a broader agenda that included Germany’s
membership in NATO, the future deployment of Allied troops in Germany, and the status
of nuclear weapons on German soil.86 Eventually, the six agreed to a limited agenda of
devolution of Four Powers for the Two-Plus-Four Talks, and that a reunited Germany and
the Allies would determine Germany’s security standing in the future, and not to
constrain Germany’s sovereignty by denying it the right to self-defense or to determine
its own military and diplomatic alliances.87
The Two-Plus-Four Talks and the reunification of Germany proceeded in monthly
sessions among the six foreign ministers through the summer of 1990. In the final treaty,
the Four Powers relinquished their rights, removed occupation forces from Berlin, and
supported a reunited Germany’s sovereignty without outside controls or constraints. The
treaty established that Germany’s borders were permanently established on the combined
borders of FRG, GDR, and Berlin, and reunited Germany abandoned all territorial claims
in Poland. Germany declared l all acts of preparations for or acts of aggression other
unconstitutional. Finally, the reunified Germany agreed not to produce or possess
weapons of mass destruction and to reduce its military personnel to 370,000 ground, air,
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and naval forces combined. The Soviets agreed to remove their forces from Berlin and
GDR by 1994, and the other three Four Powers agreed keep their forces in Berlin at
Germany’s request.88
Conclusions
Due to Gorbachev’s policies and leadership, the Soviet Union underwent a period
of political reform that weakened its power and influence. These changes made it
possible for the Berlin Wall to open in 1989. However, these changes did not guarantee
that the Germanys would reunite. Instead, continued changes and Bush’s diplomatic
efforts convinced the Four Powers to end their occupation authority and support German
reunification. Bush’s understanding of the situation in Europe made it easier for him to
manage and maintain six’s Four Powers and Germanys cooperation to resolve the issues
surrounding reunifying Germany. At the same time, Bush’s administration began to
realize that the changes occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union warranted a reevaluation of US policies towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, Cold
War attitudes were deeply entrenched and difficult to overcome. Thus, the Bush
administration remained most concerned about Soviet reaction to developments in
Germany and Eastern Europe. This did not prevent the Bush administration from
cooperating with Soviet leaders while pushing its own preferences for Germany’s future.
While the Bush cooperated with Soviet leaders to reunify Germany, those efforts
resembled the Yalta and Potsdam conferences where the United States and the Soviet
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Union, discussed the future of the Europe and the world despite their ideological
differences. German reunification was not another period of détente between the United
States and Soviet Union. Instead the reunification of Germany would prove that the Cold
War was ending. This continued as the international community responded to the Iraq
invasion of Kuwait. During this conflict, the United States led a multinational coalition,
that included the Soviet Union, against Iraq and eventually successfully defeated Iraqi
forces during the First Gulf War in Spring 1991. Bush once again demonstrated his
diplomatic skills and flexibility cooperating with nations with diverging interests and
agendas to successfully resolve Iraq aggression.
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CHAPTER III - BUSH, THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, AND THE NEW WORLD
ORDER
Introduction
By 1990, US-Soviet relations had improved as the Soviet Union abandoned
repressive policies that used military power to maintain influence and control in Eastern
Europe. These changes led to democratic revolutions in Hungary, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and reunification of Germany. As this
occurred, the threat of war between the United States and the Soviet Union decreased as
regional instabilities and conflicts rose. Diminished Soviet influence around the world
allowed the United States to develop national security strategies and foreign policies that
were less focused on containing Soviet expansion, and to re-evaluate US relationships
around the world. These re-evaluations led some countries, like Iraq and Yugoslavia, to
lose American support, as these states were no longer deemed necessary partners to
defend US interests abroad. These re-evaluations also meant that the United States was
more likely to support international opposition against its former friends when they acted
aggressively. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Saddam Hussein learned quickly that
the United States would no longer turn a blind eye to his aggressive acts against his
neighbors in the Persian Gulf.
This chapter argues that following the reunification of Germany and successful
cooperative efforts with some of its WWII allies, the United States led by Bush continued
to re-evaluate US national interests and security strategies. The culmination of this reevaluation would become Bush’s New World Order that emphasized collective security,
international liberalism, and the rule of law as the paths to secure global security and
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stability. While this differed from the strategy of containment, Bush’s New World Order
continued themes in US foreign policy of global stability and international cooperation to
deter aggression to defend the United States and its interests since the founding of the
nation. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Bush used his military and diplomatic
experiences to implement policies and strategies based on the New World Order that
allowed him to gain and maintain international cooperation to end Iraq’s illegal
annexation Kuwait. Before his election to the presidency, Bush had served as a fighter
pilot in the U.S. Navy during WWII, U.S. House of Representatives for Texas, US
Ambassador to the United Nations, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China, and
Director of Central Intelligence agency and Vice President to Ronald Reagan. These
senior positions provided Bush with military, foreign policy, and intelligence experience
that he would rely on during his presidency. His experiences in the UN ensured that Bush
was familiar with the way the UN worked, his UN post and position as Vice President
ensured that Bush had numerous contacts and relations with other foreign leaders that he
could use for the Persian Gulf Crisis.
The Persian Gulf Crisis89 also allowed Bush to publicize his views and strategies
for the new period, and transition US national security strategy and foreign policies away
from the strategy of containment. The change in the global environment as the
international community responded to Iraqi aggression demonstrated that most Cold War
attitudes had been overcome.
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Iraqi Behavior in the Persian Gulf
The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was a consequence of the Iraq-Iran War, which was
fought from1980 to 1988. The Iraq-Iran War began over Hussein’s desire control Iranian
oil fields along the Iraq-Iran border. During the war, Hussein borrowed billions of dollars
from Kuwait. After the war ended in a ceasefire Iraq owed Kuwait a large debt. This led
Hussein to bully Kuwait and Iraq’s other neighbors to force them to raise oil prices, and
forgive Iraqi debt from the war. Hussein’s behavior peaked in July 1990 when Tariq
Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, delivered a letter to the Arab League that accused Kuwait
of several charges. The charges included that Kuwait was guilty of military aggression
against Iraq for refusing to settle the Iraq-Kuwaiti boundary dispute, refusing to forgive
the multi-billion Iraqi debt to Kuwait, and pumping more oil than the agreed OPEC
production quotas. When the Arab League failed to force Kuwait to provide Iraq with a
satisfactory response, Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait.90
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was quickly met with international outrage and
condemnation. Following American leadership, the international community cooperated
to isolate Iraq, and defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. As Bush
cooperated with the other nations with interests ending Iraq’s invasion, he and his
administration began implementing the policy changes advocated by Blackwill and Rice
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during efforts to reunify Germany.91 Bush’s response to the Persian Gulf Crisis
formalized the policy revisions he and his administration had initiated. Additionally, Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait forced Bush to re-evaluate his policies to maintain stability in
the Persian Gulf, and US interests in the region. This was part of a trend of re-evaluating
US interests around the world, and understanding which allied and friendly states could
support US efforts since the Soviet Union was no longer America’s greatest adversary to
global security.
Bush’s National Security Strategy: 1990-1991
In his first national security strategy, Bush acknowledged the successful defense
of American national interests during the Cold War, and he noted that in the post-Cold
War period changes were occurring:
The familiar moorings of postwar security policy are being loosened by
developments that were barely imagined years or even months ago. Yet our goals
and interests remain constant. And, as we look toward—and hope for—a better
tomorrow, we must also look to those elements of our past policy that have played
a major role in bringing us to where we are today. It is our steadfastness over four
decades that has brought us to this moment of historic opportunity. We will not let
that opportunity pass, nor will we shrink from the challenges created by new
conditions.92
Bush wrote that Cold War national security strategies had focused on containing the
Soviet Union expansion and dominance in Europe and Asia through diplomatic,
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economic, and military means. He continued that this strategy had created conditions and
opportunities that allowed the United States to emerge as a global leader with a primary
duty to ensure the stability of the international community. He argued that as Soviet
dissolution brought changes to the international situation, America’s goals, values, and
responsibility to maintain global security and stability remained the same.93 While the
United States no longer needed to defend the world from communism, the world
remained threatened by international acts of aggression and internal conflicts that
threatened world stability and security.
Bush contended that America’s national interests were to first deter aggression
and improve strategic stability; and second to encourage greater recognition of human
rights, free market principles, free elections, and restrained military spending in the
Soviet Union.94 To accomplish this, Bush continued significant principles from the
strategy of containment. This included continuing the US reliance on flexible options to
deter and respond to aggression. It also required the United States to seek out alliances
with other states that shared American values and security interests to create a system of
collective security.95 At the same time he combined these principles with theories and
policies from before the Cold War. Even as the Cold War came to an end, US
policymakers had a difficult time breaking away from Cold War attitudes and strategies.
that had defended US national interests for over forty years. Bush realized that containing
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outbreaks of aggression around the world served US interests better that containing the
insolvent Soviet Union. He also noted that while the United States had the military
prowess to defend its interests unilaterally, it was in America’s interests to cooperate with
international friends and allies.
Bush noted, “The security environment we face in the 1990s is more hopeful, but
in many ways also more uncertain than at any time in the recent past.”96 He contended
that the United States faced numerous questions about how to ensure international
stability as global interdependence and multipolarity rose out of the disintegration of the
US-Soviet bipolarity. There were also questions about the character of America’s new
leadership role in a post-Cold War international environment, how the United States
should plan for reversals of strategic gains, and determine what risks to its interests the
United States was willing to accept. Bush was also concerned about the adaptability of
US forces to changing situations as the USSR collapsed, the viability of diplomatic
efforts to maintain cohesion with allies and friendly countries as their common threat
weakened, and the future of post-Soviet Europe.97
From this point, Bush and his administration created a post-Cold War framework
for US foreign policy to create a future that was more peaceful and hopeful than the past.
It was a grand strategy that recognized the possible holes left by the end of the US-Soviet
rivalry, and what those holes meant for alliances based on Cold War antagonisms. The
administration also prepared to respond to changes in international conflicts, though it
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would fail to recognize that the destabilization brought by the Soviet Union’s collapse
would lead to intra-state conflicts that would threaten US interests. The administration
also understood that the Cold War’s end would force all countries to adapt their
diplomatic and military strategies. It also understood that the United States would need to
adjust how it established cooperative efforts and initiated multinational responses to
international aggression. These insights prepared the United States for some of the chaos
that would follow the end of the Cold War. After successfully using Bush’s new strategy
during the Persian Gulf Crisis, these insights, especially those about the nature of future
conflicts, would leave Bush struggling to implement his New World Order strategy
elsewhere.
In the post-Cold War era, the United States remained a superpower and a world
leader, but in the new world environment without the Cold War dichotomy Bush would
have to direct the world toward collective action to create a future of global stability and
peace. As part of his national security strategy, Bush promoted the rule of law, diplomatic
solutions for regional conflicts, maintaining regional balances of power, and promoting
the spread of democratic institutions. It would also support humanitarianism, trade, and
financial policies that promoted economic, social, and political progress throughout the
world. It would also pledge the United States to protect democratic institutions from
aggressions, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and drug trafficking.98 Bush’s
1990 national security strategy outlined the most important aspects of his New World
Order—collective security and deterring aggression, and he would finalize the New
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World Order throughout preparations for the Persian Gulf War. Thus, even as Bush’s
post-Cold War framework was in development, he had determined the direction he
wanted to take the United States—to lead the world toward collective action to deter
aggression and to defend peace.
The New World Order
During this period, Bush introduced a new perspective on American national
security that included a non-containment framework for his policies. However, Bush
would not begin explaining this strategy until the buildup for Operation Desert Storm.
The Bush called his new strategy the “New World Order,” and he in multiple statements
argued his strategy would help the world eliminate terrorism, pursue justice stronger,
improve security to bring about peace, and promote a harmonious and prosperous global
community. He also contended his New World Order strategy would create new ways for
nations to cooperate, and deter aggression.99 Additionally, the New World Order would
introduce a different type of global security that emphasized an enduring international
commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes and solidarity against aggression.
Bush rejected any notions that the New World Order would create a Pax Americana or
was a euphemism for the United States as world policeman. Instead, he posited that the
New World Order strategy would help the United States act as one of several leaders
among nations and within international organizations.100
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Bush’s description of the New World Order Woodrow Wilson’s call for the
League of Nations after WWI to avoid another world war and to bring about world peace.
Bush’s call for international cooperation to address aggression and crises revealed the
Bush wanted the United State to be a leader in the global community not the leader of
the world. Bush’s strategy looked as the United States’ position as the world’s only
superpower, and created a strategy that emphasized multilateralism while leaving
unilateral action as an option when necessary to defend US interests. Even with unilateral
action still available, Bush’s plan for America’s post-Cold War leadership had a greater
emphasis on collaboration with friends and allies. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait tested the
feasibility of Bush’s framework in the post-Cold War world, and how far Bush’s ideas
would be accepted by the international community. Bush’s ability to help lead the
international opposition to Iraqi aggression would determine the possibilities for future
international cooperation that Bush wanted to become the standard for the emerging era.
As Bush continued to discuss the New World Order strategy, the administration
noted that New World Order strategy could be described by multiple principles and
theories—a commonwealth of nations governed by the Rule of Law, nations joined in
collective action against aggression, liberal or democratic internationalism, or a global
partnership of nations pursuing peace, security, and justice. The administration noted that
these many of these theories were incompatible with each other. They also noted that
justifying the intervention in the Persian Gulf through some principles and theories, like
the rule of law, was problematic because historically the UN charter had been applied
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arbitrarily even though it was internationally accepted. Additionally, many Persian Gulf
regimes did not abide by the rule of law or adhere the other theories.101
The multiple influences in the New World Order strategy pulled on American
traditions since Woodrow Wilson and World War I, that used American leadership to
encourage international cooperation to deter aggression. The New World Order strategy
also demonstrated that Bush recognized that crises and conflicts would continue after the
Cold War. He also accepted that without the US-Soviet rivalry he would face new
challenges and had to use different means to secure international cooperation, even with
support from US allies. The memo showed that would struggles similar to main struggle
Bush faced would be generating consensus among international leaders that no longer
had a unifying threat to their interests as he attempted to establish international
cooperation. However, the crisis created by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait created a
temporary threat that the world united against because it bridged any differences or
conflicts among the nations.
National Security Policy Toward the Middle East
After World War II, US interests in the Middle East increased as part of the policy
to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union, protect Israel, and gain access to cheap oil.
To contain communism, the United States initiated military and diplomatic arrangements
with strategically important Middle Eastern countries including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran,
Israel, Kuwait, and others. In the 1950s and 1960s, nationalist and anti-American
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movements produced regime changes in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and other
countries experienced major instability that altered America’s security strategies in the
Middle East. In response, the United States increased economic and military support for
those countries that continued to support US policies in the region.102
Along with political relationships, the United States has been involved with
Middle Eastern oil since 1928, though it was not until after WWII that oil became a
national security interest. After the end of WWII, the world’s demand for oil increased,
and the oil embargo during the 1970’s shifted power from oil consuming countries to oil
producing ones. However, the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, oil
conservation measures, and an alliance with Saudi Arabia protected the United States
from the oil hike in 1979 caused by the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War. The
combination of those methods also lessened the influence oil diplomacy could have on
the United States. By the mid-1980s, US oil policy shifted from defense against oil
supply instabilities to defending oil producing countries from regional or international
threats. To defend the Persian Gulf region, the United States aligned with Iraq. This
relationship remained in place until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 decreasing
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America’s need to rely on Iraq to defend the oil producing Persian Gulf countries against
Soviet expansionism.103
As America’s national security and foreign policies towards the Middle Eastern
changed in response to the changing international situation some policies remained
constant including maintaining access to oil. However, other policies the United States
had implemented changed the ways the United States went about protecting its oil
interest in the Persian Gulf. For instance, without the Soviet threat the United States no
longer needed Iraq to defend the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the United States became less
forgiving of Iraqi aggression, though the government had some difficulties expressing
this change diplomatically, or acknowledging Hussein’s willingness to use aggression to
achieve his goals. Nonetheless, after Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait, the US
response demonstrated how little room the United States was willing to provide Iraq to
implement policies that threatened any US interests in the Persian Gulf.
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National Security Directive-26
Upon taking office in 1989, Bush outlined his policies toward the Persian Gulf in
National Security Directive-26. In this directive Bush contended that, “access to Persian
Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national
security,” and that the United States would defend vital interests in the region through
military force if necessary.104 In addition to defending US interests in the Persian Gulf,
Bush wrote that the United States was committed to supporting collective self-defense
efforts of friendly Persian Gulf countries because it would enable those states to have a
more active role in their own defense and reduced the need for US unilateral actions. This
included encouraging mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships
with the Cooperation Council for the Arab Sates of the Gulf (GCC) created by the IraqIran War.105 In this NSD, continued his policies towards international cooperation Bush
by using the strategy as part of his regional policies towards the Persian Gulf. He also
addressed the policy changes to respond to the end of the Soviet threat in the Middle
East, and the rise of anti-American attitudes.
As a means of buttressing America’s position in the Middle East and to
counterbalance Iran, Bush continued friendly relations with Iraq, but caveated America’s
support for Iraq to US long-term interests. This included maintaining relations also long
as Iraq promoted stability in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. To encourage the desired
behavior from Hussein, Bush proposed using economic and political incentives to
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encourage Iraq to moderate its aggressive behavior and to increase America’s influence
there. Bush also directed the administration to create contingency policies that included
economic and political sanctions against Iraq if Hussein used chemical or biological
weapons. Lastly, Bush wanted policies that would encourage Iraq to stop meddling in
other Middle Eastern affairs, and to play a constructive role in the Middle East peace
process.106
This policy recognized Iraq as a regional power the United States could rely on to
promote regional stability, and it provided Bush with an opening to drop Iraq as an ally if
its policies threatened Middle Eastern stability and access to oil. However, it also
recognized that Iraq’s usefulness was limited. While the United States wanted to pursue a
policy of collaboration with Iraq, Bush also prepared to respond to any Iraqi action that
undermined his policies to promote regional stability and maintain access to oil.
While Bush developed these policies, the policies were limited by assumptions
about Saddam’s intentions. The Bush administration believed that after fighting against
Iran and incurring a large debts and destruction of the military, that Saddam was tired of
war and needed time to rebuild its forces. The administration believed this weariness
would encourage Hussein to rely on diplomatic coercion rather than military force. The
administration also assumed that it could deter any act of aggression through diplomatic
and economic methods.107 Unfortunately, these assumptions were incorrect, as Saddam
began rebuilding Iraq’s military forces shortly after the end of the Iraq-Iran War, and US
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diplomatic efforts to discourage Saddam’s aggression were ineffective. This policy
failure forced Bush to classify Hussein and Iraq as threats to the United States and the
world. As the world recognized Iraq as a threat to every country’s oil interests, Bush
found an easy conflict to generate cooperation around. Bush’s efforts to cooperate with
the rest of the international community to develop a consensus towards Iraq brought his
post-Cold War strategy to life. The Persian Gulf Crisis led Bush to issue two other NSD’s
as the situation changed and to develop policy responses. At the same time, Bush began
working with the international community to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi
aggression.
National Security Directive-45
On 20 August 1990, Bush released NSD-45, which maintained that the Persian
Gulf was vital to US national security, and that the United States would use military force
to protect those interests if necessary. He argued that the Iraq invasion of Kuwait placed
US interests in danger and outlined four principles to guide his policy response. The first
principle had the United States call for Iraq to immediately, completely, and
unconditionally withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait. It also called for Iraq to restore
Kuwait’s legitimate government. Third, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to
the Persian Gulf’s security and stability. Lastly, Bush pledged the United States to protect
American citizens from any danger from Iraqi forces. Additionally, Bush directed the
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United States to support the implementation of UNSC resolutions 660108 and 662109 Bush
also instructed Baker to work with American allies and the international community to
find a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf Crisis.110
Bush’s first policies implemented economic sanctions in line with UNSC
resolution 661111, and froze all Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in the United States. He also
started Operation Desert Shield which deployed US troops to Saudi Arabia to defend the
country against an Iraqi invasion. As part of Operation Desert Shield Bush ordered US
forces to protect American interests Saudi Arabia by establishing defensive positions to
deter Iraqi aggression. Bush also ordered those forces to defend American allies in the
region if necessary, and to enforce UNSC resolutions 660 and 661.112 Bush’s experiences
in the UN had ingrained on him how beneficial cooperating with the UN was to protect
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US interests and to execute US foreign policies. As part of his New World Order, Bush
relied on the UN to implement his collective security framework, and demonstrate the
UN’s post-Cold War possibilities to support cooperative security arrangements and to
respond to international aggression.
NSC Policy Discussions After the Invasion of Kuwait
From the start of the Iraqi invasion the NSC/PC and NSC/DC met to help Bush
formulate policies to respond to additional Iraqi actions in the Persian Gulf. On 1 August
NSC/DC had its first meeting on the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. During the meeting,
the NSC/DC started drafting plans for the United States to coordinate with the UN and
US allies to create a concerted response. The NSC/DC also discussed the Kuwait
government’s desire for the United States to fulfill its commitments to Kuwait. This
included America’s commitment to defend Kuwaiti security and sovereignty.
Additionally, the NSC/DP discussed the Kuwaiti request for the United States to issue a
strongly worded statement that condemned Iraqi aggression, denounced Iraq’s violation
of the UN Charter, and demanded Iraq to immediately cease the invasion and
immediately withdraw all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.113
From its first meeting on the Persian Gulf Crisis the Bush administration decided
that it was going to seek international support to oppose Iraqi aggression and end the
illegal invasion of Kuwait. Bush adhered to the New World Order early in the planning
process towards the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, by deciding at the beginning that the United
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States would seek a multilateral approach instead of a unilateral one. Bush’s decision to
create an international opposition to Iraqi aggression demonstrated Bush’s commitment
to cooperative security methods to respond to aggression. It was also a way to show other
countries that the United States had not interests ensuring global security and stability
alone, but that the United States intended to cooperate with other countries and regions.
The first actions the administration focused on was generating international
support for economic sanctions against Iraq. The NSC/DC decided its first actions were
to implement economic sanctions that froze Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets based in the United
States to prevent Hussein from stealing from Kuwait, and to deny Hussein funds to
maintain his military. The NSC/DC also made plans for members of the administration to
call President Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia
to request their assistance pressuring Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, copy American
calls for Iraq to agree to a ceasefire, and for Iraqi forces to avoid harming American
citizens and other foreigners in Kuwait. The NSC/DC decided that the United States
needed to side with Kuwait in UN meetings, get as many other UN members to support
US efforts, and to ask the Soviets to stop supplying the Iraqis with arms.114 The
administrations planning demonstrated its determination to implement a multilateral
approach to resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis. It also revealed that the administration knew
that it faced challenges that would stymie efforts to create an international response.
Additionally, this planning would demonstrate that Bush and the United States possessed
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the skills necessary to resolve post-Cold War conflicts without having to police the world
alone.
As the administration drafted policies, it faced diplomatic hurdles from some of
the countries it was trying to work with. These challenges included convincing the Soviet
Union to work with the United States, and Middle Eastern states that were ambivalent to
the US efforts. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union had provided Iraq with
military supplies. After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Soviets were reluctant to end their
military support of Iraq, or support the sanctions and embargoes passed by the UNSC.
However, the US diplomats eventually convinced the Soviet Union to stop supporting
Iraq and to enforce UN sanctions and embargoes.115
Jordan was another state that repeatedly hindered efforts to resolve the crisis.
While Jordan did not unconditionally support Iraq, it had strong ties with Saddam. This
led Jordanian officials to reluctantly supported UN sanctions, and to repeatedly attempted
to connect the Middle East peace process to the resolution for the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait. US diplomats were less successful convincing the Jordanians to change their
policies. However, the Jordanians were part of a minority that supported Iraq and where
often unable to sway the members of the UN.116 Jordan and the Soviet Union represented
some of the challenges Bush and his administration faced in their efforts to create an
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international opposition to Iraq. Nonetheless, Bush and his administration created policies
that overcame or limited any negative effects from any resistance to the international
effort. However, this did not stop other challenges from emerging and hindering the
multilateral effort to stop Iraq.
In the UN Security Council (UNSC), the United States struggled to work with
allies to pass UNSC resolutions, and get international cooperation to enforce economic
sanctions against Iraq. The British and the French repeatedly clashed with the Soviet
Union over the language of UNSC resolutions. As the sanctions continued, less
prosperous countries needed relief from the negative effects of sanctions on their
economies.117 The Bush and his administration responded to these challenges by relying
on cooperation and diplomacy to draft solutions. In response to the disagreements over
language the United States worked to draft resolutions that provided compromised
between the British, French, and the Soviet Union. The United States also established a
system to help the more prosperous countries provide relief for those states suffering
from the effects of UN sanctions. These efforts, further demonstrated the possibilities of
Bush’s New World Order’s ability to create a secure post-Cold War period. Bush’s
policies revealed that his cooperative security strategy was focused on responding to
aggression, and managing other problems that might occur.
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In September, US officials continued diplomatic efforts to get Iraq to withdraw,
and strengthen sanction enforcement among UN members. The administration also
drafted an arms bill to sell aircraft and armaments to Saudi Arabia to bolster its
defenses.118 The administration’s work establishing and maintaining the coalition and
concerted action required Bush and his administration to constantly adjust tactics and
respond to demands. The Bush could had decided to move unilaterally at any point to
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but he did not. Instead, Bush remained dedicated to
collective opposition against Iraq, and used his and Baker’s diplomatic skills to minimize
any differences within the coalition. Bush’s efforts up to this point were designed to
establish a precedence for future post-Cold War international responses to conflicts and
crises. It demonstrated Bush and America’s determination to work with the international
community to resolve conflicts, rather than relying on US unilateral action. Bush’s
policies demonstrated that the United States wanted to apply this strategy to US
leadership in the post-Cold War period.
The Bush administration’s diplomatic efforts were not limited to the UN and
maintaining the coalition. Bush’s policies also included diplomatic efforts to encourage
opposition within the Iraqi people to force Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
By the end of October, the administration had initiated public diplomacy efforts through
USIA aimed at convincing the Iraqi public to pressure Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait,
or to encourage the Iraqi people to overthrow Hussein’s presidency. These efforts
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included Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts into Iraq, films depicting coalition strength
and unity, and radio addresses from Bush.119 These efforts continued into December,
when the DOD joined the USIA to create videos that depicted coalition military power.
At the same time, the VOA started “Around the Gulf” a television program that provided
non-government controlled news to the Iraqi people. These public diplomacy efforts were
designed to motivate the Iraqi people to pressure Hussein to abide by UN resolutions or
face the consequences.120 Public diplomacy abroad and domestic served to disseminate
diplomatic policies and strategies to the public, and can be used to garner support from
domestic and foreign audiences. While these efforts were unable to create change within
Iraq that convinced Hussein to withdraw his efforts, they demonstrated the variability of
US methods to end to invasion of Kuwait diplomatically.
As Bush outlined in NSD-46 Bush was willing to use military force to defend US
interests in the Persian Gulf if necessary. However, Bush’s policies up to the declaration
of war on January 16, demonstrated Bush’s desire to resolve the conflict without such
measures. Even as Bush attempted to resolve the conflict diplomatically quickly accepted
the necessity of military force. Bush’s decision to resort to military force set another
precedence for his New World Order by establishing that there was a deadline to
peacefully resolve a conflict before the United States would turn to military power.
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National Security Directive-54: Operation Desert Storm
On 15 January 1991, the day before the Persian Gulf War began, Bush issued
NSD-54 which outlined the US military response to Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf.
From his original policy directives in NSD-26, and those established in NSD 45 Bush had
outlined the strategic interests the United States had in the Persian Gulf region and its
determination to defend those interests. In the opening of NSD-54 Bush argued:
“prolonging the current situation would be detrimental to the United States in that
it would increase the cost of eventual military action, threaten political cohesion
of the coalition countries arrayed against Iraq, allow for continued brutalization of
the Kuwaiti people and the destruction of their country and cause added damage
to the US and world economies.”121
By publishing of NSD-54 Bush acknowledged that diplomatic efforts had been
exhausted, and that a consensus had been reached among most UN members that a
military operation was the only way to liberate Kuwait. In NSD-54, Bush noted that
Hussein’s defiance of the UN and its resolutions had forced Bush to deploy US and
coalition forces to end Iraq’s illegal occupation of Kuwait. NSD-54 established that
Operation Desert Storm’s objective was the liberation of Kuwait. It also established
operation objectives that included destroying Iraqi military power, and that the coalition
would not invade Iraq or overthrow Hussein unless he used chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons against coalition forces.122 In addition to military objectives, NSD-54
also established diplomatic measures for the operation to maintain full coalition
cooperation, and to avoid any events that could divide the coalition, and threaten the
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Operation Desert Storm’s success. By the time, Bush finalized his directive for the
United States, he had obtained a consensus within the UN for the objectives for
Operation Desert Storm.
As Bush needed the full participation of coalition partners in every aspect of the
operation, he focused his diplomatic effort overcoming any differences or resistance
coming from the Middle Eastern countries participating in the coalition. This included
overcoming reluctance to challenge Iraq, support the United States, and opposition to
Israeli military participation. Bush convinced Syria and Turkey to deploy additional
forces to their borders with Iraq to distract Iraqi forces and draw their resources away
from Kuwait. Additionally, He discouraged Israeli military participation by promising
Israel that the United States would defend Israel from Iraqi attacks, especially if Iraq
began launching attacks against Israel. Bush also had to continue to discourage Jordanian
participation and support for Iraq. Bush’s efforts to manage the different angles of
coalition cooperation also required Bush to defend Iraq from any attempts to use
Operation Desert Storm to annex Iraqi territory. This did not mean that Bush rejected
removing Hussein from power. Instead, Bush was conditionally willing to implement
regime if Hussein used chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or supported terrorist
acts against any coalition member.123 As NSD-54 showed that Bush would have to
continue his diplomatic efforts to maintain coalition cohesion once Operation Desert
Storm started. Again, Bush demonstrated his determination to make international
cooperation a foundation of international relations during post-Cold War period. His
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efforts to quell discord within the coalition, settle differences between UN members
about language in UNSC resolutions, and find remedies for countries that suffered from
unintended consequences of economic sanctions and embargo, demonstrated Bush’s
commitment to creating a secure and stable post-Cold War period.
Conclusions
As the post-Cold War period emerged, Bush used Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to
share and lead the world towards his New World Order. Bush’s New World Order was
based on collective security, deterring aggression, and maintaining global and regional
security and stability. Throughout the conflict, Bush successfully used his diplomatic
experience to create international unity, and build a coalition force to end Iraq’s
aggression. Bush outlined his policies and policy changes through his national security
strategy and individual directives on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf.
From these guidelines, Bush and his administration drafted policies that allowed Bush to
unite the international community against Iraq. Bush began by establishing that the
United States and the rest of the world had invested interests deterring and ending Iraq’s
aggression to prevent conflicts and instability from dominating post-Cold War
international relations. This cooperation was the basis of Bush’s New World Order, and
Bush’s belief that using multilateral responses against acts of aggression was the key to
generating global security and stability.
As Bush said, “The New World Order” was emerging. However, the question was
what would the post-Cold War world resemble, and how would the United States adapt to
it. This was important since the United States remained the only global superpower with
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significant influence and roles around the world.124 Bush decided that post-Cold War
American leadership should focus on helping regions and the world cooperate to bring
stability and security. This strategy was possible with the end of Cold War tensions, and
an emerging belief that the post-Cold War period could be peaceful. Bush’s desire to
have the United States lead this stable and secure period, resembled Wilson’s efforts after
WWI to create the League of Nations to spread liberal internationalism to promote global
peace and stability. Additionally, Bush’s desires also remained consistent with
longstanding themes and principles in US foreign policy, even as the changing
international system changed the ways US foreign policy followed them. However, like
Wilson’s attempt, Bush would also face additional crises that would reveal that despite
his desires, it was still difficult to bring security and stability to the world.
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CHAPTER IV – THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BUSH
PRESIDENCY
Following the successful reunification of Germany and international effort to end
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Bush directed his attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. The
year 1989 proved to be an eventful year for Europe: democratic revolutions in Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the opening of the Berlin Wall, and the beginning of the
collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, like the German
Democratic Republic and the Warsaw Pact, was born of the Cold War. Throughout the
Cold War the United States and NATO relied on Yugoslavia to act as a bulwark against
Soviet expansion into Western Europe. To keep Yugoslavia’s support, the United States
and other governments provided Yugoslavia economic aid, which the Yugoslav
government used to finance government spending and to promote economic prosperity as
the Yugoslav economy faced difficulties throughout the Cold War.
However, Gorbachev’s reforms and the warming of US-Soviet relations decreased
the Soviet threat to the United States. Thus, the Bush administration and NATO
determined that Yugoslavia was no longer needed to defend Western Europe from Soviet
aggression, and there was no longer a need to provide Yugoslavia economic aid. Without
international economic support, the Yugoslav government and economy destabilized
worsening ethnic tensions and political divisions that emerged after Josip Broz Tito’s
death in 1980. The destabilization of Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the rest of
Europe and presented a challenge to US security interests in Europe and maintaining
European stability and security. In 1990, the Bush was focused on preserving European
stability as Germany reunified and re-stabilizing the Persian Gulf region and the world
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after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. These conflicts were given higher priority over
Yugoslavia even though the Yugoslav conflict also had the ability to destabilize a world
region. After the international community had resolved the issues in Germany and
Kuwait, Bush and Western European leaders focused on solving Yugoslavia’s ethnic and
political divisions. Unfortunately, by the time that occurred those tensions had turned into
democratic and secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia that were spreading to
other Yugoslav states.125
This chapter argues that following the diplomatic successes in Germany and the
Persian Gulf, Bush had established a new cooperative security strategy for the United
States that he could use to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. This strategy followed US
foreign policy themes of international cooperation and maintaining global stability and
security. However, Bush’s attempts at collaboration with NATO and later the UN failed
to resolve the Yugoslavia’s crisis. There were several reasons this collaboration failed:
the United States and NATO’s delayed response to the crisis, internal divisions in NATO,
strategy disagreements between NATO and the United States, Bush’s decision to not to
have any leadership role in NATO efforts or to help bridge divisions in NATO, and
Bush’s insistence that the solution maintain Yugoslavia’s integrity. Bush’s decision to
withhold US leadership was uncharacteristic of Bush, but it reflected the public’s
growing hesitancy to the United States policing the world and attempting to resolve all

125

Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).
Alastair Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia, 1991-1999, (New York: Osprey, 2014). Misha Glenny, The
Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, (London: Penguin Books, 1993). Susan Woodward, Balkan
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). John
R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000). Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990-1993, (New York: Routledge, 2000).

86

international conflicts. These factors combined to produce the first failure of Bush’s New
World Order. Bush’s inability to use the New World Order to resolve the Yugoslav crisis
revealed the limitations of cooperative security, especially when that cooperation lacked
any US leadership.
Yugoslavia’s March Toward Disintegration
Ever since the Ottoman Empire reached as far as Eastern Europe, the Balkans had
experienced ethnic divisions and conflicts. After World War I the allies created Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia out of six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia—with internal borders along ethnic and historical
lines. During WWII, the ethnic divisions and animosities worsened as the Serb and Croat
Chetniks collaborated with the Nazis, while communist Partisans supported the Allies.
Throughout the war the Chetniks and the Partisans committed atrocities against each
other. After WWII, the Allied Powers supported Josip Broz Tito and the communists and
their efforts to establish a communist government in Yugoslavia. Tito established the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and installed a satellite of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia in each republic’s government. Under Tito’s leadership
Yugoslavia was espoused as the model middle way between a planned economy and a
capitalist economy, and Yugoslavia enjoyed economic prosperity with limited ethnic
conflicts. Following Tito’s death in 1980, no other leader emerged capable of managing
Yugoslavia’s ethnic divisions. At the same time, the federal government proved
incapable of responding to political, economic, and national challenges. As tensions
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increased ultranationalist groups spread propaganda reminding the Yugoslavs about the
atrocities from WWII encouraging ethnic fighting and Yugoslavia’s collapse.126
Shortly after Tito’s death the first cracks in Yugoslav unity emerged in student
demonstrations in Kosovo, and calls for an Albanian republic in Kosovo. As more
students protested for an independent Kosovo state, the Serbs responded with demands
for a Greater Serbia in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the non-Serb majorities in Kosovo and
Sarajevo began calling for separation from Serbia. By 1986, Serb nationalism emerged to
oppose Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. This Serb nationalism evoked national myths
and argued that the Serbs bore the brunt of the economic burdens of Yugoslavia’s
modernization. That year, Slobodan Milošević was elected the head of the Serbian
republic through appeals to the Serb nationalism. Following his election, Milošević
removed all liberal communists from the government and gained the Yugoslav army’s
support becoming the sole leader of Serbia. He also encouraged anti-Muslim sentiments,
which had been grown along with Serbian nationalism. Like Serbia, Slovenia
experienced a rise in nationalist sentiments. Slovene intellectuals drove the Slovene
national movement duplicating Serbian arguments that Yugoslavia’s modernization had
retarded Slovene efforts to modernize and fix their economy.127
As the world focused on German reunification and then Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait, Croatia and Slovenia held free elections that brought democratic officials and
new governments to power. In response, the Yugoslav Army tried to disarm the national
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defense installations in Croatia and Slovenia, but Croat and Slovene forces rebuffed the
army. Following these altercations, Croatia and Slovenia began illegally buying weapons
to prevent future retribution from the Yugoslav government. On 23 December 1990,
Slovenia held elections, during which an overwhelming majority voted for independence
from Yugoslavia. By mid-March 1991, Milošević had turned his attention toward
creating Greater Serbia. On 3 May 1991 Croatia voted to secede from Yugoslavia. After
the election in Croatia and Slovenia, the Croat and Slovene governments announced they
would declare their independence on 26 June. However, Slovenia declared its
independence on 25 June. The Slovenes also cut off power, communications, and water
to the Yugoslav army bases in Slovenia to prevent the Yugoslav army from stopping
Slovene secession.128
As Yugoslavia's dramatically changed internally, it faced similarly significant
changes to its international standing. During the Cold War Yugoslavia refused to align
with the Soviet Union or the United States. As a non-aligned nation, Yugoslavia gained
military and economic support from the United States to counter Soviet expansion.
Yugoslavia's non-aligned status also allowed it to get loans from Western European
governments. So that by the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia had borrowed over twenty
billion dollars in r loans from the United States alone. As US-Soviet relations and the
democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe weakened Soviet influence and power,
Yugoslavia’s international standing and its security importance diminished. Also, the
changes occurring among the former Warsaw pact nations made them more suitable
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candidates for monetary aid than Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia’s economic resources dried
up, the economic problems increased domestic turmoil and decreased the government’s
ability to prevent ethnic conflicts.129
The crisis in Yugoslavia was caused by the end of the Cold War and the strategy
of containment. Without the Soviet threat, the United States and NATO no longer found
viewed Yugoslavia as a security partner to help defend Western Europe from Soviet
expansion. This re-evaluation led these countries to end their economic support for
Yugoslavia, which the government had become entirely dependent on to function. The
governments growing decay sparked economic problems that antagonized ethnic
divisions. The rise of ethnic hostilities was worsened by ultranationalists in Yugoslav
states who urged the states to secede from the Yugoslav federation. The secession of
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina sparked an ethnic conflict the Balkans that
also threatened to destabilize Yugoslavia’s neighbors and the rest of Europe. As the crisis
in Yugoslavia threatened the rest of Europe, Bush began drafting policies to support
NATO efforts to mediate a resolution to the conflict.
National Security Policy Toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe
In his 1990 national security strategy review, Bush continued to focus on the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. He wrote that communist states “were mired
in stagnation, paralyzed by outmoded static ideologies that stifle innovation and
productivity. Poor economic performance, especially in contrast with the West, has
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discredited a system that prided itself on its mastery of economic forces.”130 He continued
that in response to the changes occurring in the East, the United States and its Western
European allies were dedicated to overcoming Cold War divisions in Europe. To achieve
this, Bush wanted to ensure the core of post-Cold War Europe rested on democratic
institutions and values, and that a high priority was placed on quickly decreasing force
levels and improving stability. The United States would also support economic
development, democratic institutions, and overall stability in Eastern Europe.131
Even as he promoted core US foreign policy values of promoting and defending
democratic institutions, decreasing aggression, and improving global stability, Bush was
unable to implement this national security strategy equally as he did not mention
Yugoslavia or the Balkans. Instead Bush remained focused on Eastern Europe and former
members of the Soviet States, even as US –Soviet Relations improved. This fixation
allowed Bush to miss the crisis happening in Yugoslavia and its role in European security
and stability. At the same time, Bush was preoccupied with the reunification of Germany
and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. So, these two situations combined to create a policy
vacuum towards Yugoslavia that Bush would have to respond to in 1991.
In his 1991 national security strategy review, Bush discussed changes to USEuropean relations. He noted that changes in Eastern Europe created a greater need for
NATO members to cooperate and deter aggression in Europe. Additionally, NATO
needed to continue to serve as a channel for American involvement in Europe. He posited
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that the United States should use its membership in NATO to prevent aggression among
NATO member states. 132 These notes established that Bush intended to help Europe
adapt NATO from a Cold War alliance against the Soviet Union into a European
cooperative security institution similar to the UN. By refashioning NATO into a
cooperative institution, Bush hoped to encourage New World Order strategies and
principles in Europe. By maintaining an active role in NATO and other European security
institutions, and maintaining America’s military presence in Europe.133 He’s plan would
also allow the United States to remain active in European security discussions and to
encourage cooperative actions against aggression.
Bush also noted in his national security strategy that Soviet influence had frozen
disputes between and within Eastern Europe countries. He used the crisis in Yugoslavia
as evidence that the collapse of the Soviet Union had unleashed security problems on
Europe. Bush contended that the Yugoslav government had managed to suppress ethnic
animosities during the Cold War, but without the Cold War competition, fighting
between ethnic groups was creating security problems.134 Tito overcame Yugoslavia’s
ethnic divisions by creating a communist government that focused on representing
everyone as a Yugoslav communist first and their ethnicity second. Tito also promoted
economic reforms which also discouraged ethnic divisions, by using economic aid he
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received from the United States in return for standing against Soviet communism.135
Bush suggested creating policies that relied on the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and NATO to resolve the turmoil.136 Bush's decision to
rely on CSCE and NATO leadership to resolve the Yugoslav crisis fit within the
parameters of Bush’s New World Order. Through this policy, the CSCE and NATO
would cooperate to establish mediation between the Yugoslav states to resolve their
differences so that Yugoslavia would survive. This was essential to Bush’s post-Cold
War strategy, since Europe would have to respond to conflicts caused by the collapse of
governments sponsored by the Soviet Union or the United States during the Cold War.
However, this policy limited Bush’s ability to exert American influence in the mediation
process, to reinforce NATO decisions, and resolve disagreements in NATO.
Contradicting Views of Yugoslavia and America’s Response
As Bush was drafting his policies towards Yugoslavia, NSC and CIA analysts
studied the situation in Yugoslavia. While the NSC and CIA agreed on the fundamentals
about the situation in Yugoslavia, they differed about the ability of the United States to
prevent Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The analysis papers the NSC and CIA analysts
provided Bush and his advisors revealed their divergences. The NSC paper focused on
the impact Yugoslavia’s impact would have on US interests while the CIA focused on the
feasibility of any US policies to influence the situation in Yugoslavia and prevent its
collapse.
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In the NSC paper, the analysts noted the dissolution of Yugoslavia would cause
local, regional, and continent-wide problems in Europe. In addition, the ethnic makeup of
Yugoslavia would cause violence as the individual states attempted to separate from the
federation. The authors argued that US interests were served by a repeating the
developments in the former Soviet states in a united Yugoslavia:
“Our interest in avoiding violence among the Yugoslavs and instability at the
Balkan and European levels, our interest in promoting political democracy,
market-based economies, and enhanced respect for human rights, as well as
relevant principles of international law and relevant international covenants all
would seem to point in the direction of preserving Yugoslavia’s unity.”137
This paper established that Bush’s security goal in Yugoslavia should resolve the
conflict, keep Yugoslavia united, and encourage democratic reform. This analysis
contradicted the democratically decided secession movements in Yugoslav states. It also
reversed Bush’s policies that supported German self-determination during Germany’s
reunification. The administration would not reconcile this contradiction as it supported
NATO and CSCE efforts to mediate a solution. Instead, the Bush administration would
exacerbate this contradiction as it continued to implement policies in Yugoslavia
designed to prevent Yugoslavia’s dissolution while supporting democratic reforms. The
NSC analysis also dissented with the CIA national intelligence estimate on Yugoslavia
that presented a different evaluation of the situation in Yugoslavia and the possibilities
for the success of US policies there.
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On 18 October 1990, the CIA issued NIE 15-90 “Yugoslavia Transformed.” It
opened:
"Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year and will
probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup.
Serbia will block Slovene and Croat attempts to form an all-Yugoslav
confederation. There will be protracted armed uprising by Albanians in Kosovo.
A full-scale, interrepublic war is likely, but serious intercommunal conflict will
accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be
intractable and bitter. There is little the United States, and its European allies can
do to preserve Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to
advocacy of democracy and self-determination."138
CIA analysts argued that the collapse of Yugoslavia was inevitable and caused by
the Yugoslav’s inability to create an all-Yugoslav political movement after the Titoist
vision collapsed. They noted that without an all-Yugoslav movement nationalism, local,
and economic aspirations would determine Yugoslavia's future. They continued that
neither the Communist Party nor the Yugoslav National Army would keep Yugoslavia
together. At the same time, historic religious antagonisms and cultural identification in
Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia would serve as strong factors that would worsen the
conflict. The analysts wrote they did not believe it was possible for any option other than
dissolution to succeed. They pointed to diverging ideas about government and economic
reforms between the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.
The authors also attempted to predict the situation in Yugoslavia once the collapse
began. The analysts predicted that the collapse would start sporadic and spontaneous
ethnic violence that would progress into a civil war. They also noted that the Serbs would
encourage ethnic uprisings among Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
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further spreading the ethnic violence.139 Unfortunately, Bush and his advisors ignored
NIE 15-90 because it contradicted their security strategy for the Balkans and Europe.140
Instead, the Bush administration’s followed the advice presented in the NSC paper and
initiated policies designed to keep Yugoslavia united even as Croatia, Slovenia, BosniaHerzegovina, and Macedonia, voted to secede from Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was
collapsing Bush prioritized American security strategy over the realities of the situation
in Yugoslavia. Part of this was a desire to recreate the successes in Germany and Kuwait
in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the administration miscalculated the challenges posed
creating a cooperative security solution to an intranational conflict versus an international
one.
NSC/DC Meetings on Yugoslavia, 1990-1992
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the NSC Deputies was primarily
responsible for crafting US policies, and established Americans initial position and
strategy towards Yugoslavia. From October 1990 to the end of Bush’s presidency, the
NSC/DC met twenty-nine times to discuss policy options and the situation in
Yugoslavia.141 The NSC/DC proposed the administration plan for the rapid collapse of
Yugoslavia accompanied by escalating cycles of inter-ethnic violence, Serbian repression
of the Albanian population in Kosovo, and splintering of the Yugoslav Army along ethnic
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lines as Yugoslavia moved toward a civil war. The committee suggested starting
consultations with principal allies and regional institutions, and consider using the UNSC
or CSCE to mediate between the parties. The NSC/DC believed that if the CSCE could
successfully resolve the Yugoslav conflict, then the CSCE’s could establish a precedence
for future CSCE efforts to mediate disputes, like the UN’s response to Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait.142
The NSC argued that the United States could not prevent Slovenia, Croatia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina from declaring their independence then the United States should
follow traditional principles on recognizing new states. However, the NSC caveated this
policy that the United States should only recognize those states if the Yugoslav
government did not contest their independence. The NSC posited that if the declaration of
independence were contested then the United States should encourage the seceding states
to continue mediation.143 From the beginning the NSC designed strategies and policies
around keeping Yugoslavia from disintegrating and recreating the successful cooperative
action against Iraq. The administration also decided that it would only grant recognition
conditionally. These decisions limited Bush’s policy choices, even as the administration
hoped to use international mediation efforts to resolve Yugoslavia’s conflict. However,
the NSC’s decisions rested on a selective analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia, and a
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miscalculation of America’s or the CSCE’s ability to effectively influence political and
social divisions in Yugoslavia to resolve the conflict. This foundation prevented the
administration from adjusting to the situation in Yugoslavia and the growing inevitability
of dissolution.
Based on its findings, the NSC/DC recommended that the United States should
encourage Yugoslavia to adopt democracy, pressure the Serbs to democratize, and push
all Yugoslav groups to deal with their affairs through a federation government. NSC/DC
also suggested that the United States needed to clearly explain that US assistance was
only for a united Yugoslavia, and announce that the United States would not recognize
declarations of independence from Yugoslav republics. The NSC/DC recommended that
the United States oppose any Yugoslav military action to prevent the states from
seceding. It argued that any forceful repression of independence threatened the
democratic process and democratic aspirations in Yugoslavia. Lastly, committee
encouraged Bush and the State Department to work with the EC to develop a policy
consensus towards Yugoslavia to facilitate cooperative actions.144
As the NSC/DC continued to layout US policy principles towards Yugoslavia, the
committed continued to contradict the principles and strategies it had proposed earlier.
The NSC did this by refusing to recognize the seceding states, while refusing to support
Yugoslavia’s use of force to maintain public order and prevent the states from seceding.
This policy also contradicted with the government's right to use force to maintain public
order, and how to support the use of one without violating the other. Another issue was
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the NSC/DC determination of policy without including any references to NATO and
CSCE policies towards Yugoslavia. By establishing its Yugoslavia policies this way, the
administration established few alternatives for any disagreements with Europe as the
situation in Yugoslavia progressed. This would make it difficult for the United States to
fully support CSCE and NATO initiatives to mediate the Yugoslav conflict.
From Yugoslav Unity to Deterring and Containing the Yugoslav Conflict
In January 1991 after three months of deadlock and increased violence in
Yugoslavia, the NSC/DC changed its policy direction to focus on crafting policies that
deterred and contained the escalating violence in Yugoslavia. This policy included
responding to Yugoslav army’s human rights violations, getting the CSCE to focus on
Yugoslavia, and getting the EC to lead negotiations between the parties to end the
conflict.145 From January to July the United States attempted to encourage the CSCE and
EC efforts to create an agreement between the Yugoslav states that would end the ethnic
division and violence. Unfortunately, the CSCE and EC were unable to convince the
Yugoslavs to mediate their differences. In July, the NSC/DC decided to change US
policies again to respond to the EC’s failed mediation efforts, and increased Serbian
violent repression against the seceding states.146
As the NSC/DC recognized American policies in Yugoslavia and Europe were
failing to end the conflict, the administration redirected its policies to prevent the conflict
from affecting any other areas in Europe. Bush and his advisors also began to recognize
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that the CSCE and EC were less capable of exerting their influence within Yugoslavia or
encourage the parties to reconcile their problems. At the same time, members of Bush’s
National Security Affairs department recognized the test that the Yugoslav conflict was
placing on America’s role and relationships with Europe. In particular, the unwillingness
of the United States to take a leading role in mediation efforts was hampering Europe’s
cooperative security arrangements and endangering Bush’s New World Order.
David Gompert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
sent a memorandum to Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, that critiqued
American leadership in Europe during the Yugoslav crisis. Gompert argued the United
States faced increased international pressure to take the lead in Europe as the EC’s
mediation and peacekeeping efforts floundered in Yugoslavia and Milošević realized his
"Greater Serbia". He contended that if the United States wanted to continue to claim that
it was European power in the post-Cold War period, then the United States should expect
Europe to look to the United States for ideas and direction. 147
Gompert continued that if the United States, like the EC, failed to create a plan to
end Yugoslavia’s conflict, then two things would happen that were against US interests.
He posited that a civil war would break out consuming some or all of Yugoslavia, and the
civil war would have the ability to affect other Balkan countries. Second, the United
States would lose domestic and international confidence in NATO, CSCE, and the New
World Order. He argued the Bush administration had to make a choice: the United States
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and EC push the CSCE to create a large-scale peacekeeping force and the United States
takes a more assertive mediator role, or the United States can encourage the French,
British, and Dutch to intervene in Yugoslavia without NATO or the CSCE.148 He noted
implementing one of the options would affect US policy agendas. He wrote that using the
CSCE would strengthen CSCE’s standing as a European collective security institution,
but using the CSCE could hinder efforts to establish NATO in the post-Cold War as the
foundation for European security. On the other hand, having the French, British, and
Dutch act unilaterally would support independent European security arrangements, which
would undermine any attempts to promote cooperative security arrangements in
Europe.149 Gompert’s analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia and America’s policy
choices revealed significant interests at stake for the United States, Europe, and
Yugoslavia. He also revealed that the United States needed to take a firm stand and
greater leadership in CSCE and EC to prevent the situation in Yugoslavia from
worsening or threatening US interests in Europe.
Along with his policy analysis, Gompert described possible European reactions to
America’s policy choice. In Yugoslavia, Milošević would oppose either action since it
prevented him from creating Greater Serbia, but the Yugoslav army would not forcibly
resist a European peacekeeping force. The Europeans would oppose allowing the British,
French, and Dutch to deploy peacekeepers out of fears the peacekeepers would face
violence from paramilitary units in Yugoslavia. Gompert noted that the United States
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could easily overcome any opposition or initial resistance in the EC to either option. He
continued that the only way either policy would succeed was for the United States would
to fully support the policy it chose. He continued that it the United States continued to
enact lukewarm policies, the United States should not expect the Yugoslav crisis to
resolve itself. He argued that it was likely that the Europeans would try to mediate a
solution if the violence worsened again. However, without US support and direction
European efforts were unlikely to succeed. He continued that:
"We will shortly need to decide not only which approach we favor but, as importantly, whether
the U.S. will get behind the wheel. We will not need to be visibly in the lead, nor will the White House
need to play a role. Moreover, direct U.S. involvement in either the peacekeeping or peacemaking effort
will continue to be unnecessary if not unwise. At most, we might appoint a senior Yugoslavia crisis
coordinator, reporting to Secretary Baker.”150

As Gompert’s memorandum reveals the policies established by the NSC towards
Yugoslavia were failing to push the parties towards resolving the conflict. Additionally,
Bush’s reliance on the CSCE to lead mediation efforts was revealing divisions with the
CSCE membership on the best way to bring peace back to Yugoslavia. Bush’s reliance
on European cooperative institutions was jeopardizing Bush’s efforts to establish
cooperative security as the strategy for the post-Cold War period. Additionally, the
Yugoslav conflict would reveal how little influence international actors had to address
internal causes of intranational conflicts. The inability of the CSCE, NATO and the
United States to encourage the Yugoslav parties to accept mediation and end the conflict
revealed the difficulties external parties would have in the future resolving intra-state
conflicts.
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Following Gompert's memorandum, the NSC implemented some policy changes
but did not deviate far from the original strategy developed by in October 1990. As Bush
and his staff worked with Europe to resolve the Yugoslav conflict, the United States
continued to face difficulties collaborating with the CSCE and NATO to mediate an end
to Yugoslavia’s conflict. The administration also ignored Gompert’s suggestion that the
United States take on greater a leadership role in the CSCE and NATO to end the conflict
in Yugoslavia. Instead of adjusting policies to promote the changes it desired more
effectively, the Bush administration continued ineffective policies that were not helping
resolve the Yugoslav conflict and endangered the feasibility of Bush’s New World Order.
The conflict in Yugoslavia would prove that post-Cold War intranational conflicts
required different resolution methods and a deep understanding of local politics and
culture for international efforts to succeed.
In September, the NSC/DC decided the United States should assertively argue
against instant recognition of the seceding Yugoslav states. The NSC/DC suggested two
policies. First, the Bush administration could promote a policy that recognized Slovene
and Croat independence, with the knowledge that their independence would exacerbate
ethnic violence in Yugoslavia. Second, they could encourage a policy that isolated
nationalist Serbia’s leaders to pressure other Serbian leaders to agree to an internationally
supervised cease-fire and negotiations. The committee noted that the major drawback of
the isolation policy was that it required EC consensus to nonrecognition of the seceding
states to work efficiently. However, the NSC/DC also wanted to follow and support those
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efforts the CSCE’s lead, and the CSCE was moving to recognize the seceding states.151
This put US policy in a contradictory position. The United States supported CSCE
policies, and the administration did not want it to appear like the United States wanted to
take over mediation efforts. However, the United States opposed recognizing the
independent states, or ending negotiations. This strategy put the Bush administration in a
position to undermine CSCE efforts to resolve the conflict in Yugoslavia and limit further
violence. It also endangered Bush’s New World Order, and Bush’s post-Cold War
revisions of the CSCE and NATO.
The Move Toward Recognizing Seceding States
In December, the CIA released an analysis explaining which European countries
supported recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The CIA noted that Germany was leading
efforts to recognize Slovenia and Croatia within several weeks, but that this would not
hinder efforts to settle the conflict between Serbia and Croatia over Croatian Serbs. The
CIA contended that Germany was pushing for recognition to force the Serbs to accept a
settlement within previous borders and limit their ambitions. The CIA noted that
Germany hoped its strategy would prevent the civil war from transforming into an
international conflict. The agency also noted that CSCE debates on recognizing the
former Yugoslav states had increased pressure on the United States to become more
involved. Additionally, several US European allies were indicating that only US pressure
could delay the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. If the CSCE agreed to recognize the
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two states, then the CSCE expected the United States to have direct involvement in the
crisis.152 This divergence between the US strategies and CSCE strategies added to the
difficulties the cooperative arrangement faced. The lack of consensus within the CSCE
and between the CSCE and the United States highlighted different priorities. It also
revealed that without a strong leader a consensus was unlikely to emerge, and Bush’s
desire to establish international cooperative security as the international strategy would
flounder against intra-state conflicts.
Shortly after the CIA released this report, the NSC/DC discussed the possibility of
copying the EC policy for Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to earn
formal recognition from the United States. It also discussed America’s response to the
CSCE decision to implement a similar policy for recognition by 15 January 1991. During
discussions committee members argued that continuing America’s policy against
recognition kept the United States and EC divided and undermined CSCE efforts to stop
Serb aggression.153 The NSC/DC also that the policy led the international community to
question America’s resolve to end the Yugoslav crisis through EC-lead mediation efforts
if the United States did not support CSCE efforts. The committee believed that by
mirroring EC policies those problems could be avoided, but it would not stop the Serb
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military from forcefully carving up those states even after they were recognized.154 As
1991 was closing, the Bush’s NSC/DC committee began proposing policies that mirrored
the CSCE’s. It also accepted that continued divisions between the United States and
CSCE were hindering peace efforts. As Bush and his advisors began to implement this
policy change they also began to invest US energies towards better supporting CSCE
negotiation efforts. However, US reluctance to support and mirror CSCE efforts began
negatively affected Bush’s New World Order cooperative security efforts.
The Bush administration initiated this policy change on 13 December. That day
during its meeting the NSC/DC decided that the United States would implement a policy
of earned recognition for former Yugoslav states. The committee had the State
Department develop the criteria for the states to gain US recognition, and establish
evaluations for American humanitarian aid and ways to expand it if necessary. The
NSC/DC also decided to support the Vance-Carrington negotiations, and to support UN
peacekeeping efforts.155 The policy changes that the NSC/DC initiated began to bring US
policies towards Yugoslavia back in line with Bush’s New World Order. These policies
dedicated US support to European-led strategy with mediations led by UN special envoys
Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington. The changes in US policy towards the collapse of
Yugoslavia reflected the Bush administration’s coming to terms with the reality that the
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Yugoslav federation would not survive because of internal problems the international
community was not influential enough to change from outside.
To prevent a policy division from reoccurring between the United States and
Europe, The NSC/DC suggested the United States consult with the EC and NATO about
de-recognizing Yugoslavia to prevent any implications or semblance that the United
States or NATO usurping CSCE. The NSC/DC suggested having discussions with UN
Secretary Vance about his intended approach to the peacekeeping mission, and what
assistance he would seek from the United States if the UN approved deploying a
peacekeeping force.156 As Bush and his advisors increasing accepted that Yugoslavia’s
divorce was unpreventable, they increased their efforts to buttress European efforts to
prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia from exacerbating the violence and instability in
the Balkans. This policy change demonstrated that Bush and his staff was dedicated to
the New World Order. However, Bush’s prioritization of the US interests by maintaining
Balkan stability through Yugoslav unity rather than attempting to mediate a better path to
dissolution supported the problems in Yugoslavia and created divisions between US and
European policies.
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By 16 January 1992, the NSC/DC finalized the method for recognizing the former
Yugoslav states.157 The committees’ method began with supporting the cease-fire and the
UN peacekeeping force that Vance recommended to the UN, and tied US recognition to
former Yugoslav states cooperation with the future peacekeeping mission. After the
former Yugoslav states had demonstrated their willingness to cooperate with the UN and
Vance then, the United States would recognize a state.158 However, the Bush
administration continued to delay Slovenia and Croatia throughout February, even though
forty-five other countries recognized them. However, The United States was not the only
country that delayed recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Greece refused to recognize
Macedonia which stalled the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Greece argued that it
could not recognize the country of Macedonia because the name “Macedonia” had
significant historical and cultural value to Greece. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s recognition was
delayed as the EC waited for the results of its independence referendum among its
Muslim, Croat, and Serb population. The EC believed it was likely that Bosnia-

157

In an unofficial brainstorming paper commissioned by the NSC/DC, the committee reveals that
the Bush administration had come to view the crisis in Yugoslavia within American interests. The
committee wrote that it was in American interests to keep the former Yugoslav states within the borders of
former Yugoslavia, and to prevent the conflict from moving outside of former Yugoslavia's borders. US
interests were also served by creating a neighborhood of independent and democratic states in the Balkans,
to strengthen US-European ties, to support further mediation efforts to end the Yugoslav crisis and to keep
CSCE principles and processes intact. The committee noted that it was no longer in US interests to have a
unified Yugoslavia or a dominant regional power, especially one that was communist and authoritarian.
Memorandum, "Serving US Interests in the Yugoslavia Crisis," folder H-Files NSC/DC Meetings File,
OAID 90021-018, "NSC/DC 330 December 23, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on Yugoslavia, Keywords:
Yugoslavia" National Security Council, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
Memorandum, “An Approach Toward Recognizing Yugoslav Republics, n.d.” Folder H-files
NSC/DC Meetings File OAID 90021-018 “NSC/DC 330 December 23, 1991 - NSC/DC Meeting on
Yugoslavia, Keywords: Yugoslavia” National Security Council, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
158

108

Herzegovina would vote for independence even though it would exacerbate ethnic
tensions in the country.159
On 21 February, the UNSC approved a resolution to create a peacekeeping force
for former Yugoslavia. In preparation to recognize the independent states, the State
Department decided to mirror the Commonwealth of Independent States set up by the
former Soviet countries, which included clear distinctions between recognized statehood
and conducting of diplomatic relations. The State Department offered five recognitions
policy strategies. First, only recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Second, immediately
recognize Croatia and Slovenia while delaying recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia pending consultations with the EC. Third, recognize, Croatia, Slovenia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina but not Macedonia. Fourth, recognize all four independent states.
Fifth, recognize Croatia and Slovenia, and recognize Bosnia and Macedonia when the EC
recognizes them. Of these five options the State Department recommended recognizing
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, but not Macedonia.160 This strategy discussion revealed
that the Bush administration continued to face difficulties cooperating with Europe. At
the same time the situation in the EC revealed that it still faced difficulty coming to a
consensus among its members. These issues hindered cooperative action to resolve the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The difficulties the United States and EC faced creating viable
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policies to respond to the intranational conflict in Yugoslavia revealed their difficulty
adjusting to this growing post-Cold War style conflict.
In preparation for a foreign ministers meeting on international Yugoslav policy,
the State Department advised Baker delaying recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina risked
intimidation from Serbian hardliners and Croats for Bosnia to accept its partition along
ethnic lines rather than gaining recognition. They noted that if Bosnian Serbs and Croats
attempted to push for partition with would create a civil war in Bosnia. However, if the
international community could create a policy consensus and concerted response then it
was possible for the international community to stabilize Yugoslavia and move it toward
a peaceful solution consistent with CSCE principles.161
The department also advised Baker there was no option to recognizing Bosnia
since it had voted for independence on 3 March. Additionally, recognizing BosniaHerzegovina would make it difficult for Serbia and Croatia to leave the mediation efforts.
The State Department believed that recognizing the four Yugoslav states would hinder
Milošević's designs for a Greater Serbia out of parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It suggested recognizing Serbia and Montenegro as a Yugoslav state and continue
diplomatic relations with the new Yugoslavia on the condition that it acknowledged and
respected the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav republics. It was also important
to pressure the new Yugoslavia to grant the ethnic minorities in Serbia the same rights it
demanded the Serb minority in Croatia. Baker was encouraged to get a US-EC
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recognition of Bosnia, a strong warning against Serbian efforts to destabilize Serbia, and
joint support to encourage cooperation among Bosnian ethnic groups to find a way to
coexist.162 As the State Department’s memo explained the foreign ministers meeting in
March would have ramifications for future international cooperation resolving the
dissolution of Yugoslavia and preventing a civil war in Bosnia. The memo relayed that
Bakers ability to negotiate with the European foreign ministers and come to a consensus
about policy towards former Yugoslavia was paramount to any attempts to limit further
violence caused by Yugoslavia’s end.
On 10 March, Secretary Baker met with EC Foreign Ministers to formalize a USEC agreement on recognizing Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. In
preparation for his meeting, the State Department acknowledged that the United States
and EC did not agree on which states to recognize. The State Department admitted that it
would be difficult for reach an agreement because the Greeks continued to stall efforts to
recognize Macedonia, and several EC members remained ambivalent about recognizing
Bosnia out of fear that ethnic divisions among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs would start a
civil war.163
Following the foreign ministers meeting, Baker reported that though the meeting
had provided the EC and United States with an excellent opportunity to coordinate their
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policies on the Yugoslav crisis, they were unable to reach an agreement on recognizing
Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia. However, Baker and the other foreign ministers
concurred that Greece could no longer delay the vote to recognize Macedonia, and they
set 6 April as an informal deadline for EC action.164 Baker’s meeting with European
diplomats revealed that the United States and the EC had not completely overcome their
policy disagreements. It also revealed that entrenched policies among EC members and
the United States would continue to hinder cooperative actions towards Yugoslavia. At
the same time, Baker’s report revealed that those disagreements were decreasing as the
United States and Europe found increasing strategies to agree on.
On 3 April Thomas M. T. Niles, US ambassador to the European Union, informed
Baker that the European and Canadian Affairs office recommended two policy options to
the NSC in response to EC recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April. The analysts
recommended the United States recognize Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on
or shortly after 7 April if the EC recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 April. However, if
the EC did not, then the analysts recommended that the Bush administration take no
action towards recognizing any of the former Yugoslav republics. Instead, they suggested
that Bush send a letter to the President of Macedonia informing him of America's intent
to recognize Macedonia after the issues with Greece were resolved, while Baker sent
send letters to the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro expressing American willingness
to begin discussing future relations between the United States and Montenegro and Serbia
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as a new Yugoslavia. They also supported removing sanctions against Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia while keeping sanctions in place against Serbia.
They noted the Bush administration explain the sanctions were conditional upon the end
of Serbia’s blockade of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.165 On 7 April 1992, the
United States formally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia.
Conclusions
Bush and his administration’s response to the collapse of Yugoslavia was
hindered by its focus on the reunification of Germany, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and
the reintegration of former Warsaw pact nations into Western Europe. At the same time
that Bush successfully implemented the New World Order in the Persian Gulf, the
conflict in Yugoslavia led many to expect that Bush’s application of the New World
Order in Yugoslavia would continue to demonstrate the capabilities of post-Cold War
cooperative security methods on the regional scale. However, Bush’s policies towards
Yugoslavia did not successfully translate the New World Order to respond to
Yugoslavia’s intra-state conflict. Instead, several policy decisions at the beginning of
America’s response made it difficult to influence change in Yugoslavia. The first
decision was based on a national strategy assessment that US interests in Europe were
served with a united Yugoslavia. This decision created an impediment that prevented the
administration from readily adapting to the situation in Yugoslavia. Additionally, this
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policy contradicted with American principles and values on democracy and selfdetermination that Bush and his administration had pursued in Germany.
The next policy decision Bush and his advisors made was to avoid taking a
leadership role and to support CSCE later UN sponsored negotiations with Yugoslav
representatives. This policy limited American influence in European discussion and
American policymakers’ ability to create a consensus among the European states. When
the administration decided to change policies, the changes focused on addressing
violence and restoring stability to prevent instability from spreading to the Balkans and
Europe. At the same time, the Bush administration encountered policy disagreements
with the CSCE and EC which preferred a stronger US presence in negotiations. However,
Bush viewed the Yugoslav conflict as a crisis the CSCE, NATO, and EC should resolve
Thus, Bush pursued a Europe-led strategy to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia. However,
after forty-plus years of directing Western European foreign policies, this proved difficult
and negatively affected resolution efforts with the EC. Additionally, the EC and NATO
were unable to recreate the UN's collective efforts against Iraq even with Bush's support.
As the conflict in Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the Balkans and the rest of
Europe, and endanger the democratic revolutions occurring in Eastern Europe, NATO,
with US support, attempted to mediate a solution. Unfortunately, NATO efforts would
prove unsuccessful and the Yugoslav federation collapsed. However, the collapse of
Yugoslavia did not end the ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Instead, the collapse of
Yugoslavia led to a conflict in Bosnia as Bosnian Serbs attempted to ethnically purify
Bosnian territory to annex to Serbia to create Greater Serbia. While Bush’s policy and
strategies failed to prevent Yugoslavia from collapsing they remained in line with core
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US foreign policy principles of international cooperation, deterring aggression and
ensuring global security and stability.
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CHAPTER V – BUSH, CLINTON, AND THE BOSNIAN WAR
Following the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, ethnic violence erupted in
Bosnia-Herzegovina after it declared its independence. In Bosnia, Serbian nationals
working with Slobodan Milošević and Serbia carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing
to create Greater Serbia out of parts of Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs with support from the
Serbian army and Serbian government systematically forced Bosnian Muslims and
Catholic Croatians to flee their homes, sent them to concentration camps, or
systematically killed them. As it had during the collapse of Yugoslavia, the international
community attempted to stop the violence through collective actions that included UN
sanctions and negotiations. The Bosnian War was one of several international crises that
President Clinton would inherit from his predecessor, President Bush. Lacking foreign
policy experience, Clinton would initially continue Bush’s policies before implementing
his own. Clinton and Bush made policy decisions based on transcendent values that have
shaped US foreign policy throughout the twentieth century that included defending and
spreading democracy, deterring aggression through international cooperation, and
ensuring American stability and security. While American presidents used different
methods the values at the heart of those policy decisions did not change.
This chapter argues that both Bush and Clinton relied on similar understandings
of international cooperation but relied on different methods and leadership styles to
resolve the Bosnian War. Bush preferred a European-led cooperative arrangement that
focused on humanitarian relief, while Clinton gradually introduced American leadership
into international mediation efforts and redirected the focus of UN sanctions to end the
war in Bosnia. Both men also continued to abide by traditional US foreign policy themes
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and principles as they worked with the European community to restore stability and
security to the Balkans. While Bush and Clinton’s methods differed, the principles
guiding their decisions remained the same. Thus, Clinton’s method allowed him to bring
more American pressure against the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, Bosnians, and Croats to
mediate a solution. However, Clinton, like Bush, struggled to find a strategy that
effectively used outside influences to end the intra-state conflict in Bosnia.
Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Muslims, Croatians, and Serbs in Bosnia
began fighting amongst themselves over territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian
Croats and Bosnian Serbs gained support from Croatia and Serbia to defend the areas
where their ethnic group was a majority. At the same time, Bosnian Muslims attempted to
maintain the cohesion of Bosnia as contiguous state. During the fighting, Bosnian Serbs
with support from Slobodan Milošević and Serbian military forces initiated ethnic
cleansing to remove Bosnian Muslim from areas of Bosnian to create Greater Serbia,
while Bosnian Croats supported by Croatia annexed Bosnian territory they historically
claimed as part of Croatia.166 This policy of ethnic cleansing eventually led to dramatic
scenes of refugee streams, cities under siege, and tales of genocide, as the international
community attempted to convince the three parties to end the fighting, and punish
Bosnian Serbs and Serbia for its policy of ethnic cleansing.
Bush’s Policies and the Bosnian War
After recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent country, Bush
confronted continued violence in former Yugoslavia as the Croatian, Muslim, and Serb
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ethnic groups fought for control of territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the Bosnian
War the Serbs carried out ethnic cleansing to remove non-Serbs from areas of BosniaHerzegovina to create Greater Serbia. As the Bush administration prepared to respond,
the CIA released a NIE report analyzing the situation and the methods available to
respond and contain the violence. The analysts wrote, “nothing short of large-scale,
outside military intervention—which no European country is now prepared to
undertake—can end the fighting in Yugoslavia.”167 The report continued that a UN
peacekeeping mission would not resolve the conflicting territorial claims and growing
animosities among Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians. Also, the greatest obstacle to
peace was Serb-inspired fighting in Bosnia to create Greater Serbia. The CIA argued that
the only way to the international community could prevent the violence from
destabilizing the rest of Europe was by using all available sanctions and rewards to
exploit internal problems in Serbia that would force Serb leaders to participate in
settlement negotiations.168
As the CSCE focused its attention on resolving the conflict in Bosnian, Bush
applied his Yugoslav strategies towards Bosnia. This included not deploying US forces to
enforce peace in Bosnia. Bush also remained committed to supporting European policy
decisions towards Yugoslavia and using international cooperation to end the fighting
there. However, the administration did support sanctions to pressure the parties to
mediate a solution to the civil war. As the United States and international committed
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worked to establish sanctions against the parties in Bosnia, they agreed that humanitarian
aid was needed in Bosnia.169
In June 1992, the UN passed resolution 757,170 which encouraged UN members to
ensure the delivery of humanitarian supplies to those displaced by the Bosnian conflict.
In support of UN resolution 757, Bush analysts studied humanitarian needs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish US humanitarian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
analysis explained that humanitarian aid was critically needed in Bosnia since the
UNHCR and ICRC had stopped delivering aid to Bosnia because of guerrilla fighters and
refused armed escorts to deliver humanitarian aid. They also noted that without UNHCR
and ICRC humanitarian supplies, Croatia was the only country delivering help to
Sarajevo. The analysis also described that the UN’s inability to broker a cease-fire had
hindered efforts to set up the Sarajevo airport to deliver aid.171 As the administration
decided how to deliver the much-needed aid to Bosnia, it also discussed ways to
cooperate with allies to ensure that humanitarian supplies reached Bosnia with as little
interference as possible. To accomplish this the NSC/DC developed a diplomatic strategy
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to get consensus from European leaders to support US efforts and use their influence in
former Yugoslavia to prevent any hindrances to US humanitarian deliveries.
The NSC/DC suggested getting Russia and European allies to deliver démarches
to Belgrade that expressed US intentions to provide aid to Bosnia, and that the United
States expected Serbia to unblock the Sarajevo airport, withdraw their forces from the
area, and respect the UN-brokered agreement that had opened the airport. The NSC/DC
argued that rather than making a simple decision for or against US participation in
delivery efforts, that the administration needed to determine which circumstances
warranted the US involvement.172 It explained that the advantages of providing
humanitarian aid demonstrated American concern for Bosnian, supported Bosnia’s
president, increased Serb opposition against Milošević, tempered Milošević’s aspirations,
pressured Croatia to stay out of Bosnia, and a US commitment increased the operations
probability of success. However, the disadvantages were that the situation in Bosnia
could worsen and endanger the lives of American soldiers, aid could remain undistributed
at the airport, the EC could become reluctant to follow through leaving the United States
to carry the greatest share of the burden, guerrilla attacks on aid deliveries could resume,
and there would be calls to expand humanitarian deliveries beyond Sarajevo.173
This analysis of US humanitarian policies revealed that the Bush administration
did not want the United States to be provide humanitarian relief for Bosnia if the
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Europeans were not willing to participate. To prevent the United States from bearing the
burden of the relief efforts unilaterally or becoming caught in a quagmire in Bosnia.
Especially when CIA, NIE, and NSC memos demonstrated there was little resolve among
the Europeans to assertively end the conflict or start a peacekeeping operation. The CIA
report reaffirmed the costs to end the violence in Bosnia, and the lack of willingness
among European states to undertake the necessary actions to end the violence.
Recognizing that no country was willing to deploy their military to stop the violence in
Bosnia and that a UN peacekeeping mission would not resolve the issues causing the
violence, the NIE recommended international sanctions against Serbia. While the
international community recognized the violence occurring in Bosnia there was little
drive to introduce forceful policies that would pressure all sides to mediate a solution to
the conflict. Bush’s decision to consider supporting humanitarian relief while
encouraging NATO and UN to resume theirs revealed that the United States, like Europe,
was hesitant to forcefully intervene in the Bosnian intra-state conflict.
Balkan Task Force Established
During a meeting on 4 June to discuss the memorandum on humanitarian aid to
Bosnian, the NSC/DC concluded that the situation in Bosnia had deteriorated further and
there were no signs that the violence would abate soon. International efforts to help
Sarajevo had also stalled as the UN was unable to deliver humanitarian aid to Sarajevo or
open the Sarajevo airport. However, the states were enforcing the sanctions. In an attempt
to better develop policies to respond to Bosnia Bush agreed to establish a group dedicated
to examining the situation in Bosnia and to propose solutions that could successfully
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deliver aid to Bosnia.174 Shortly after this meeting, the Bush administration established
the Balkan Task Force, and its first report described the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia.
The BTF was created on 12 June 1992 and headed by Jim Carson, CIA Chief of
Security Issues Division, and made up of analysts from the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and
other agencies as needed. The BTF’s objective was to ensure the efficient use of
American resources and US intelligence analysis by centralizing and coordinating the
development and implementation for America’s response to Bosnia. It also centralized
and coordinated sanctions monitoring according to UNSC resolution 757, coordinated
general and tactical military intelligence analysis, and drafted contingency plans to
support the delivery of aid to Bosnia.175 Bush established the BTF’s original mission to
focus solely on America’s humanitarian policies towards Bosnia. Since Bush was not
prepared to expand US support any further, the BTF’s objectives remained narrow in
focus. Bush’s formation of the BTF reveals that US policies towards the Bosnian conflict
needed more resources to analyze the situation and readily recommend policy changes.
The BTF was not tasked with developing recommendations for policies toward ending
the conflict in Bosnia or international cooperation. However, the BTF did provide
situation reports on the effects the Bosnian conflict was having on the rest of Europe.176
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In an August intelligence memorandum, the BTF reported that the violence in
Bosnia had created a “terror campaign that threatened to destroy civil society and inflict
famine and disease on a large population.”177 The report noted that the Serb policy of
ethnic cleansing had created a severe refugee problem with over 1.3 million Bosnians
displaced internally, 500,000 refugees had fled to Croatia, and 9,000 killed in the
fighting. It continued that in response to continued fighting and increased domestic and
international pressures the Western European governments would have to revise their
refugee policies.
It also described the destruction of residential areas, government buildings, major
thoroughfares into the cities were blocked, and most of Bosnia’s airports. Additionally,
municipal services including electricity, water, and sewage treatment were erratic and
scarce in urban areas, and rural fighting was pushing refugees into urban areas
exacerbating the conditions there.178 The BTF agreed that the humanitarian situation
would worsen during the winter of 1992-1993 and that, “the current conflict and
atrocities are a result of residual resentment over acts committed by all sides during the
Second World War.”179 The BTF report continued to blame the violence on "ancient
hatreds," while describing the humanitarian disaster. Bush decided to continue US
cooperation with Europe to provide humanitarian relief to the Bosnians. He also
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continued to resist deploying US military forces even as the Europeans began planning to
deploy their forces to Bosnia.180
Bush’s strategy towards Bosnia was primarily focused on devising ways for the
United States to support humanitarian relief efforts for the civilians displaced and
suffering from the Bosnian War. His strategy was also devised to prevent the United
States from deploying its military forces to try and end a political conflict that required
diplomatic resolution efforts not an outside enforced peace. Bush also focused on
allowing the Europeans to resolve its own security concerns, so that Europe could
establish post-Cold War cooperation frameworks. However, Bush remained dedicated to
America’s core foreign policy themes and principles of deterring international
aggression, supporting international efforts to resolve crises, and defending US interests
around the world.
Clinton and the Bosnian War
In November, the Bush had lost his re-election bid for the American presidency to
Bill Clinton. When he assumed the presidency, Clinton initially continued Bush’s focus
on humanitarian relief for Bosnia. At the same time, the Clinton administration started to
draft its national security strategy for the United States. First Clinton’s administration
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needed to “decide what it wants to achieve and what price it is prepared to pay to get
it.”181
In his 1994 NSS, Clinton outlined that European stability was vital to US security.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had an unparalleled
opportunity to contribute to a free and undivided Europe. Part of this strategy required the
United States to work to end the Bosnia War, and to prevent the war from enveloping
Europe and its new democratic countries. To do this the United States needed to stem the
flow of refugees, stop civilian deaths, and confirm NATO’s centrality to post-Cold War
European security. Clinton also acknowledged the violence in Bosnia demonstrated that
military forces remained relevant, and that the United States faced difficult decisions
about the use of its military power to respond to post-Cold War intranational and
international conflicts.182
Clinton’s first steps upon taking office was to recognize the threat the Bosnian
War posed to US interests in Europe. He also reaffirmed NATO’s role in European
security, and America’s role as a NATO member in European security. Clinton’s security
strategy also recognized that the United States needed to create a strategy to determine
when military interventions were feasible options for intranational conflicts. Clinton’s
national security strategy also demonstrated reluctance to deploy US forces as part of a
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, though US interventions in other intranational conflicts
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were possible. The national security strategy also revealed that Clinton was not willing to
usurp the EC and NATO but desired greater cooperation with those institutions. Clinton
first national security strategy went further than Bush’s strategy in recognizing the future
threats that intranational conflicts posed to US interests. However, like Bush, Clinton also
lacked a clear strategy for preventing and responding to those conflicts. As he continued
to comprehend and respond to the Bosnian War
In his first Presidential Review Directive,183 Clinton outlined a new policy focus
based on campaign promises to do more in Bosnia. This included relying on intelligence
documents inherited from the Bush administration. While Clinton’s first policy decision
was to continue delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnia, he also directed Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Director of Central Intelligence R.
James Woolsey, and Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to consider
the policy options available for Clinton to consider beyond enforcing the no-fly zone in
Bosnia.184 Through his directive, Clinton provided his advisors and their staffs with the
initial direction he wanted his Bosnian policies to go. He also established that for the
Bosnian War, the United States would continue to take a support role in international
efforts to end the conflict.
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Clinton requested his advisors consider methods to guarantee the delivery of
humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, end Serbian aggression, reverse Serbian
territorial gains, punish Serbia for its actions, provide additional support to the VanceOwen negotiations, reaffirm and better explain Bush’s Christmas demarcate185 and how
the administration planned to implement it. Clinton sought ideas on how to pursue
concerted action with European allies and the world community to place economic and
military pressure on Serbian leaders to end the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and participate
in negotiations. He also asked for clarification on ways the administration could tighten
sanctions against Serbia, deny Serb military forces access to land and water
transportation routes, increase international efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal,
encourage Milošević’s opposition in Serbia, and other options that did not involve a US
military intervention and the costs of each strategy. Lastly, Clinton asked his advisors to
consider all possible actions except military force such as alternatives to air dropping
humanitarian supplies, the best options to provide defensive military supplies to the
Bosnians, and actions the U.S. could take to help implement the Vance-Owen plan if it
was accepted.186
Clinton’s policy directive revealed that he wanted to implement more assertive
polices in Bosnia. However, he wanted to continue humanitarian relief and wanted to
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avoid deploying American forces to end the conflict. While Clinton wanted to be able to
fulfil Bush’s warning to Milošević, Clinton remained hesitant to deploy US forces to
intervene. Clinton’s advice request revealed that he was initially focused on diplomatic
and non-military options to force the Serbs to participate in the Vance-Owen process, and
that he wanted to end Serbian support for Bosnian Serb actions. Clinton’s request also
revealed that he wanted to maintain US support and cooperation with the international
community to end the Bosnian conflict. However, Clinton did not ask for any
recommendations on increasing American leadership in efforts to end the Bosnian War.
Additionally, these initial steps demonstrated that the Clinton wanted to
implement more aggressive policies to end the Bosnian war, but with little deviation from
Bush's policies. Instead, the administration wanted more aggressive policies versions of
Bush's policies. As the administration continued to respond to the violence in Bosnia and
negotiation efforts stalled or failed, the administration was forced to reconsider initial
policies and the best ways to achieve them.
Clinton Keeps the Balkan Task Force
Another holdover from Bush’s presidency was the BTF. Clinton decided to
continue the BTF, and expanded its mission beyond recommending humanitarian policies
to include working with the NSC to guide discussions and policy strategy options. This
decision allowed Clinton to take advantage of a resource dedicated and experienced with
studying the Bosnian War to provide additional policy recommendation. At the end of
March, the BTF issued a paper on Serbian war goals, it noted:
“The central Serb goals in Bosnia have been and remain the destruction of Bosnia
as a viable independent state and the incorporation of Serb-claimed regions into a
greater Serbia. The current Bosnian Serb offensive in eastern Bosnia should be
128

seen in this context; it appears aimed at eliminating the few remaining Muslim
enclaves in the region. Barring the introduction of an external force strong enough
to compel them to desist, the Serbs are unlikely to stop until they have achieved
that goal.”187
It continued that the Vance-Owen Plan encouraged the Serbs to accelerate their
efforts to force the international community to recognize Serb territorial gains before a
settlement was reached. The BTF noted the Serbs continued to resist the Vance-Owen
Plan because the map only recognized Serb territorial gains in the Bosnia's Drina River
Valley. The BTF concluded that the Vance-Owen Plan had not encouraged the Serbs to
stop their actions, because the Serbs knew continued violence in Bosnia would prevent
the international community from implementing the Vance-Owen Plan or any other peace
agreement. This encouraged the Serbs to eliminate the few remaining eastern Bosnian
Muslim enclaves the Serbs to gain military and demographic control of the region.188
The task force contended that the siege of Sarajevo had little military value to the
Serbs, especially since the Serbs lacked the personnel to engage in house-to-house
fighting necessary to claim the city. Instead, the siege of Sarajevo was a Serb plan
designed to destroy Sarajevo as a symbol of a multi-ethnic Bosnia. The siege was also
designed to pressure Izetbegovic to leave the talks, so the Serbs were not the only party
opposed to the Vance-Owen Plan.189 The BTF memorandum concluded that Serb
“actions reflect political reality; there is little doubt that Serb ‘agreement’ to a version of
the Vance-Owen Plan will not imply compliance with the letter or spirit of an accord. The

187
“1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” Clinton Digital Library, accessed
November 6, 2015, http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12318. 1
188

“1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” 1

189

“1993-03-23B, BTF Memorandum re Serb War Aims,” 2.

129

Serbs are not likely to withdraw from any territory they occupy barring the arrival of an
international force able and willing to compel them to do so.”190 As the BTF reported the
Serbs were the main culprit for the continued violence in Bosnia. The BTF report showed
that the Serbs were taking advantage of the international community’s reluctance to
militarily intervene to annex Bosnian territory and drive out non-Serbs from those areas.
It also revealed the difficulties Clinton and his administration faced ending the Bosnian
War, if the international community was reluctant to respond forcefully enough to
pressure the parties to negotiate a settlement. However, Clinton established in PRD-1 that
he too was reluctant to deploy American military power to Bosnia to end the conflict.
The BTF analysts contend that if the international community successfully
undertook the mission then the Serbs would grudgingly comply while encouraging
guerrilla attacks. The BTF argued, though difficult, the administration could implement
policies that pressured the Serbs to alter their policies. It suggested lifting the arms
embargo against Bosnia to encourage Serb cooperation. However, the BTF noted that the
United States would have difficulty persuading the UN, Russia, and EC to support the
policy change because they would argue lifting the embargo endangered UN troops and
humanitarian operations. The BTF’s alternative policy suggestion was to tighten
sanctions against Serbia further, which would increase pressure against Milošević.
However, this policy would radicalize Serbian public opinion and increase the influence
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of ultra-nationalists, which would require the United States to increase aid to Macedonia,
Romania, and Bulgaria to gain their cooperation.191
The BTF’s policy recommendations revealed another issue Clinton faced in his
efforts to encourage the international community to pressure the parties to negotiation:
the lack of consensus among the international community on policies to end the Bosnian
War. The BTF report revealed that while the United States supported lifting the arms
embargo against Bosnia, other members of the community opposed it fearing danger to
their troops and the humanitarian mission. Like the international community’s reluctance
to deploying military forces to Bosnia to forcibly end the war, the opposition to this
policy demonstrated the international community’s limits on intervening in intra-state
conflicts beyond supporting negotiations. This opposition to ending the arms embargo
against Bosnia was one policy that repeatedly stymied Clinton and his administration’s
efforts at international cooperation to end the Bosnian conflict. As Clinton increased the
assertiveness of his policies and introduced American leadership to the peace process,
international opposition to more forceful policies gradually decreased.
NSC Meetings 1993-1995
From 1993 to 1995 Clinton used various responses to end the Bosnia conflict and
slowly abandoned Bush’s policies towards Bosnia. During the first two NSC/PC
meetings, the Clinton administration discussed Bush’s strategy and ways to use the BTF
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under NSC Director for Europe Jenonne Walker’s leadership 192 The NSC/PC also
established three categories of actions to pressure the Serbs to end their campaign. The
first category focused on humanitarian policies including air drops and closing Serb
detention camps. The second dealt with sanctions and public diplomacy in Serbia. The
third category explored policies that included American military power, including air
power, and ending force restrictions on UNPROFOR.193 Early in 1993, Clinton and his
advisors had a strategy foundation for Bosnian policies. Clinton initially decided to
continue several of Bush’s policies towards Bosnia. This included the BTF, Bush’s
warning to Milošević against spreading violence to Kosovo, limiting American military
involvement to end the fighting, and cooperating with the UN and EU. At the same time,
Clinton altered these policies to fit his strategy.
The NSC/PC agreed early on that the United States was willing to use force to
implement an agreement. As part of this, the committee had the military draw up a
possible military intervention in Bosnia. The intervention included targeting Serbian
military, industrial, and government sites, and required American access to allies’
airbases, and deploying US Naval forces to the Balkans. The military noted that the
intervention would lead to high civilian casualties and increase refugee flows out of the
Balkans, European allies would oppose a military intervention, and it would alienate
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Russia.194 The NSC/PC also discussed European opposition to ending the arms embargo
against Bosnia and US support for Bosnian Muslims. The committee discussed European
threats to abandon the peace process if the United States insisted on ending the embargo
forcing which would force the United States negotiate unilaterally with the three groups.
They noted that this situation isolated the United States from its allies and limited US
options.195
The administration’s discussion on cooperation with the EU and UN revealed that
while the United States had accepted and was reluctantly willing to militarily intervene in
Bosnia to end the war or end the arms embargo against Bosnia, America’s allies were not
ready to make that step. Instead, EU and UN remained dedicated to negotiating an end to
the conflict, and remained determined to avoid military entanglements in Bosnia before a
peace agreement was reached. At the same time, while the EU and UN had confidence
the Vance-Owen negotiations would succeed, Clinton and his administration were less
confident and believed the Vance-Owen Plan was not aggressive enough. The differences
in strategy preferences between the United States and the international community were
not lost to Clinton and his advisors. However, Clinton’s commitment to an international
approach to end the war, required him to make compromises with the international
community to bring peace to Bosnia.
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To compromise American policies with the international community, Clinton’s
advisors debated US diplomatic strategy beginning with four broad approaches:
1. Replacing the Vance-Owen Plan with a more aggressive US approach,
2. changing the Vance-Owen map for one more morally acceptable and
enforcing it,
3. ending US participation in EU-led negotiations while maintaining pressure
on all parties to accept the agreement,
4. focus US efforts on providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia and ending all
US political and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.196
The NSC/PC immediately eliminated the first and last options as placing too restrictive
on US strategy. The continued diplomatic discussions based on the third and second
option.197 As policy disagreements with EU limited Clinton’s strategy choices, Clinton’s
advisors set aside military options and focused on humanitarian and diplomatic strategies
that worked “in parallel with the Allies and Russia rather than in concert” that included a
two-track strategy—humanitarian aid and acquiescing to Vance-Owen negotiations.198
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While Clinton was unwilling to break with international efforts to end the conflict in
Bosnia, the divergences between American policy goals and the international
community’s goals hindered efforts to end the intranational conflict.
Clinton’s Policies Towards the Vance-Owen Plan
Since 1991 Lord David Owen, EU Envoy to the UN Secretary-General had
worked to create a negotiated settlement that would end the fighting in Bosnia. In the first
half of 1993 the Vance-Owen Plan was the international community’s best chance to end
the Bosnian War. In 1993, Cyrus Vance, Special Envoy to UN Secretary-General joined
Lord Owen and together the men created the Vance-Owen Plan. The Vance-Owen Plan
created a Bosnian constitution, military solution, and established Bosnian territorial
boundaries and ethnic provinces based on ethnic population. The Vance-Owen Plan
relied on the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia’s provisional constitution,
plan to demilitarize Bosnia, and a map that divided Bosnian into ten provinces with
proportional representation in the government. The map also rejected most of the Serbs
territorial gains outside of the Drina River Valley.199
The Vance-Owen map would cause the Serbs and Muslims to reject the plan
initially while the Croats accepted it. The Serbs rejected the plan because it voided their
territorial gains in Bosnia, and the Bosnian Muslims rejected the map because it
recognized Serbian territorial gains through ethnic cleansing.200 The Vance-Owen Plan
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compromised the international committee’s commitment to reject territorial acquisitions
made through aggression or genocide. This compromise was the main problem Clinton
and his administration had with the Vance-Owen Plan, and why they wanted to push for a
“more morally acceptable” map.201 While the Clinton administration worked to support a
Vance-Owen settlement, the administration discussed their disapproval of the VanceOwen Plan. The discussed their moral apprehension to recognizing any of the Serb's
territorial gains from ethnic cleansing. Another issue was the large number of troops
required to implement the plan.202 While the Clinton administration disliked the VanceOwen Plan, they were unwilling to reject it because they were not ready to lead mediation
efforts.203 Despite Clinton and his advisors’ antipathy to the Vance-Owen Plan, their
commitment to an international effort to end the Bosnian conflict and reluctance to take
over leadership of the settlement overruled their opposition. Even as the Clinton
administration hoped the Vance-Owen Plan would succeed the administration drafted
contingency policies and continued to work on providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia.
Following its initial meetings, the NSC/PC and NSC/DC continued to meet as the
Vance-Owen negotiations progressed, and the international community held high hopes
the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would accept the Vance-Owen Plan. By April the
Muslims and Croats had signed the Vance-Owen Plan. In preparation for an agreement,
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Clinton’s advisors began debating the roles the United States would take to implement
the Vance-Owen Plan.204As the deadline approached to accept the Vance-Owen Plan,
Milošević continued to hold off on the agreement. In April, Lord Owen met with
Milošević and other Serbian leaders and personally presented the plan. After this meeting
Milošević signed the Vance-Owen Plan, and sent it to the Serbian parliament for final
approval. Milošević accepted the plan to reduce international pressure and economic
sanctions against Serbia, and because he believed the international community would not
provide the military force necessary to enforce the Vance-Owen Plan. 205
As the Clinton administration waited for Serbian parliament to agree, the NSC/PC
drafted requirements for US military support for the settlement. The NSC/PC required the
parties to abide by the settlement and their fighting. However, if the parties ignored the
settlement and fighting continued, US forces were prevented from deploying to
Bosnia.206 Even as the NSC/PC confirmed US willingness to help implement and enforce
the agreement, it also worked to protect US military forces entering an unresolved
conflict where American soldiers would get caught between opposing sides. Along with
the safeguards, the NSC/PC requested the CIA establish a method the administration
could use determine which party was responsibility for refusing to comply with the

204

Summaries of Deputies Committee Meetings on Bosnia March 4-9, 1993 in National Security
Council and Records Management Office, “Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia,” Clinton Digital
Library, accessed December 20, 2015, http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614.
205

Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 276-279.

206
Memorandum “Decisions of Principals Committee Meeting On Bosnia, March 13, 1993” in
National Security Council and Records Management Office, “Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia,”
Clinton Digital Library, accessed December 20, 2015,
http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614.

137

Vance-Owen settlement.207 As it appeared possible the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats were
reaching an agreement, the administration determined that the United States would
participate in multinational efforts to implement and enforce a settlement. Even as
Clinton broke with Bush's strategy, he still followed the EC's lead though he increasingly
pressured the EC to act more assertively.
Between March and May, the administration concentrated on collaborating with
the UN and NATO to implement the Vance-Owen Plan and discussions in the UNSC to
develop concerted responses in case Serbia refused to sign the agreement. There was a
general consensus in the UN that the UN should enact harsher sanctions against Serbia if
it refused the settlement.208 As the mediation efforts continued into April, the Serbs were
the only party that had not signed the agreement. Despite Milošević’s arguments for
signing the agreement, the Serbian Parliament disagreed and refused to ratify the plan.209
The Vance-Owen Plan’s failure forced the Clinton administration to re-evaluate
its strategy. The administration decided to continue encouraging EC efforts to create a
new peace settlement. The administration also continued to review the possibility of
deploying US forces, and disagreed about sending US airpower to support NATO safe
havens or defending UNPROFOR. The NSC/PC decided to send Secretary Christopher to
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discuss strategy options with European foreign ministers, and the committee discussed
contingency plans in case the Europeans rejected any of the proposals. These
contingencies included taking unilateral actions, abandoning the negotiations completely,
adopting the European approach to military force, try to contain the fighting to Bosnia,
start punitive airstrikes against Serbia to force Serbia to accept an agreement, support the
UN cease-fire, or to make no changes. These debates were not significantly different
from the discussions the administration had in January, except that the administration
added the use of force to the options list.210
After the defeat of the Vance-Owen Plan, the international community continued
its efforts to get the Bosnian parties to agree to a settlement. The United States continued
to push for ending the arms embargo on Bosnia and preventing the fighting from
spreading beyond Bosnia. In September, another agreement was attempted by the British
on HMS Invincible, but it failed as the Bosnian Muslims continued to oppose any map
that recognized Serb territorial gains and the Serbs rejected any settlement that did not. In
response, the Clinton administration began working to establish cooperation between the
Bosnian Muslims and Croats to limit fighting in Bosnia.211
The Clinton administration’s policy discussions following the rejection of the
Vance-Owen Plan demonstrated that the plan’s failure had reinvested the administration
into the possibility of deploying American forces to Bosnia. At the same time, the
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administration did not deviate far from its policy discussion at the start of Clinton’s
presidency. The administration remained dedicated to an international effort to end the
Bosnian War, and to avoid acting unilaterally.
1994
In February 1994, Secretary of State Christopher, NSA Anthony Lake, and Vice
President Al Gore met with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and the Croatian
Foreign Minister Mate Granic. This meeting began a US-led effort to create cooperation
between Bosnian and Croat governments. On 1 March the Muslims and Croats finalized
the Washington Agreement.212 The Washington Agreement established a cooperative
framework for a confederation agreement between the Bosnian government and Bosnian
Croats. On 18 March, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and the Bosnian Croat Leader
Zubak signed a constitution that created a confederation for those Bosnian areas with
Croat and Muslim majorities.213 The Washington Agreement, stopped the fighting
between the Muslims and Croats making it possible for the Muslims to receive weapons
through Croatia.214 The Clinton administration’s efforts to create the agreement between
the Bosnian government and its Croat population demonstrated it was possible to reduce
the fighting the Bosnian conflict. The Clinton administration’s ability to influence an
intranational conflict like Bosnian revealed that international pressure was viable.
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In April, the Serbs launched an attack on the city of Gorazde, which the UN had
designated as a safe haven. Clinton administration responded by urging the UN to tighten
sanctions against Serbia, increased US forces in UNPROFOR Macedonia and provided
more equipment to UNPROFOR.215 It also discussed how the international community
was enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zones in Bosnia and how to make those
zones more effective.216 On 23 April, the administration discussed the possibility of
NATO airstrikes against Serb artillery in retaliation for Gorazde. They also decided to
send Christopher and Albright to discuss America’s “unhappiness” about the UN’s
refusal to authorize NATO airstrikes against the Serbs with Secretary General BoutrosGhali.217 The NSC/PC also discussed plans for possible NATO airstrikes on 24 April if
the Serbs refused to abide by the ceasefire and remove their weapons from Gorazde.218
The Washington agreement and the attack in Gorazde established a turning point for
Clinton’s Bosnia policies. Following these two events the Clinton administration
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gradually adopted a more aggressive diplomatic strategy to end Bosnia’s war. While
Clinton would slowly introduce more assertive policies, policies of humanitarian aid,
participating in international peace efforts remained core components of Clinton’s policy.
These core policies, especially cooperation with the international community would
provide the main hindrances to Clinton’s more assertive policies.
As 1994 continued, the US reaffirmed its policy to only participate in
peacekeeping measures under NATO auspices and continued to support negotiation
efforts. Yet the makeup of the international negotiation team was changed as the US and
Russian envoys, and representatives from UN, EU, and ICFY created the Contact Group,
to handle negotiations following settlement failures in 1993.219 The Contact Group began
drafting a new settlement in April. The first change the Contact Group made was to the
division of Bosnia. The first settlement divided gave the Bosnians 34 percent, the Croats
17 percent, and Bosnian Serbs 49 percent of Bosnian territory. This map also recognized
the settlement reached in the Washington Agreement and recognized the Muslim and
Croatian territories as a confederation.220 In concert with the Contact Groups strategy, the
Clinton administration tried to encourage Bosnia to accept the Contact Group's Proposal
for a 51/49 territory division with Serbia, and reiterated the US’s commitment to
supporting a viable settlement that ended the conflict. They also decided if the Serbs
remained the only holdout to the Contact Group proposal then the US would tighten

“Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, May 20, 1994,” in
National Security Council and Records Management Office, “Declassified Documents concerning Bosnia,”
Clinton Digital Library, accessed December 20, 2015,
http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614.
219

220

James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 260-264

142

sanctions against Serbia.221 When the Serbs rejected the Contact Group plan in July the
United States to push for increased sanctions against Serbia in the UN. The irony of the
Contact Group’s division of Bosnia was that it accepted some Serbian territorial gains
even though the Clinton administration had disagreed with the Vance-Owen Plan for the
same reason. However, following the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan and several other
efforts, the destruction of Bosnia, and the population changes forcibly created by Serbian
ethnic cleansing, the international community had little power to overturn the ethnic
changes in Bosnia. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration remained determined to
pressure the Serbs to accept a settlement that stopped the fighting.
During the summer, Secretary Christopher attempted to convince the Contact
Group to implement more robust options to punish the Serbs for refusing the settlement.
The administration recognized that it was becoming frustrating trying to convince the
other Contact Group members they needed to implement more forceful actions against
Serbia.222 Along with the Contact Group, the Clinton administration faced resistance in
the UN to strictly enforce the existing zones of exclusions, end the arms embargo against
Bosnia, and to a proposed Omnibus Sanctions resolution that included options to loosen
or tighten sanctions against Serbia based on Serb actions in Bosnia.223 Despite these
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challenges, the administration continued to push for more forceful policies against the
Serbs.
Throughout 1994 the administration’s strategy continued as it had during 1993.
However, the Washington Agreement and the attack on Gorazde had encouraged the
Clinton administration to implement more aggressive action. Beginning with its role in
the Contact Group, the Clinton administration began exercising American leadership and
encouraging more assertive policies in the international community. Additionally, after
disagreeing with the Vance-Owen Plan for its morally ambiguous map, the Clinton
administration increasingly accepted that there were no good options for a Bosnian
solution because no morally acceptable settlement would satisfy all parties or the morally
acceptable solutions created residual local-level conflicts for the new governments
handle.
Policy Re-evaluations After Two Years
In 1995, Clinton reassessed the Bosnian War and its impact on UN security
concerns. Clinton argued that while the Bosnian War did not threaten US security or
warrant an American unilateral military action, it remained a threat to post-Cold War
security that the United States could not ignore. Therefore, Clinton focused US policy
towards Bosnia on obtaining a political settlement that preserved Bosnia's territorial
integrity, provided all Bosnians a viable future state, prevented the war from spreading
into Europe, stopped refugee flows, ended ethnic cleansing, and reinforced NATO’s
central role in post-Cold War European security.224
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When compared to the NSS93, NSS94 only differed with the additions of
objectives to achieve a political solution to the conflict and creating a viable Bosnian
state. Clinton’s decision to continue participating in international efforts to end the
Bosnian War, even though the war did not threaten US interests, demonstrated Clinton’s
commitment to keeping the United States engaged in the world. These changes revealed
that after two years of participating in unsuccessful international efforts to end the
Bosnian conflict, the Clinton administration was ready to end the conflict, and start a
peacekeeping mission. The US faced several hurdles to achieve its goals. It faced
divisions within the international community and the Contact Group over the strength of
punitive policies, and the best method to convince all three parities to agree to a
settlement.
In January, the administration agreed the US had to avoid all appearances of
departing from its commitment to the Contact Group despite continued hindrances to
negotiations. The administration also decided they needed to deal with the possible end of
UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the end of March if the UN did not extend its mandate.225 In
February the administration assessed its policies and noted it had successfully prevented
the war from spreading, kept relief supplies available, and maintained cohesion with its
allies. However, the administration had been unable to produce a political settlement that
all parties accepted, and it had not reversed enough Serb territorial gains to convince the
Bosnians and Croatians to agree to a settlement. They noted the US lacked leverage with
the Bosnian government and Croats and had been unable to effectively use economic
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sanctions against Serbia to pressure the parities to accept a settlement. They also noticed
that none of the parties had a peacemaker, and that Milošević was unwilling to make the
Serbs stop fighting. In a policy review, it stated that:
"If we stay on our present course the prospects are for an escalation of the war in
Bosnia and a new war in Croatia, with the potential unraveling of our limited
achievements to date and increased pressures for U.S. involvement…If the war
escalates, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia, Bosnia or both will
become increasingly likely—creating the prospect of U.S. troops on the ground in
former Yugoslavia in a hostile environment, the outcome we have most sought to
avoid.”226
At this point the administration recognize it had failed to prioritize its policies in
any meaningful way, and that it had strategic choices to make based on Clinton’s 1995
national security strategy. These options included continuing current policies, adopting a
neutral position, and focusing on containing the fighting, arguing for the international
community to isolate Greater Serbia and impose UN sanctions, supporting the Bosnians,
and applying military force through UNPROFOR or NATO air strikes to pressure the
Serbs to accept a settlement.227
In early 1995, the administration continued to focus on political and democratic
measures to create a political settlement in Bosnia. As the year continued the
administration realized that diplomatic and political methods were not yielding the results
they desired. However, America’s limited leverage and the needed to maintain
international cooperation the administration could ill afford to end its diplomatic efforts,
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providing humanitarian relief, and containing the conflict.228 The administration’s
numerous policy re-evaluations up to 1995 revealed the administration was unable to find
satisfactory solutions to its disagreements with the international community on policy
choices. At the same time the administration remained committed to using international
pressure to convince the parties to settle the conflict, even though the international
community was unable to place sufficient pressure on the parties to accept an agreement.
In February, the Clinton administration attempted a new method to end the war. It
did this by attempting to convince Milošević to recognize Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia,
and the other former Yugoslav states.229 However, Milošević rejected the
administration’s suggestion because it "would be tantamount to recognition of the
Izetbegovic government, a move which would be counterproductive as it would drive the
Bosnian Serbs into a war fever."230 Milošević also replied that the only way to convince
the Serbs would be full and immediate sanctions relief.231 The administration floundered
through the rest of the summer trying to convince Milošević to accept the recognition
plan.
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Dayton Accords
In August, the Clinton administration started plans for a US-led peace settlement.
The administration planned to work in in conjunction with the Contact Group to negotiate
with the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs to finally achieve a settlement. In Geneva, the
Contact Group drafted the principles of an agreement that included recognition of Bosnia
and a political settlement to the conflict. The Contact Group also agreed to use NATO
Forces to implement the peace plan after it was accepted.232 As 1995 headed to a close,
the Clinton administration prepared to lead negotiations between Serbia, Bosnia, and
Croatia to settle the conflict and begin restoring peace to the Balkans.
The Clinton administration’s efforts at the end of 1995 culminated the gradual
changes it had implemented following the Washington Accords and the bombing of
Gorazde. Ever committed to international cooperation, the administration introduced
American leadership to the Contact Group and upcoming negotiations that was able to
leverage international pressure to convince the parties to accept US-led negotiations. Like
the Vance-Owen Plan before it, the Clinton administration’s attempt to end the conflict
would reveal Clinton’s ability to participate and lead international efforts to resolve other
intranational conflicts.
Throughout November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base near Dayton,
Ohio, Secretary Christopher, EU Special Representative Clark Bildt and Russian First
Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov negotiated with Croat, Bosnian, and Serb presidents
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to settle the Bosnian conflict. The first days of the conference began with positive steps,
and all three presidents attended all the sessions. The Serbs were not emotional and
provided constructive feedback to various proposals while the Bosnians pushed for the
end to the arms embargo.233 The opening days of the Dayton Conference started the
negotiations on a positive note. However, this positive beginning did not predict a good
outcome for the US-sponsored negotiations, especially when territory remained the
biggest hindrance to a settlement.
As the Bosnian parties worked on the map, constitution, elections, and the
federation of Bosnia, Milošević tested Contact Group members.234 On 8 November
Kerrick reported that the Serb and Bosnian presidents had agreed to a joint meeting with
the US delegation to discuss the Bosnian constitution, election issues, and the map.235
Beginning 9 November, the US delegation led intensive talks on the constitution,
election, and the map236 As the conference continued, progress was made on the
constitution and federation while map discussions stalled. The Clinton administration
resolved the impediment by proposing a map while Secretary Christopher conducted
intensive talks with the Bosnians and Serbs about the map. In December, the Bosnian,
Croat, and Serb presidents signed The Dayton Accords in Paris after agreeing to a map,
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constitution, and establishing elections.237 However, concerns remained about the
international community's ability to enforce the agreement and Bosnian Serb reactions
since many were unaware of the agreement until the last minute.
The Clinton administration’s ability to conduct the peace conference at the end of
1995 was due to a determined effort to pursue an aggressive diplomatic effort. The
administration faced considerable challenges encouraging the allies to support aggressive
policies and early humanitarian strategy inherited from the Bush administration. While
Bush had encouraged EC to lead efforts to resolve the Bosnian War, Clinton and his
administration attempted a strategy with greater US participation. Nonetheless, both
administrations had focused on limiting US military involvement in Bosnia. Both
administrations recognized that any military intervention to enforce a Bosnian peace
settlement would be large-scale and for a long duration.
Conclusions
Bush and Clinton developed different strategies towards the Bosnian War, while
relying on the same principles of US foreign policy to guide their decisions. While
Bush’s strategy towards Bosnia was an adaptation his strategy used during the dissolution
of Yugoslavia and heavily relied on European mediation efforts, Clinton’s strategy took
Bush’s strategy and incrementally introduced more American leadership and assertive
policies to pressure the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats to accept a peace settlement. Bush’s
strategy focused on humanitarian relief and supporting European leadership. Clinton’s
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strategy was repeatedly bogged down by policy disagreements with Europe that were less
inclined to adopt more forceful policies, especially over the use of military force and
ending the arms embargo against Bosnia.
In 1994, the signing of the Washington Accord by the Bosnians and Croats and
the bombing of Gorazde encouraged Clinton to implement a more aggressive diplomatic
strategy that pushed for tighter sanctions against Serbia and ending the arms embargo
against Bosnia. However, Europeans remained opposed to these sanctions. In 1995 the
Clinton administration used its leadership skills and led an international conference that
settled the Bosnian War in Dayton, OH. The signing of the Dayton Accords was possible
because Clinton effectively used American influence to bring the Bosnians, Serbs, and
Croats to the negotiation table.
Throughout the conflict in Bosnia, Clinton and Bush created policies based on US
foreign policy core principles of international cooperation against aggression. While both
presidents faced difficulties creating strategies to respond to the intranational conflict
their strategies and policy decisions demonstrate the timelessness of US core principles to
defend the United States and the deter aggression around the world. The Bosnian War
was not the only intranational conflict that posed different and additional challenges to
American foreign policymakers. The coup in Haiti would also test Bush and Clinton’s
ability to implement policies based on US foreign policy principles and respond to the
growing influence of race.
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CHAPTER VI – THE COUP IN HAITI: BUSH AND CLINTON
Introduction
Since the 1950s the United States had faced increasing pressures from AfricanAmericans and other peoples of color in the United States for social, economic, and legal
equality. These demands inspired the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth
century, which resulted in African Americans making significant strides to improve their
situation and standing in the United States. African-Americans have always had some
interest in US foreign relations238 and during the Cold War US foreign policymakers
relied on African Americans to defend against the Soviet threat.239 In the post-Cold War
period, American society continued to face questions about race and race relations at
home, but also how the United States would respond to race in post-Cold War
international relations. As African Americans gained political power they increased their
influence in American foreign policies towards African and the Caribbean.240 The
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overthrow of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 was one test of racial
politics in US foreign policy, especially as African Americans gained more power to
influence US foreign policy after the 1980s.
This chapter argues that Bush and Clinton’s responses to the Haitian revolution
reflected their understandings of the place of race in US foreign policy after the Cold
War. Throughout the twentieth century US foreign policymakers relied on peoples of
color to promote US foreign policy and improve relations in non-Western countries.
Bush’s and Clinton’s policies continued this strategy and demonstrated their
understanding and interests in relying on peoples of color to support US foreign policy
goals and US relations around the world after the Cold War. While Bush and Clinton did
not rely on African American diplomats as part of their responses they did acknowledge
lobbying efforts by the Congressional Black Caucus on US policies towards Haiti.
relations. The Congressional Black Caucus’s lobby efforts were especially influential in
Clinton’s decisions in 1994. During the Haitian coup, both presidents had to decide how
they were going to defend democracy after defeating communism from internal threats in
Latin America and elsewhere. Bush’s policies followed his New World Order national
security strategy and relied on negotiations led by the Organization of American States
(OAS) to diplomatically resolve the coup and restore democracy to Haiti. As he had in
Bosnia, Clinton initially adopted Bush’s policies. However, Congressional Black Caucus
lobbying efforts increasingly pushed for a change in US immigration policies towards
Haitian refugees, to take more aggressive actions against coup leaders in Haiti, take
leadership in OAS negotiations, and agree to deploy US military forces to Haiti. The
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Congressional Black Caucus also supported Aristide’s efforts and defended Aristide’s
reputation against those that support the Cédras regime.
The Haitian Coup
After decades of military rule and a five-year period of revolving governments,
Haiti freely elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the first democratic president of Haiti in
1990. During his presidency, Aristide implemented social reforms to curtail drug
trafficking and government corruption. Unfortunately, Aristide’s policies introduced
changes that angered Haitian elites that benefited from the drug trade and government
corruption. On 30 September 1991, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras led the Haitian
army in a coup that ousted Aristide and exiled him to Venezuela. Cédras then established
a three-man junta with himself, Lieutenant-Colonel Philippe Biamby, and LieutenantColonel Michel-Joseph Francóis. During its rule, the Cédras regime carried out numerous
human rights violations that included political murder, mutilations, and rape against
Aristide supporters and others in Haiti. To gain support for his return to Haiti, Aristide
relocated to the United States where he lobbied for international assistance from the OAS
and the UN. Aristide also petitioned the United States for support and gained support
from the CBC and liberal members of Congress.241
Bush’s Policy Strategy Regarding the Haitian Coup
In his 1991 national security strategy, Bush acknowledged that Latin America and
the Caribbean believed the United States was only interested in their region when the
Western Hemisphere was threatened. He argued that in the post-Cold War period the
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United States had to promote mutual common destiny of all the regions in the Western
Hemisphere, especially as the Western Hemisphere had become more significant to US
interests after the Cold War as democracy spread there. The United States proximity to
Latin America and the Caribbean made the United States more susceptible to threats from
instabilities in those countries. Bush also acknowledged that the Western Hemisphere
was on its way to becoming completely democratic with the introduction of democracy in
Haiti and Panama, and the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua. Bush noted that these
democracies were fragile and the United States needed to support them.242
In his 1991 national security strategy Bush posited that the United States could no
longer have waxing and waning interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The
opening of the region to democracy and the decline of Soviet influence required the
United States to make greater efforts improve its relations there. This included supporting
democratic governments that were emerging in the region as a recognition of the
common interests the United States had with Latin and Caribbean countries. However,
Bush did not outline how the United States would improve relations with Latin and
Caribbean countries in his security strategy, or how the United States would support the
fragile democracies in the United States. After promoting right-wing dictators in Latin
America and the Caribbean as part of the strategy to contain communism,243 the United
States faced significant challenges improving its relations with Latin America and the
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Caribbean after the Cold War. Nonetheless, Bush was dedicated to reinvigorating
cooperative security to promote international stability and security in the Western
Hemisphere.
Bush’s initial policy response to the Haitian coup included publically condemning
the coup and the illegal government. However, Bush decided against taking a leadership
role in the resolution process. Instead, he used the strategy he was using in Yugoslavia–
American supported UN and OAS-led negotiations to respond to Haiti’s crisis. Bush’s
strategy promoted cooperative action.244 Due to a combination of American foreign
policy values and Bush’s preference to avoid deploying the US military to intervene in
political conflicts, and that regional security and cooperation institutions were better
situated to mediate regional instabilities.245 By supporting OAS diplomatic efforts, Bush
encouraged the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to settle the conflict
between the Haitian junta and President Aristide so Aristide could return to power and
restore democracy to Haiti. Bush’s decision not to put the United States in a leadership
role was to encourage cooperative action, a sense of common destiny and mutual
responsibility with OAS members. As part of his support for OAS policies towards Haiti,
Bush declared a national emergency towards Haiti, and prohibited financial transactions
between Haiti and the United States on 4 October.246 On 28 October, He issued a second
order that expanded the prohibited financial transactions between the United States and
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Haiti.247 Bush’s policies towards Haiti began by economically isolating Haiti and
establishing that the United States did not recognized the junta’s government. As he had
in Yugoslavia, Bush pushed for a collaborative effort to resolve Haiti’s crisis rather than
adopting a unilateral response. As the Cédras regime solidified its control and
international sanctions took hold, Haitians began fleeing the violence and worsened
poverty in their country. The refugees fled to the Dominican Republic, Latin American
nations, and the United States.
Eventually, the refugee flow caused by the Haitian crisis began affecting
American immigration resources. Bush responded by establishing a refugee processing
center at Guantanamo base in Cuba. Through November the refugee flow to the United
States increased and overcrowded the center at Guantanamo. This led Bush to abide by
the 1981 US-Haiti immigration agreement. This agreement by Reagan and Haitian
dictator Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier allowed the United States to interdict Haitian
refugees at sea and return them to Haiti without following traditional asylum practices.248
Bush defended his decision by arguing that most of the refugees were fleeing the
economic sanctions in Haiti, not the military junta. The administration decided to begin
repatriations with the Haitian refugees in Guantanamo. The Haitians were returned to
Port-au-Prince aboard a US Coast Guard cutter. The Haitians were only allowed to return
to the ship if their life or safety was in immediate danger where the United States would
provide humanitarian assistance. The administration also decided it would suspend
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repatriation if any Haitian migrants were brutalized by the illegal government upon
disembarking. However, the Haitians had to return to US ships under their own power.249
While Bush’s executive orders demonstrated the United States supported OAS
diplomatic efforts to resolve the Haitian crisis, and Bush’s commitment to international
cooperation. Bush’s refugee policy opened the Bush administration to questions about its
commitment to defend human rights abroad. Unlike the conflict in Yugoslavia where
America’s distance from the conflict protected the United States from threats to its
interests, America’s proximity to Haiti ensured the country received some of the refugees
fleeing the military junta and international economic sanctions against Haiti.
As Bush responded to the crisis in Haiti, the CBC pressured Bush to ensure that
the Aristide was returned to power and democracy was restored to Haiti. The CBC was
founded in 1971, and is the successor to the Democratic Select Committee founded by
Congressman Charles Diggs. The Democratic Select Committee was created to bring
African American Representatives to meet sporadically. In 1969 African American
Congress members began coordinating their efforts in response to the Nixon presidency
that led to a protracted confrontation between African American Congress members and
the president and led to a sense of common purpose and identity. The CBC also emerged
at a point that the Civil Rights Movement was in decline and the African American
community was placing emphasis on political accomplishments. The original CBC
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mission was as “Congressmen at large for twenty million Black people.”250 As the CBC
continued it expanded its mission from a domestic focus to include foreign policy as well.
CBC efforts to discuss Bush’s policies towards Haiti was part of the CBC’s
growing influence in Congress and foreign policy discussions. Beginning on 1 October
1991 the CBC and its members began contacting Bush and his administration with policy
advice and encouraging Bush to adopt “all diplomatic means to restore the legitimately
elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide…and encourage you to call on
the United Nations and the Organization of American States in seeking a peaceful
resolution to this conflict.”251 The CBC encouraged Bush to seek international
cooperation to end the Haitian coup, but it did not encourage Bush to act unilaterally. The
CBC also connected the rise of democracy in Haiti to America’s mission to spread
democracy abroad, “As totalitarianism collapses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
the United States must reaffirm its commitment to the democratic roots of Haiti.” 252 The
CBC’s letter to Bush indicated it concerns about the situation in Haiti, and connected
Haiti’s crisis to US interests.
During Bush’s presidency and the early part of the coup, the CBC exercised few
attempts to influence Bush to adjust his policies in Haiti. This would change as the crisis
continued, refugees continued to flee to the United States and military junta refused to
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cooperate with international mediators. The CBC would increase its influence on policy
decisions during Clinton’s presidency. As Bush and Clinton struggled to determine
America’s role in the post-Cold War period, and how the United States would encourage
international cooperation, the CBC gained influence in US foreign policy decisions
towards Haiti. While CBC efforts were less assertive during Bush’s presidency, Clinton’s
presidency created more opportunities for the CBC to influence foreign policies. In
particular, the CBC would prove capable to convincing Clinton and other policymakers
that the Haitian crisis posed a significant risk to US interests that warranted a US
intervention to restore Aristide and democracy to Haiti. At the start of the Haitian coup,
race did not heavily influence Bush’s foreign policy. Though he faced opposition for his
immigration policies towards the Haitian refugees, most of the critics opposed the
repatriation of Haitian refugees for humanitarian reasons. Additionally, the CBC was less
outspoken of Bush’s policies.
Race and Clinton’s Foreign Policy
Three months after beginning his presidency, Clinton had his first White House
meeting with Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. After the meeting, Presidents
Clinton and Aristide held a joint press conference. During the conference Clinton said it
was important to him and to the United States to restore democracy to Haiti and return
President Aristide to power. He continued, “I want to make it clear in the strongest
possible terms that we will not now or ever support the continuation of an illegal
government in Haiti…And I want to make it clear that the United States is committed
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strongly to a much more aggressive effort to restore Mr. Aristide to his presidency.”253
Many including the CBC viewed Clinton's statement as a change in his policy direction.
However, it was not until 1994 Clinton carried out America’s commitment to return
Aristide to Haiti. While Bush had been less influenced by race in his foreign policy
decisions, the growing prominence of race and racial interactions in public debates
between Bush’s and Clinton’s presidency required Clinton to pay greater attention to
America’s policies in the Caribbean and Africa as he implemented his national security
strategy of engagement and enlargement. He did this by connecting the Haitian coup to
US interests promoting and defending democracy around the world.
One of the reasons that Clinton’s Haitian policy differed from Bush’s was because
of increased CBC lobbying and the changing race demographics in the United States. In
1990, the Census Bureau noted that minorities made up 25 percent of the population, and
were on track to constitute a majority of the population by 2050.254 These demographic
and political changes shifted the priorities Clinton gave to non-Caucasian countries in his
foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Clinton had a strong connection with African
Americans having won 75 percent of the African-American vote in 1992. During his two
terms, Clinton appointed seven African Americans to cabinet positions and 14 percent of
his federal judge appointments were African American.255 Also US race relations
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repeatedly dominated the domestic public agenda in the 1990s. In 1991, the broadcast of
the beating of Rodney King by the Los Angeles police raised issues of police brutality
and minorities, and the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of those continued
the discussion brought those discussions back to the public agenda. In 1995 the O.J.
Simpson murder trial returned American race issues to the forefront of the public agenda.
Clinton’s childhood also mirrored that of many African American voters. He was
from a working-class background and had been raised by a single mother who struggled
to support him. On the Arsenio Hall Show during the 1992 presidential campaign Clinton
famously played the saxophone demonstrating his affinity for jazz music and other music
forms based on African American culture.256 In 1998, Toni Morrison called Clinton “the
first black president” after his impeachment trial for having a martial affair with Monica
Lewinsky. Morrison argued that Clinton’s treatment mirrored the treatment African
American men received when they appeared to get out of their social place.257 These
characteristics and the environment in America during the 1990s, presented opportunities
for Clinton to continue and expand the influence of race in American foreign policy.
Clinton's Foreign Policy Agenda for Haiti
When Clinton became president, he began as he had for all of the crises he
inherited from Bush by continuing some of Bush’s policies and implementing his own
that put greater international pressure on the Cédras junta to step down.258 In his 1994
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National Security Strategy, Clinton argued that the world still needed American
leadership and that exerting American leadership abroad, deterring aggression,
encouraging peaceful resolutions to conflicts, opening foreign markets, and supporting
democratic regimes would make America safer and more prosperous. Clinton continued
that it was in US interests to assist, defend, and restore new democratic governments
around the world.259 Clinton also claimed that Haiti provided the United States with an
opportunity to demonstrate its support and to increase the international community of
democratic governments. As well as improve US national security and defend national
interests. Clinton contended in the post-Cold War period, the United States had to be
willing to take immediate and public positions to stop the overthrows of democracies. He
posited the best ways to do this was by strengthening the pillars of civil society, and
supporting internal efforts to combat corruption and political discontent by encouraging
good these new democracies to adopt democratic governing practices. At the same time,
Clinton called for selective engagement to prevent the United States from becoming the
world’s policeman. He further defended selective engagement as a way for the United
States to focus on those challenges that were most relevant to US interests, and to engage
in those conflicts where the US involvement had the most impact. Part of this selective
engagement established America’s defense and promotion of democracy was a tertiary
priority to ensuring US military capabilities, and promoting cooperative security
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measures that opened foreign markets to encourage global economic growth and
supported American prosperity.260
Both presidents agreed in their national security strategies that America’s defense
and promotion of democracy came after defending the United States from acts of
aggression, and maintaining America’s military capabilities around the world. However,
they differed in their strategies for defending democracy and determining when to limit
American activism abroad. Where Bush’s limited engagement in international conflicts
was done to encourage a cooperative environment where regional powers and
institutions, and the UN could lead efforts to deter aggression and resolve conflicts
without US leadership. Clinton’s selective engagement encouraged the United States to
cooperate from a leadership position and a supportive role. Clinton strategy also accepted
the United States needed more policies to engage with the non-Western world that would
bring prosperity and stability. Bush and Clinton’s responses to the Haitian crisis further
revealed their understanding of race’s influence in foreign policy decisions.
By the time Clinton became president, the OAS and UN had issued several
economic sanctions against Haiti. Clinton adopted OAS and UN economic sanctions to
his foreign policy. First, he authorized immigration officials to denied entry to the United
States to any Haitian national and their immediate family members who had impeded the
negotiations to restore Haiti’s constitutional government. He also authorized the Treasury
Department to freeze any US-based Cédras regime assets. Lastly, Clinton directed
Secretary Christopher to consult with the OAS on ways to tighten sanctions, and he
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directed Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Albright to consult with the UN to
develop additional sanctions against the junta.261 On 16 June, the UNSC passed
resolution 841 authorizing a trade embargo of Haiti to take effect on 23 June,262 which
Clinton supported with Executive Order 12853 freezing the property of any Haitian
supporting or doing business with the junta.263
Clinton’s initial policy decisions toward the illegal government in Haiti continued
Bush’s strategy. Clinton also issued executive orders that supported OAS and UN
economic sanctions by denying the Cédras regime access to financial assets in the United
States or denied any Cédras supporter to entry to the United States to flee Haiti’s
economic hardships. Within Clinton’s first year, the Cédras regimes stalling and refusal
to abide by negotiations eventually encouraged Clinton to implement more assertive
policies against the Haitian junta. At the same time, these issues with Haitian negotiations
encouraged the CBD to lobby for changes in US policies towards Haitian refugees and
isolating the Cédras regime.
Accord de Governors Island: A Sign of Hope?
On 3 July 1993, after several months of UN and American economic sanctions,
Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Lt. General Raoul Cédras met at Governors
Island, NY to sign an agreement that would end the military junta’s control of Haiti and
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restore Aristide to power. In the Accord de Governors Island, Aristide and Cédras agreed
to allow UN and OAS representatives into Haiti to observe Aristide’s return. In return,
Aristide promised to grant amnesty to the Cédras and the other members of the junta
according to Haiti’s constitution. Additionally, the international community agreed to end
its economic sanctions against Haiti, to facilitate Haiti’s economic recovery. The parties
agreed that Aristide would return to Haiti as president on 30 October 1993, and the junta
leaders would resign their power to UN and OAS observers by 30 October.264
Unfortunately, the Cédras regime reneged on their commitment to the Accord de
Governors Island in October. When international observers arrived in the harbor at Portau-Prince, the junta instigated a mob that prevented international observers from
disembarking off their ships forcing them to leave for the United States.265 Clinton
responded to the Cédras government’s refusal to abide by the Accord de Governors
Island, by issuing executive order 12872. Executive order 12872 froze the US-based
assets of forty-one Haitian military officers and civilian supporters, as well as those who
had supported the mob’s obstruction of the Accord de Governors Island.266 Clinton also
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authorized the deployment of US Naval Forces to help re-establish UNSC resolutions
841, 873, 875, and a petroleum and arms embargo of Haiti from.267
In the first year of his presidency, Clinton and his administration supported
international efforts to convince Aristide and the Cédras junta to agree to a negotiated
settlement to the Haitian crisis. The international pressure led the two Aristide and Cédras
to sign the Accord de Governor’s Island in July 1993. The Accord de Governor’s Island
was a major breakthrough for international resolution efforts and demonstrated that
international efforts were a viable method to resolve intranational conflicts. The accord
demonstrated that regional institutions could manage their own security and stability. It
also fulfilled Clinton’s national security strategy to promote and defend democratic
governments. Unfortunately, the Cédras regime reneged on their promise to step down
from power. Like the conflict in Yugoslavia, the Cédras’ regimes actions demonstrated
that ending intranational conflicts went beyond getting the parties to make an agreement.
The international community also had to demonstrate that there were consequences for
refusing to abide by international agreements. The military junta’s rejection of the
agreement was also a turning point for Clinton’s policies towards Haiti. Following junta’s
refusal to step down the CBC increased its criticisms of Clinton’s policies and increased
pressure on Clinton to implement more assertive policies against the Cédras regime to
ensure Aristide’s return to Haiti and restore Haiti’s democracy.
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Clinton, the CBC, and Haitian Policy Decisions after Accord de Governors Island
Throughout the Haitian crises, the Clinton administration received numerous
letters from members of Congress questioning, supporting, and criticizing his policy
decisions. One of the most vocal supporters of American action in Haiti was the CBC, led
by Representative Kweisi Mfume. The CBC was a Congressional body that pooled the
strength of individual African American Congress members to lobby for domestic
reforms and policies that affected the lives of African Americans, and influence
American foreign policies towards the Caribbean and African countries.268 Throughout
Aristide's exile, the CBC was the leading proponent encouraging Clinton to implement
stronger policies against the junta and end the interdiction and forced repatriation of
Haitian refugees. The CBC also promoted a positive public image of Aristide, countered
allegations Aristide had violated human rights in Haiti, and challenged those that opposed
stronger American opposition to the Cédras regime. The first policy success the CBC had
was convincing Clinton to end US Coast Guard interdictions and forced repatriation of
Haitian refugees.269
The CBC achieved its goals through correspondence and meetings with Clinton.
The first letters Clinton received from CBC members came in December 1993. One letter
from Charles Rangel criticized CIA reports that publically defamed Aristide by charging
Aristide of instability and inflexibility. Ragnel also wrote the CIA reports against Aristide
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undermined America’s support in Haiti.270 Along with challenging negative reports of
Aristide in the government, the CBC also challenged those assertions in the media. In a
C-Span interview in July 1994, Representative Catherine Meeks argued against claims
that Aristide has numerous human rights violations.271 The CBC’s efforts to encourage
Clinton to change his policies included public campaigns to defend Aristide’s character
and present him as defending Haitian democracy from an illegal overthrow. These efforts
focused on Aristide’s rightful place as Haiti’s president, and that the United States had a
responsibility to restore democracy to Haiti.
In March 1994, the CBC started attacking Clinton’s Haitian policies as
"ineffective and counterproductive," and that US lukewarm policies encouraged the
Cédras regime to carry out violence and political suppression. They contended that the
administration drastically needed to change its policy to avoid appearing to undermine
democratic change in Haiti. The CBC urged Clinton to implement more sanctions and
restrictions against Haiti. They suggested Clinton apply a total embargo of Haiti, a no-fly
zone, deny visas to Haitian military leaders, and freeze Haitian military officials
supportive of the Cédras regime US-based assets. The CBC also encouraged the president
to deploy a multinational border patrol to stop violations of the embargo along the HaitiDominican Republic border, and to stop intercepting Haitian refugees at sea and
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returning them to Haiti.272 Clinton did not immediately apply all of the policy suggestions
from the CBC. However, by the time Clinton decided to militarily intervene in Haiti he
had implemented all of the CBC’s policy suggestions. The CBC’s efforts to keep the
Haitian crisis a significant foreign policy crisis gradually influenced Clinton to
implement more assertive policies against Haiti and to lead a multinational military
intervention to end the coup.
In May, Representative Cynthia McKinney wrote that she was offended by
Ambassador Swings suggestion that Haitian boat people were only economic refugees,
and that such messages undermined America’s moral ground to restore Aristide and
democracy to Haiti. She informed Clinton that Americans wanted him to display
leadership abroad and that he needed to "set a clear and workable path for the return of
Aristide and democracy to Haiti; devote all necessary resources to achieve the goal."
Representative McKinney urged Clinton to enlist support from among Aristides
Congressional supporters and “to not to shy away from aggressive, affirmative measures”
and “to stand for democracy and with Haiti.”273 Clinton responded to McKinney's letter
informing her that he was working to strengthen sanctions and that the United States had
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adjusted immigration procedure to allow Haitian boat people to apply for political asylum
status.274
In May, the administration acknowledged that CBC suggestions were consistent
with Clinton’s strategy. The administration decided to encourage additional cooperation
with the CBC to help the administration restore democracy to Haiti.275 The administration
also scheduled meetings with the CBC to discuss Haitian policy and Clinton’s decisions.
This included discussions on intensifying UN sanctions, making more assertive
diplomatic policies, ending the policy of interdiction and forced repatriations to avoid a
humanitarian disaster, supporting the UNMIH, and discussing other developments in
Haiti and US policies responses.276 As Clinton continued to deal with the crisis in Haiti,
he increasingly implemented policies the CBC recommended. This shift increasingly
moved the United States towards a military intervention to restore Aristide to power. This
strategy did not prevent disagreements between the CBC and the Clinton administration.
Instead the CBC’s influence in the Clinton administration and on Haitian policies made
Clinton and his advisors more receptive to CBC criticisms and more likely to adopt CBC
policy suggestions. This administration’s policy changes were not supported by all of
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Congress. Some Congress members disagreed that US policies towards Haiti needed to
change or become more involved in the negotiation process.
While the CBC supported stronger US involvement in Haiti, Congressional
Republicans opposed greater US participation in Haiti, including a military intervention.
Several leading Republicans informed Clinton that they firmly opposed any policy that
sent US troops to Haiti to restore Aristide to power. They also found it troubling that
Clinton was considering military intervention, and wrote the "persistent and widespread
political problems affecting the Haitian people deserved the attention of the United States
of America. But it is in the essences of leadership in such a situation to make use of only
diplomatic and humanitarian methods best suited to the complicated political realities."277
Republican opposition to increased US involvement in Haiti focused on keeping the
United States out of a complicated political conflict. Republicans agreed with the Clinton
administration that the United States should pay some attention to the crisis, but
Republicans argued that the Clinton’s policies should focus on humanitarian and
diplomatic policies. Republican suggestions to focus on diplomatic and humanitarian
solutions followed Bush’s policies towards Yugoslavia and the Haitian policies. Despite
the opposition, Clinton carried out the changes to his policies leading up to the
deployment of US forces to Haiti as the last option to restore Aristides democratically
elected government to Haiti.
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The Move Toward A Military Intervention in Haiti
In the spring of 1994, the Clinton administration began preparations for a military
intervention in Haiti. In an undated Haitian policy paper, the Clinton administration’s
Haitian observers argued that diplomatic policies were unlikely to pressure the Cédras
regime’s rule to step down and allow Aristide to return. They argued that current US
policies further entrenched the military regime. They argued that the longer the US
followed diplomatic policies it increased violence, human rights violations and economic
and physical resource destruction in Haiti, and encouraged continued refugee flows.
Mirroring CBC arguments, the author contended that the administration needed to initiate
more assertive policies that directly confronted the military regime. They recommended a
strategy that forced the Cédras regime to surrender or face capture by US troops during a
military intervention. They noted that after the Cédras regime was removed then the
Haitian parliament should pass an amnesty law for officials of the illegal government.
Next, US forces should escort Aristide back to Haiti as he calls for calm, and the UN
should deploy peacekeepers to maintain law and order. As part of the rebuilding process,
the Haitian observers recommended establishing a system to retrain and rehabilitate the
Haitian legal system, and the Haitian military and paramilitary personnel. They also
called for the demolition of 1915 circa US military infrastructure the Cédras junta had
used to maintain control of Haiti.278
Upon deciding to intervene in Haiti, the Clinton administration adopted most of
these recommendations as part of mission for the US-led multinational intervention in
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Haiti. Even as Clinton made these preparations he continued cooperative and diplomatic
efforts to end the military regime demonstrating that a military intervention was a last
resort, like Bush had in response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. At the same time,
Clinton recognized that continuing diplomatic and humanitarian methods would not
remove the military junta from Haiti. Clinton’s decision for a military intervention
recognized he had reached an impasse and the limits of peaceful cooperative action, and
that the threat of force or force itself were the only options left.
In July 1994, after repeated international efforts failed to restore Aristide and
democracy to Haiti, the UN authorized its members to use all means necessary to remove
the Cédras regime from power in Haiti.279 From July to September, the Clinton
administration continued its efforts to remove the military leaders through diplomatic
measures.280 This included Clinton’s last diplomatic attempts to negotiate the Cédras
regimes and four executive orders that established a complete embargo against Haiti and
the Cédras regime.281
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Before UNSC resolution 940, Clinton’s strategy gradually increased the
assertiveness of America’s policies towards Haiti, intensified pressure against the Cédras
regime, and expanded America’s leadership in the negotiation process. After the UN
authorized its members to use force to remove the Cédras regime from power, Clinton
put the United States in a firm leadership role in cooperation with Aristide to create and
deploy a multinational military force to restore Aristide to Haiti. Clinton's work with the
CBC encouraged this policy shift. Clinton’s work with the CBC on US policies towards
Haiti were due to the CBC’s lobbying efforts for the United States to take a more forceful
stand against the Cédras junta.
On 8 September Clinton approved Presidential Decision Directive-28 (PDD-28).
In PDD-28, Clinton outlined US policies for Latin America and the Caribbean, beginning
with a determination that it was a long-term US strategic goal to foster democracy in
Latin America and the Caribbean as part of US efforts to promote the spread of
democracy around the world. Clinton established that the United States would do this by
encouraging and requiring state militaries to respect democratic governments, human
rights, and civilian control of the military. It would also foster a greater respect for
democracy within the military and develop greater civilian participation in the country’s
defense policy. PDD-28 also called on the United States to quickly respond to coups in
Latin America and the Caribbean that threatened to or did overthrow democratic
governments. Clinton also charged the United States to work with the OAS and UN to
defend and if necessary restore those governments.282 Clinton’s decision directive firmly
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established his belief that the United States had a responsibility to defend and restore
democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere as a way to protect the US interests.
It also cemented Clinton’s directive to send US forces as part of a multinational military
intervention in Haiti. PDD-25 also reaffirmed Clinton’s engagement and enlargement
strategy by combining US engagement to promote global security and stability with
enlarging and protecting the world’s democratic governments.
On 10 September, Clinton authorized Operation Uphold Democracy to start on 20
September. This gave Clinton ten days for one last attempt to peacefully end remove the
Cédras regime from power. On16 September, as US forces prepared to leave for Haiti,
Clinton dispatched a diplomatic mission that included former President Jimmy Carter,
retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nun to Haiti. The combination of
mobilizing US forces to Haiti and Carter-Powell-Nun negotiations convinced the Cédras
regime to relinquish power. On 19 September US troops deployed to oversee Aristide’s
return and Haiti's transition back to democracy.283
Conclusions
Bush’s policy towards the Haitian crisis focused on supporting OAS negotiations
between Aristide and the Cédras regime. While Bush publically condemned the coup, he
only initiated economic sanctions that abided by OAS sanctions against Haiti. Bush’s
policies continued his New World Order directive to sponsor cooperative actions against
aggression. His Haiti policies also relied on the same strategy for the Yugoslavia crisis,
which focused on encouraging regional institutions to resolve the crisis, rather than using
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American leadership to establish a settlement between Aristide and Cédras. During
Bush’s presidency, he had little collaboration with the CBC. Though the CBC initially
supported Bush’s policies towards Haiti, as the crisis continued and Bush’s refugee
policy went into effect, the CBC began to criticize Bush’s Haitian policies. However,
Bush was less influenced by CBC lobbying as Clinton was and continued to interdict and
repatriate Haitian refugees.
During Clinton’s presidency, debates African American interactions with the
police and the justice system, and continued racial inequality increasingly dominated
public discussions. The CBC and other groups for peoples of color worked to keep these
issues on the public agenda. This increased the pressure on Clinton to work with the CBC
on his Haiti policy. Thus, Clinton’s policies evolved into an aggressive stand against
coup leaders in Haiti. Between 1993 and 1994, Clinton’s increasingly implemented
policy suggests from the CBC. These policies increased US pressure on the Cédras
regime to end their control of Haiti. The CBC was most responsible for making US
policymakers focus on the Haitian crisis. The CBC’s lobbying efforts continued their
tradition of encouraging the US to pay more attention on its policies towards the
Caribbean and Africa. The CBC’s influence and Clinton’s security strategy of
engagement and enlargement combined to lead Clinton towards a military intervention to
restore democracy to Haiti. As Bush and Clinton implemented policies in Haiti that
continued to abide by long-standing policy themes and principles, they faced challenges
as they incorporated race into those themes and principles. Race became a significant
theme in US foreign policy during the Cold War and policymakers attempted to refute
Soviet claims of US racism. After the Cold War, race remained a part of international
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relations as non-Western countries gained international power. The challenges Bush and
Clinton faced with race in US foreign policy mirrored the racial challenges American
society faced in the 1990s, as the African American community continued to push for
economic, legal, and political equality after the Civil Rights Movements ensured African
Americans were no longer treated as second-class citizens.
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CHAPTER VII – CLINTON AND THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
During the post-Cold War period the United States faced two crises that involved
the targeted killing of ethnic populations, the first in Bosnia and the second in Rwanda. In
Bosnia, the ethnic violence occurred after the collapse of Yugoslavia which led the Serb,
Croat, and Muslim populations to fight over territory in Bosnia. In Rwanda, the genocide
occurred after a truce ending the Rwandan civil war between the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic
Forces and the Hutu government failed following the death of Rwanda’s president in a
plane crash. Additionally, the genocide occurred at the same time the United States was
responding to the crises in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. The convergence of these crises
occurring during the same period tested America’s ability to participate in peacekeeping
operations around the world. It also led the American public and US Congress to question
America’s participation in international peace efforts. These issues led the Clinton
administration to undertake policy re-evaluations towards US participation in
multinational peacekeeping operations. The publics concerns about America’s extensive
participation in peacekeeping operations in response to intranational conflicts and desires
to limit such participation created contradicting influences on Clinton’s policy decisions
towards Rwanda.
This chapter argues that as genocide occurred in Rwanda, Clinton attempted to
alter how the United States cooperated with regional and international peace efforts,
while maintaining America’s commitment to engage with cooperative security efforts in
non-Western countries and regions. Clinton initiated the changes, outlined in Presidential
Decision Directive-25, in response to public concerns that the United States was
participating in too many unsuccessful peacekeeping missions that were overextending
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US resources. PDD-25 attempted to balance traditional US foreign policy principles of
supporting international efforts against aggression to promote stability and security and
limit the possibilities the United States would participate in a peacekeeping mission that
was likely to fail or become a quagmire. Clinton’s re-evaluations of America’s policies
towards peacekeeping operations placed new limits on his national security strategy,
foreign policy decisions, and American support for international cooperation that
contradicted traditional policy themes and principles.
Origins of Rwandan Genocide
On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana’s jet was shot down
killing him and Burundian President Cypriean Ntaryamira. In Washington, DC, Kevin
Aiston, the State Department Rwanda desk officer, informed Prudence Bushnell, Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of State, of the crash. Bushnell drafted a memo to Secretary
Christopher warning that after the Rwandan and Burundi presidents were confirmed dead
there was a high probability of violence erupting in the two countries. She advised
Secretary Christopher, “Our strategy is to appeal for calm in both countries. Soon after
Habyarimana’s death was confirmed, the Hutu military killed moderate Rwandan
politicians including the Rwandan Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. Soon after
the death of Rwanda’s moderate politicians, the Hutus started killing moderate Hutu and
Tutsi civilians. Over 100 days after the death of Rwanda’s president, hardliner Hutus
killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutus.284
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The Rwandan genocide was caused by ethnic divisions that originated during
Belgium colonial rule of Rwandan. Under Belgium control the Tutsi minority were given
privileged status and control over Rwanda and the Hutu, which the Tutsi used to
discriminate against the Hutu majority. When Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the
Hutu gained control of Rwanda and carried out retaliatory discrimination and violence
against the Tutsi. In 1990, the Rwandan civil war began when the Rwandan Patriotic
Front, a group of mostly exiled Tutsi, invaded Rwanda. From 1990 to 1993 the RPF
gained territory against Hutu government forces.
In 1993, Tanzania negotiated the Arusha Accords between the RPF and Rwandan
government with support from the major Western powers. The Arusha Accords ended the
civil war, and created a power-sharing government between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The
accords also established a UN peacekeeping mission that deployed over 2,000 UN forces
to monitor the ceasefire and assist in demilitarization of the country. UN peacekeepers
were also assigned to help provide a secure environment for Tutsi exiles to return to
Rwanda. Despite efforts to introduce peace into Rwanda, Hutu extremists opposed the
Arusha Accords. The Hutu extremists also feared Tutsi retribution since the Arusha
Accords did not grant amnesty to anyone that committed human rights violations during
the war.285 These fears combined with their continued hatred and mistrust of the Tutsi.
Once the Rwanda’s president was dead the extremist Hutu acted to remove Tutsi and
moderate Hutus from Rwanda. The violence in Rwanda was another post-Cold War
intranational ethnic conflict. While Rwanda’s genocide was not related to the end of the
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Cold War, it still had the potential to establish a strong precedent for the US post-Cold
War policies. As other presidents had during earlier parts of the twentieth century and as
he had during the Haitian conflict, Clinton had to decide how he was going to respond to
a non-Western conflict. He also had to decide how to support peacekeeping efforts in
Rwanda following changes he made to the way the United States participated in and
supported international peacekeeping efforts.
Changes to US Peacekeeping Policies
During the post-Cold War period, the international community faced repeated
problems establishing, deploying, and sustaining peacekeeping missions. The difficulties
surrounding international peacekeeping missions led the American public and American
Congress to publicly debate US participation in future peacekeeping operations, and the
continued viability of peacekeeping missions as a method to restore stability and security
around the world. In response to these debates, the Clinton administration re-evaluated
US policies for peacekeeping missions. However, as the world’s superpower, changing
America’s role in the UN and UNSC would change dynamics within the UN and the way
the UN responded to international crises. The American public and Congressional
reluctance to continue to support and participate in UN peacekeeping missions led
Clinton to alter US policies towards UN peacekeeping missions.
In Presidential Review Directive-13, Clinton noted that the post-Cold War period
had more intranational conflicts that international ones. Additionally, the increased
breakout of intranational conflicts created more international demand for UN
peacekeeping missions to resolve those intra-state conflicts. However, the UN had not
updated its policies and peacekeeping structures to respond to the increased frequency of
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intranational conflicts and increased demand for peacekeeping missions. In PRD-13,
Clinton established that the United States needed to re-evaluate the role of UN
peacekeeping operations in US foreign policies. This policy re-evaluation had to include
an understanding of the post-Cold War period’s increased demand for UN peacekeeping,
and re-evaluations of US roles and participation in the UN.286
Clinton defended the policy re-evaluations as a necessary step to improve
America’s response to the higher costs and requests for peacekeeping operations after the
Cold War. PRD-13 focused on re-evaluation US policies towards financial support for
peacekeeping operations, the probability of the mission’s success, and how easily UN
members would support any peacekeeping mission. Clinton’s call for his advisors and
staff to re-evaluate US policies towards UN peacekeeping missions included
understanding the role UN peacekeeping missions played in US foreign policies. In
particular, the ways that peacekeeping missions served US interests. and whether
peacekeeping mission undermined America’s ability to act unilaterally.287
The PRD also encouraged Clinton’s advisors to analyze America’s reliance on
international organizations and operations as a means to downsize US military forces, as
well as respond to changes in public and Congressional attitudes towards peacekeeping
operations. Clinton also had his administration analyzed international repercussions of
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the international community’s increased reliance on UN peacekeeping missions to secure
regional stability. In particular Clinton wanted to understand which countries or regions
were more dependent on UN peacekeeping missions to resolve internal crises.288
PRD-13 introduced a post-Cold War re-evaluation towards UN peacekeeping
missions. This included understanding their successes and failures. It also required the
Clinton administration to reconsider how the United States determined how it would
support and when it would participate in UN peacekeeping missions. These
reconsiderations would lead to significant changes in the way the United States
responded to calls for peacekeeping missions around the world. Additionally, it would
change the way the United States influenced the world to support these types of
operations. Traditionally the United States has provided much of the military and
financial support for UN peacekeeping operations. However, the analysis requested by
Clinton would introduce changes that revealed America’s growing reluctance to
peacekeeping missions, and increased pressure for peacekeeping missions to demonstrate
the possibility of success before the United States participated.
In the fall of 1993, Clinton’s advisors responded to PRD-13 with Presidential
Decision Directive-25 “US Policy to Reform Multilateral Peace Operations.” In PDD-25
the Clinton administration outlined changes the United States would make to its roles in
UN peacekeeping missions. The administration began by reducing America’s overall
financial commitment to the UN. This included reducing America’s financial
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responsibility for peacekeeping missions to 25 percent from 31.739 percent. 289 In the
UN, the United States was the largest financial contributor to UN operations. At the same
time the United States also owed a significant debt to the UN for previous peacekeeping
missions.290 By reducing America’ financial responsibilities by 6.739 percent the United
States would either force other UN members to make up the difference or force the UN to
cut the costs of its operations, especially peacekeeping operations.
In addition to reducing America’s financial responsibilities to the UN, PDD-25
established new benchmarks for peacekeeping proposals to meet before the United States
would participate in a peacekeeping operation. These benchmarks were established to
ensure that the United States was participating in peacekeeping operations that would
succeed and not drag the United States into a quagmire. The criteria were also designed
to focus American resources to those missions that were the United States could
effectively support peace.291 At the same time, the Clinton administration recognized that
UN peacekeeping missions provided the United States with a method to respond to
security threats in the post-Cold War period multilaterally. They argued that
peacekeeping missions acted as force multipliers for US efforts to promote peace and
stability around the word. However, to ensure that the United States could get the
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maximum return from peacekeeping missions without placing too high a burden on the
United States, peacekeeping missions had to meet certain criteria first. 292
In PDD-25 the Clinton administration outlined eight requirements peacekeeping
proposals had to meet before the United States would agree to participate. First, the
proposed peacekeeping mission advanced American interests in the country or region.
Second, peacekeeping operation was in response to a threat or breach of international
peace due to international aggression, a humanitarian disaster, an illegal government
change, or gross violation of human rights. Third, the proposals established clear
objectives for the mission, and the mission was to either a peacekeeping or peace
enforcement operations293. Fourth, a ceasefire already existed for peace keeping missions
that did not fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter294. Fifth, due to significant threats
to international or regional peace the peace operations were authorized under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. Sixth, the United States could financially afford to support and
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participate in the operation. Seventh, the political, economic and humanitarian costs of
UN inaction outweighed UN action. Eighth, the peace operation’s duration was set and
connected to clear objectives and a realistic criterion for ending the operation.295
The guidelines established by PDD-25 introduced restrictions on US involvement
in UN peacekeeping missions to protect the United States from endangering its interests
and over-extending its resources. However, these new guidelines would have unintended
consequences on US relations with the UN and international community that would
emerge as the UN attempted to respond to the genocide in Rwanda. These unintended
consequences included limiting US leadership in the UN and discouraging other UN
members from participating in peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. It would also lead the
international community to question America’s interests in the global community, and
Clinton’s strategy to keep the United States engaged with the world.
Initial Response to Rwandan Genocide
Following the outbreak of violence in Rwanda, American and other foreign
governments prioritized evacuating their own citizens from Rwanda, before they worked
on establishing a new peacekeeping mission to Rwanda. By 9 April, the United States
had successfully evacuated all Americans from Rwanda by ground or French flights.
Following the evacuation of US personnel, the Clinton administration supported
Belgium’s efforts to evacuate their citizens as violence escalated in Rwanda. Part of this
support included cooperating with the French to secure the Kigali airport and airspace for
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Belgium to deploy its troops to defend Belgium citizens in Rwanda.296 During the
violence, the Hutu military killed UN personnel. The deaths of UN personnel by the Hutu
military encouraged the Clinton administration to push the UNSC to end the UN
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), “we make a lot of noise about terminating
UN forces that aren’t working. Well few could be as clearly not working. We should
work with the French to gain a consensus to terminate the UN Mission.”297
The failure of the UN peacekeeping forces to prevent the violence from renewing
in Rwanda led the administration to conclude that attempting to maintain a peacekeeping
mission in Rwanda would put more people in danger, and was not worth the risk. The
United States was not alone in prioritizing the safety of its citizens, and helping other
governments protect and evacuate personnel. However, the United States viewed the
renewed violence in Rwanda as evidence that a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was not
a good investment of international resources. Richard Clarke’s email arguing for the
United States to support efforts in the UN to end UNAMIR demonstrated America’s
increased reticence to peacekeeping missions when the parties were unwilling to abide by
their own agreements. Many viewed the failure rates for UN peacekeeping missions
towards intranational conflicts, like the failure of UNAMIR, demonstrated the UN
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needed to re-evaluate how it designed and implemented peacekeeping operations in the
post-Cold War period.
As the violence overtook Rwanda, the CIA reported that the outbreak of violence
had ended all efforts by the Hutu government and RPF to abide by the Arusha accords.
The CIA also reported that renewed violence had undermined the UNAMIR mandate,
fueled massive refugee flows, threatened to rekindle ethnic violence in Burundi, and
threatened to destabilize the region. They continued as the RPF attempted to gain control
of the Rwandan government the fighting between the Hutu and RPF would be worse than
the civil war because the RPF would attempt to gain control of the Rwandan
government.298 The CIA’s analysis revealed that the intranational ethnic violence in
Rwanda, similar to the Bosnian War, would create refugee flows that would create
humanitarian crises on Rwanda’s borders that would destabilize other countries and
possibly the region. At the same time the analysis gave the Clinton administration the
evidence it needed to argue against continuing UNAMIR. The administration also
understood that unless both sides were ready to stop fighting it was unlikely that a new
mission would succeed.
On 11 April, Richard Clarke repeated his call for the United States to support
calls to end the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. He also asked NSA Tony Lake for
guidance on a response to a UN request for US assistance to remove its forces from
Rwanda. Clark noted that the UN was likely to request a US airlift to facilitate the quick
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withdrawal of UN forces from Rwanda. He continued that the French would attempt to
withdraw their troops along with UN forces while Belgium deployed it’s to defend and
support the evacuation of its citizens.299 Lake responded that the United States “was
inclined to help. But decision should go to Principals.”300 At the beginning of the fighting
the Clinton administration was willing to support international efforts to withdraw
foreigners and UN forces from Rwanda. At the same time, the administration was slow
establishing a policy response to Rwanda beyond evacuating American citizens from
Rwanda, and ending UNAMIR. Part of this was because the United States has
traditionally given foreign policies towards Africa a low priority. Another reason was
because the United States was also dealing with the coup in Haiti and the Bosnian War as
well as the Rwandan genocide, similar to the way the collapse of Yugoslavia got lost
behind German reunification and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Historically, the African continent has been a low priority in American foreign
policy, as US foreign policy traditional focused on US relations with Europe and the
Western Hemisphere. Yet Clinton wanted to support the development of democracy,
economic development, and conflict resolution there. In particular, Clinton wanted to
address the roots of African conflicts, and encourage resolution efforts to internal
disputes and continue US support for humanitarian missions. However, Clinton did not
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want to commit the United States to supporting long-term humanitarian and
peacekeeping operations.301 While Clinton argued that Africa was “one of our greatest
challenges for a strategy of engagement and enlargement,” this did not make Africa a
high national security interest.302 Clinton’s interest in post-Cold War Africa was related
to implementing international and internal policies that would support the growth of
democracy and economic development, while continuing to support limited humanitarian
and peacekeeping operations. However, the policy re-evaluation of international
peacekeeping operations would further limit Clinton’s ability to engage in post-Cold War
Africa, and to support peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda. The power of this policy reevaluation also limited the influence of race, even as debates about race relations in the
United States caused by the Rodney King beating, the LA Riots, and OJ Simpson murder
trial increased the influence of multiculturalism in the United States and US foreign
policy.
As the violence overtook the area, the UN started deliberating the future of
UNAMIR. Many members including the United States supported ending UNAMIR rather
than expanding UNAMIR’s mission. The CIA noted that African countries were
conditionally willing to participate if adequate logistical support and equipment were
provided. However, many western governments were reluctant to provide some of the
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required troops to field a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda.303 The CIA also noted that
any expansion of UNAMIR faced contradictory desires from the Hutus and the RPF. The
Hutu military wanted the UN to deploy a force large enough to enforce a cease fire and
backup a political settlement while the RPF wanted a peacekeeping mission to augment
the 2,500 UN force already in Rwanda.304 Along with the contradictory desires of the
opposing parties, Belgium and France had withdrawn their forces they had deployed as
part of UNAMIR to avoid being drawn into the Rwandan Civil War. Other UN members
supported withdrawing their forces from UNAMIR in after the Hutu military had killed
sixteen UNAMIR members.305
As the Clinton administration considered its next steps in Rwanda, it joined the
majority of UN members in withdrawing its forces from UNAMIR and Rwanda.
Clinton’s decision to withdraw US forces from UNAMIR and to support international
efforts to end the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda was the start of a cycle of
hesitancy in international efforts to resolve the Rwandan genocide. Following the
withdrawal of US citizens from Rwanda and supporting efforts to end UNAMIR, the
Clinton administration adopted the policy guidelines established by PDD-25 for US
participation in international peacekeeping efforts.
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Following the successful evacuation of Americans and other foreigners, the
Clinton administration started drafting policies and strategies for the US response to
Rwanda. During a NSC meeting on Rwanda, the Clinton administration decided that
America’s main strategy was to carry out humanitarian relief by resettling Rwandan
refugees and those displaced inside Rwanda. However, any US force deployed to
Rwanda would be focused on providing security for International Committee of the Red
Cross humanitarian aid deliveries and rather than deliver humanitarian aid. It also
decided the United States would support international efforts to establish a new cease-fire
between the Hutu and the RPF. During this first policy meeting, there was no discussion
about America’s position in the UN on UNAMIR, its mission, or deploying US troops as
part of a peace enforcement mission to Rwanda.306 From this initial meeting the Clinton
administration decided that the situation in Rwanda was a humanitarian crisis, and that
the United States would provide security for humanitarian aid deliveries for those
Rwandans displaced by the conflict. This fit within Clinton’s national security strategy
and the increased selectivity the administration planned for post-Cold War peacekeeping
operations. However, PDD-25 also made policies towards Rwanda contradictory to
Clinton’s desires to keep the United States engaged in the world. By establishing onerous
prerequisites for American participation, PDD-25 effectively kept the United States out
of proposed peacekeeping missions to Rwanda.
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Thirteen days after the violence began in Rwanda, the administration received an
appeal from Human Watch, a NGO that monitored human rights violations, to oppose the
quick withdraw of UNAMIR because the mission was supposed to be protecting 25,000
Rwandans from the genocide.307 Up to this point the Clinton administration had treated
the violence in Rwanda as a resumption of the civil war that was stopped by the Arusha
Accords in 1993. With the appeal form Human Watch, the administration received one of
the first calls for aid to end the Hutu-led genocide against the Tutsi and their Hutu
supporters.
In response to the letter from Human Watch, Eric Schwartz asked Susan Rice and
Donald Steinberg, “if true shouldn’t it be a major factor informing high-level decision
making on this issue? has it been?”308 The Clinton administration responded by
investigating Human Watch’s claims, but did not change the administration’s policies.
Additionally, there was no further discussion of genocide in Rwanda until the end of
April in preparation for UN discussions about peacekeeping in Rwanda. The Clinton
administration’s reluctance to describe the violence in Rwanda as a genocide, and its
determination to withdraw UNAMIR forces from Rwanda contradicted Clinton’s
statements in his 1994 national security strategy to improve US relations with the African
continent and encourage resolution efforts for internal conflicts. It also contradicted
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PDD-25 guideline that allowed the United States to participate in peacekeeping missions
where substantial human rights violations were occurring.
On 20 April, the administration resumed discussions on the refugee issue in
Rwanda, and the status of the UNAMIR forces protecting Rwandans in a Kigali soccer
stadium. They noted that rather than the 25,000 Human Watch had claimed, the
remaining 2,100 UNAMIR forces were protecting between 6,000-12,000 Rwandans in
the Kigali soccer stadium. The meeting participants discussed UNAMIR assets, and
noted UNAMIR personnel lacked the necessary equipment to fully equip their forces let
alone defend the Rwandans seeking refuge in the stadium.309 This information did not
encourage the administration to alter its policies, and it continued to focus on
humanitarian aid. Additionally, the administration resumed plans to push the UN to recall
UNAMIR forces after its mandate ended. The NSC/DC began discussion on where to
relocate the Rwandan refugees that were relying on UNAMIR protection in preparation
for UNAMIR’s withdrawal.
After discussing the status of the UNAMIR, the NSC/DC presented four options
to withdraw UNAMIR forces the Rwandans under UNAMIR’s protection from Kigali.
The first option relocated UNAMIR into RPF controlled area. The committee noted that
while this option was the easiest to carry out it was also the most dangerous. The second
option was to relocate UNAMIR and the Rwanda refugees to Tanzania. Unfortunately,
twenty thousand Rwandan’s had already fled there to escape the violence. Additionally,
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there were numerous logistical difficulties including safely travelling hostile Hutu
controlled territory, and in order to relocate UNAMIR and the Rwandans the United
States would need permission from the Tanzanian government. The penultimate option
was to relocate everyone north of the violence, but it required the UNAMIR and the
Rwandan refugees to travel a long distance, it was logistically difficult, and there were
less resources available in the north. The final option was to withdraw UNAMIR and the
12,000 refugees to Uganda, leave the Rwandans in refugee camps, and establish a
UNHCR operation. The committee was concerned that if the 12,000 Rwandans were
relocated to Uganda it would encourage more refugees to flee there, increasing the
refugee population from 12,000 to 250,000.310
The committee also discussed the repercussions of UNAMIR’s continued
presence in Rwanda. They noted that while UNAMIR provided a safe location for
Rwandans fleeing the violence, it placed UN personnel in danger and pressured other
countries to deploy their troops into a highly unstable situation to participate in a peace
operation. 311 At this point neither Clinton nor his administration were not ready to deploy
US forces to a peace operation in Rwanda. Instead they remained focused on
withdrawing UNAMIR and the refugees they were protecting to reduce pressure for the
international community and the United States to deploy additional forces to protect the
Rwandans from the violence.
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The Clinton administration’s focus at the start of the Rwandan genocide was to
protect American and foreign citizens and UN personnel from the violence in Rwanda.
This priority limited the administration’s ability to draft responses to stop the violence in
Rwanda before all foreign personnel were safely evacuated from Rwanda. At the same
time, the Clinton administration’s attentions were divided between responding to the
crises in Bosnia and Haiti. As Bush had responded to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the
Bosnian War, Clinton was unwilling to deploy US forces to enforce peace in Rwanda and
to end the ethnic violence occurring there. Both Clinton and Bush were reluctant to
intervene in ethnic conflicts where one ethnic population was attempting to eliminate the
other. While Clinton would gradually move to pressure the Bosnian parties to reach a
settlement, Clinton did not implement similar strategies towards Rwanda. Instead,
Clinton remained fixed on humanitarian relief and supporting African-led negotiations
between the Hutus and the RPF.
Reports of Genocide
On 28 April, the NSC/DC issued a discussion paper that described the situation in
Rwanda. The report noted that by 28 April 100,000 Rwandans had been killed, the
government and RPF continued to fight, and paramilitary forces were massacring Tutsi
and moderate Hutus while radio stations called for additional killings. At the same time,
the remaining 270 UNAMIR forces were trying to protect 12,000 Rwandans at Kigali
stadium, and 500,000 Rwandans had fled to the borders of Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire
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where the refugees were denied permission to cross the borders and needed humanitarian
assistance.312
The NSC/DC outlined six short-term policy objectives that the Interagency
Working Group had identified. First, the United States needed to pressure the RPF and
Rwandan army to stop killing Rwandan civilians. Second, the United States should
support UN and non-government organization efforts to re-establish a ceasefire in
Rwanda. Third, the United States should encourage and help Tanzania and other African
countries’ efforts to pressure the RPF and Hutu military leaders to restart peace
negotiations. Fourth the administration had to prevent the violence from spreading to
neighboring countries. Fifth the US government needed to push the UN to expand
humanitarian efforts in Rwanda. Finally, the administration needed to prevent similar
violence from erupting in Burundi.313 These short-term policy objectives focused on
diplomatic methods that could end the violence in Rwanda, establish humanitarian relief,
and contain and prevent further violence and destabilization in the region. None of these
objectives included a long-term objective for US policies towards Rwanda. Instead the
administration focused policies were embedded with traditional themes of promoting
security and stability and international cooperation to thwart aggression to achieve shortterm goals it believed were most likely to succeed.
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The State Department carried out an action plan based on the NSC/DC’s policy
discussions. The State Department’s action plan that included a vigorous foreign policy
program and talking points for meetings with the Secretary General, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) leaders, concerned European states, and regional leaders. The paper
also included suggestions for the OAU to deploy a peacekeeping force to Rwanda, begin
preventative diplomacy, deter aggression in Burundi, establish an arms embargo against
Rwanda, initiate a human rights or genocide investigation, and prepare implement a UN
operation to protect the Rwandan refugees. The NSC/DC planned to review the paper the
first week of May. It also planned to express American support for UNSC resolutions that
established an arms embargo, a genocide investigation, and refugee assistance in
Rwanda.314 The discussion paper was a continuation of the Clinton administration’s
humanitarian policy for Rwanda, but expanded to produce more diplomatic pressure to
encourage the Rwandan’s to stop fighting and killing. It also avoided deploying US
forces to Rwanda unless the conditions in PDD-25 were met. At the same time, the
Clinton administration continued to encourage regional multinational institutions to lead
and initiate cooperative peace efforts to end the conflict.
The Rwandan Peacekeeping Mission and PDD-25
As May began and the violence continued, the Clinton administration decided to
materially support any OAU and other regional efforts to protect Rwandan refugees and
end acts the genocide in Rwanda. The administration also continued to avoid deploying
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US forces to help end the violence in Rwanda. The United States also started
broadcasting Clinton’s 30 April appeal to the Rwandans to stop fighting and re-enter
peace negotiations through international radio broadcasts. The administration recognized
that though the parties heard Clinton’s appeal the leaders were ignoring it. By this time,
the United States was sending delegates to work with regional African leaders to create a
peace plan to end the fighting and develop methods to protect and provide for Rwandan
refugees. US officials were also contacting RPF and Rwandan government leaders daily
in an effort to maintain pressure to convince both sides to agree to a new ceasefire and
new negotiations. Lastly the State Department had assembled $15,000,000 in emergency
humanitarian relief assistance for the refugees along Rwanda’s borders.315
Since Clinton and his advisors were determined to avoid deploying American
forces to Rwanda and risking American lives to end the conflict, the United States had
focused its policies on providing humanitarian relief to Rwanda and supporting UN and
OAU efforts to end the conflict in Rwanda. The Clinton administration’s reasons for this
policy were based on the guidelines established in PDD-25 that set criteria for US
participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. It was also based on America’s
participation in peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia which was dividing
the administration’s attention and US resources. In this situation, the international
community was attempting to resolve multiple intranational conflicts occurring
concurrently, which prevented it from engaging in each crisis equally. This meant that the
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Rwandan genocide was competing for attention against crises that had been ongoing
when the fighting resumed in Rwandan. It also increased US reluctance to participate in
another peacekeeping mission in a country where the peacekeeping forces might be
deployed for a long period.
The UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda was the first test of PDD-25 on US
policies towards multinational peace operations. On 3 May, Samuel Berger met with Kofi
Annan, UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping. During the meeting Berger
provided Annan with a copy of PDD-25, and informed Annan that that the Clinton
administration had concerns about the proposed peace operation to Rwanda, and that the
United States was not committing troops for UN peacekeeping operations. Berger
informed Annan that the Clinton administration hoped the UN received enough troop
commitments from the other countries to carry out the peacekeeping operation. Berger
also stated that the United States would attempt to provide financial and logistical support
for a UN mission to Rwanda, including fifteen million dollars for emergency relief
efforts.316
From the first attempts to deploy peacekeeping forces to Rwanda, the Clinton
administration’s implementation of PDD-25 limited US participation in military efforts to
end the violence. It also pushed the United States towards a more selective involvement
in peacekeeping efforts. During the crises in Bosnia and Haiti, the United States
increased its participation and leadership roles. However, using PDD-25 to guide US
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policies towards peacekeeping missions prevented the administration from adopting a
similar strategy to resolve the conflict in Rwanda. Since the United States had increased
is requirements for participating in peacekeeping missions, it forced the rest of the
international community to provide the support the United States would not. However,
even with US financial and political support the OAU and UN were unable to overcome
the hindrance that US reluctance to participate created in other countries.
The effects of PDD-25 and the Clinton administration’s position on post-Cold
War peacekeeping operations was most evident during Vice President Al Gore’s meeting
with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on Rwanda. Before the meeting, the
NSC Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs Office gave Gore talking points that
explained US concerns about policy towards Rwanda. The talking points noted that the
United States believed the international community needed to provide more support to
create a lasting solution in Rwanda, and that the United States wanted to explore UN
proposals further. The talking points also encouraged Gore to stress America’s continued
commitment to providing humanitarian relief, implementing the embargo, and supporting
UNHRC investigations in Rwanda. Gore was also instructed to inform Boutros-Ghali the
United States was interested in creating a protective zone on the Rwandan border to
provide international support for the refugees.317
Gore was also given points for expressing America’s main reservations against
General Dallaire’s peace enforcement proposal. The talking points focused on Dallaire’s
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proposal for a large deployment of peace enforcement forces mandated to end the
fighting, restore law and order, and pacify the population. The United States was not
concerned that Dallaire’s proposal would lead to mission that was more complex than the
mission to Somalia. There were also concerns that the Rwandans would attack UN troops
as they carried out operations, the lack of member commitments for troops, and the high
improbability that the UN would successfully raise enough troops for such a large-scale
operation. Other US concerns included the logistical difficulties staging the mission out
of the Kigali airport because it was at the center of the civil war, the mission mandate and
timeline were unclear, and there were few chances of success. Despite American
reservations, Gore was to express that the United States had not ruled out or in any
response. The talking points suggested that Gore conclude the meeting by explaining to
Boutros-Ghali that the United States was willing to support a viable and clear
peacekeeping proposal UN mission if American troops financial resources, air power,
and equipment were available.318
The reservations listed at the end of Gore’s talking points were closely tied to CIA
and State Department memos on possible dangers a UN force faced in Rwanda. The
memos pointed to the difficulties experienced in Somalia as a warning to the difficulties
the UN mission would face in Rwanda. In particular conducting a peacekeeping
operation in a country were the parties had not agreed to a cease-fire would require the
UN to deploy a large force to enforce peace. The mission risked becoming part of the
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political entanglements between the two sides, which increased the troops exposure to
attacks from either side. Talking points reconnected these concerns to PDD-25 guidelines
for US participation in multinational peacekeeping operations.319
As the talking points reveal the United States had significant reservations towards
Dallaire’s proposed peacekeeping missing to Rwanda based on previous experiences in
Somalia and the situation in Rwanda. While the Clinton administration was wary of
deploying US troops to participate, the administration did not rule out the possibility of
providing financial and logistical support once the UN decided to deploy a mission to
Rwanda.
As the genocide continued into May, the Clinton administration remained
committed to a humanitarian policy strategy to support Rwandan refugees. The NSC/DC
meetings continued to discuss General Dallaire’s proposal for an expanding UNAMIR’s
mandate, and UN plans to forcefully stop the killing by deploying a UN force. They also
explored diplomatic efforts to protect Rwandan refugees along the Tanzanian, Ugandan,
and Zairian borders. This included discussing the creation of safe zones, and scheduling
humanitarian airlifts for supplies as diseases were spreading through the refugee camps.
They analyzed the positions of the RPF and Rwandan government in relation to future
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peace efforts. They also discussed French plans to deploy the Foreign Legionnaires to
limit the fighting and deliver humanitarian aid.320
Conclusions
Throughout the Rwandan crisis, the Clinton administration adhered to PDD-25
and focused on policies directed toward humanitarian aid rather than deploying US forces
as part of a peacekeeping mission. In the post-Cold War period, the Rwandan episode
showed that the United States continued to selectively engage in world crisis. However,
selective engagement made it difficult for the United States to encourage cooperative
actions to deter aggression and to participate in multinational peace operations. The
creation of Presidential Decision Directive-25 towards US policies in multinational
peacekeeping missions added to the difficulties the Clinton administration faced
encouraging international cooperation while limiting US participation to financial and
logistical support. In addition, the PDD-25 hindered others who pushed for UN
peacekeeping missions to end the violence in Rwanda.
While Clinton had desired to introduce more American interest in the African
continent, his policy strategies towards the genocide in Rwanda contradicted that national
security strategy. At the same time, Clinton and his advisors’ attention was divided
between the crises in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia. In Somalia, the United States was
participating in a UN peacekeeping mission, while in Haiti Clinton was preparing the
United States to start a multinational peacekeeping operation. These crises pushed
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Rwanda into a lower priority for US national security and foreign policy decisions. Even
so, the Clinton administration attempted to encourage the OAU to led international
efforts to resolve the Rwandan genocide by pressuring the Hutu and RPF to accept a
cease-fire and negotiations for a new government.
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CHAPTER VIII POST-COLD WAR CRISES FRAMING AND AGENDA SETTING
AND PUBLIC OPINION
Scholars have shown that the 1960s was a crucial period in the evolution of mass
media and communications, and the public’s ability to influence the media and foreign
policy. The civil rights movements of the mid-twentieth century and the anti-Vietnam
War movement enabled and encouraged America’s media outlets to challenge the frames
and public agenda settings established by American presidents. This period was pivotal to
establishing the media’s ability to challenge public debates and to sway public opinion
away from the cold war consensus, as the media rose as a national power capable of
challenging the American government’s authority. At the same time, the increased
competition between cable television and the three broadcast networks decreased the
president’s ability to rely on dedicated television coverage to express his policies and set
the frames and agendas for American policies. After the end of the Cold War,
telecommunication technology advances gave the media greater abilities to challenge the
president’s frames and agendas, to influence public opinion to redirect American foreign
policy debates, and to force foreign policy changes.
In this chapter I argue that between 1989 and 1995 Bush, Clinton, and the US
mass media competed to define and contextualize foreign crises for the American public
to produce support or opposition for foreign policy decisions. I contend that in the postCold War period, the introduction of new telecommunications technologies changed the
way the media and presidents influenced public opinion. These new technologies also
altered the public’s relationship with American presidents and the way the American
public and public opinion influenced presidential foreign policy decisions. The expansion
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of satellite communications enabled the start of twenty-four-hour cable news networks,
like CNN, that kept Americans informed of domestic and foreign events. At the same
time, the introduction of the home computer, public access to the internet, and electronic
mail (email) provided the American public with easier methods to express opinions to
policymakers and the media. The increased presence of the public’s opinion and the
media after the Cold War, forced Bush and Clinton to debate their foreign affairs framing
and agendas with political opponents, the media, and the public to get public support for
their decisions. Bush and Clinton’s success depended on their ability to establish a frame
and agenda the public easily accepted and the media supported. However, if the media or
political opponents presented convincing counter-frames and agendas then Bush and
Clinton were less successful gaining public opinion.
Theories on the Relationships between Mass Media, the President, and American Public
Opinion
In response to the growing anti-Vietnam War movement American president
Richard Nixon said, “In each nights TV news and each morning paper the war was
reported battle by battle but little or no sense of the underlying purpose of the fighting
was conveyed.”321 Nixon continued that the lack of context made it appear that the
United States was fighting a war without a purpose or objective, and the media’s
“relentless and literal reporting” on human suffering and the sacrifices of American
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soldiers demoralized the American public.322 As Nixon’s statement reveals the media’s
ability to move public opinion behind or against for the president’s foreign policy
decisions by establishing counter frames and agendas to the president’s. It also reveals
that the media’s focus on presenting entertaining and dramatic stories without context
prevented the American public from fulling understanding foreign affairs and encouraged
public opinion to oppose foreign policy decisions that failed to end human suffering.
Robert Entman explains that the relationship between policy elites, the media, and
public is an important factor in foreign policy decision making. He explains that the
power dynamic in this relationship is best explained as a cascade of frames and agendas
started by the president that flow downward to the media and public. Entman’s cascading
activation theory shows that after the president and other policy elites express their
opinions on foreign policy that the media choses to support or oppose those opinions.
This president and other policy elites respond to the media’s coverage of the policy
debate. At the same time, the public absorbs the messages from the president, policy
elites, and the media, and makes its own opinion to approve or disapprove of the media
and policymakers, which is then fed back up to the media and policymakers. The public’s
opinion is reflected in future news coverage and policy elites adjusted messages or policy
decisions.323 Entman’s theory established that foreign policymaking is not isolated to
policy elites. Instead, foreign policymaking is a complicated process where the media,
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policymakers, and the American public interact with each other at different power levels
influencing changes as policies and events are publicly debated.
During the post-Cold War period, ABC’s World News Tonight had an average
viewership of 11.1 million Americans, CBS’s Evening News had 9.9 million, and NBC’s
Nightly News had 9.4 million views for a combined total of 30.4 million American adults
watching the evening news on broadcast television.324 It meant that at any time
approximately thirty million members of the American public had some access to news
about foreign events. The media’s news coverage of the changing international
environment after the Cold War included depictions of the continued violence and
instability around the world following the fall of communism.
These depictions encouraged the American public to view the post-Cold War
period as chaotic. Additionally, the media’s use of images of starving refugees, mutilated
bodies, and suffering women and children appealed to the public’s morality. These
images could move the public to pressure the government to intervene in a crisis or
conflict. At the same time, images of people American soldiers who were deployed to a
country to provide humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping could turn public opinion
against the intervention. The media’s influence on public opinion is not new. However,
the increased pressure the media can bring on governments due to technological changes
during the later decades of the twentieth-century has led to the CNN effect. In response to
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the CNN effect presidents now had to engage in media diplomacy as well as hard and soft
diplomacy to achieve policy successes.325
As the Cold War ended many Americans hoped for a peaceful and stable period.
However, conflicts, crises, and instability plagued the post-Cold War period from the
start. Few Americans considered these crises direct threats to the United States compared
to the threat the Soviet Union posed for the previous forty years. Additionally, few
Americans supported the United States acting as the world’s policeman though many
recognized that the United States was the world’s only superpower. Americans were also
less supportive of deploying American forces abroad to respond to conflicts that were not
international acts of aggression, and placing American troops under UN command.
Instead, much of the American public turned its attention to domestic issues, most
Americans ignored or divested in foreign affairs that did not directly affect their lives.326
Scholars have also shown that unlike the president, the American public does not
have a sophisticated understanding of foreign affairs to influence US foreign policy. This
is important as surveys have revealed that only one third of the American public is
interested in foreign affairs and US foreign policy. Part of this is due to the public’s
tendency to ignore or avoid foreign policy news it considers too distant or confusing.
However, this lack of knowledge does not prevent the American public from having an
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opinion about foreign policy or world problems.327 Instead, Americans continue to
express their opinions about foreign affairs and US foreign policies even when those
opinions are based on limited information and challenges the presidents understanding of
foreign events.
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton had to navigate this changing power
dynamic between themselves and the media to defend and promote their foreign policy
decisions to the American public. This included establishing their frames and agendas for
the foreign affairs the United States was involved to gain public. Clinton’s and Bush’s
ability to successfully establish their frames and agendas determined their ability to gain
public support, and prevent the media from establishing counter frames and agendas Each
president had to confidently and concisely justifying why the conflict or crisis warranted
his policy decision. However, if the president failed to convincingly accomplish this, then
the mass media was open to set its own frame and agenda, and gain the ability to sway
public opinion against the president.328 Additionally, if the president’s ratings are below
50 percent the president has less influence on public opinion than when his ratings are
about 50 percent. 329In this situation, the president’s ability to use media outlets to
disseminate his views determined how successfully he could lead foreign policy debates,

327

Powlick and Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 31-35.

Jeffrey S. Peake, “Presidential Agenda Setting in Foreign Policy,” Political Research Quarterly
54, no. 1 (March 2001): 69-86. Jeffrey Cohen, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,” American
Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (February 1995): 87-107.
328

329

Jordan and Page, “Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 227-

237.

212

and thereby implement the foreign policy agenda he desired. However, the president does
not have unquestioned influence.
Along with the rise of media diplomacy America’s presidents also had to respond
to the negative effects cable television had on ratings and popularity of televised
presidential statements. In the age of cable television, the American public could choose
to ignore presidential statements by changing the channel. The increased popularity of
cable television and the American public’s ability to watch something other than
presidential addresses has decreased media coverage of these addresses, and encouraged
presidents to reduce the number of addresses they give.330 However, presidential rhetoric
and statements about foreign affairs remains a strong influence on public opinion despite
of the cable television’s popularity.331
As early as the late 1970s, scholars have shown that public opinion can shape and
change foreign policy especially “when opinion changes are large and sustained.”332
However, public opinion is not developed in a vacuum. The news the public watches and
reads has its own frames, agenda setting, attributes of responsibility, and policy
preferences that may or may not diverge from those established by the president. Like the
president, television news has a substantial effect on collective public opinion, while each
source television news uses has a different level of influence to newspapers. Televised
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news broadcasts use of commentators including anchors, field reporters, experts, research
studies, and special commentators have a greater influence on public opinion than special
interest groups, demonstrations, and foreign news sources.333 The ability of the media to
use these sources effectively to influence public opinion does not enable the media to tell
the public what to think. Instead the media and president are competing to tell the
American public what to think about and to determine what events are important.
The media’s ability to influence public opinion relies on journalists’ abilities to
“focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues
of the day.”334 From the location of a story in the broadcast or newspaper, the size of the
headline, the length of the newspaper article, and reporting on a story day-after-day the
media can direct public attention to issues and events it deems important for the public
agenda. In this way, the media sets the public agenda and influences what the American
public thinks about. This also provides the media with the ability to encourage specific
policies for the government to implement.335
The media’s ability to influence public opinion and set the public agenda is as
important as the way it frames those issues. The way the mass media frames or chooses
to describe an issue or event, can affect the way the public understands what is occurring.
It can also affect public opinion in strongly enough that the change in public opinion
forces the president to change his foreign policy. Philip Hammond argues that the
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European media’s descriptions of the collapse of Yugoslavia and Bosnian War as an
“ethnic conflict” was “really a refusal of explanation: the tendency to down-play or
ignore historical and political factors…and to suggest instead that conflict is somehow
inevitable and incomprehensible.”336 Additionally, the use of a civil war frame implies
that all sides are equally to blame whereas an ethnic cleansing and genocide frame
established that one side has more responsibility for the conflict.337 As Hammond
demonstrates with his study on reporting on Yugoslavia and Bosna, the frames the media
uses influences the ways that people understand an issue, positively or negatively, and
intervenable or not.
Since the 1960s mass media scholars have debated media’s power to influence
public opinion and change foreign policy. Following the introduction of real-time
communications via satellite communications and the twenty-four-hour cable news
network, CNN, media scholars termed this theory “the CNN factor.” The CNN factor
refers to the process by which the media influences foreign policy by evoking responses
in the audience through concentrated and emotionally biased news coverage, which in
turn applies pressure to governments to adopt policy responses to the covered conflict or
crisis. 338
The CNN factor Originally referred to the effect CNN broadcasting had on the
Persian Gulf. Since then the theory has been applied broadly to refer to all real-time
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communications technology via the news media.339 Virgil Hawkins shows that there is a
downside to the CNN factor. Hawkins argues that it is impossible for the media to give
every conflict high priority coverage. This creates imbalanced coverage which means that
a conflict that is potentially more relevant to US national security or humanitarian
interests is overlooked. This lack of coverage prevents public pressure from building to a
point that it pressures the government to create a policy response to the conflict. Hawkins
contends that the media’s inability to cover every conflict leads to an absence of policy
towards those conflicts not covered by the media because the government has little
incentive to become involved.340 During the post-Cold War period when multiple
conflicts occurred concurrently this lack of media coverage had significant effects on US
foreign policy.
The “other side of the CNN factor” shows that without public opinion and interest
in an issue there is no motivation for the media to include an issue in the public agenda or
for the government to develop policies. This relationship is why public opinion, and mass
media’s influence on public opinion are important to policymakers and their ability to
direct mass media frames and agenda.341 This relationship is also why presidents attempt
to frame foreign affairs according to their preferred foreign policy strategy so that the
public will support that policy and the president’s decisions. When the media and public

339

Robinson, The CNN, 2.

Virgil Hawkins, “The Other Side of the CNN Factor: The Media and Conflict,” Journalism
Studies 3, no. 2 (2002): 225-240.
340

341
Philip J. Powlick, “The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,”
International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 427-451. Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z.
Katz, “Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” Mershon International Studies
Review 42, no. 1 (May 1998): 29-61.

216

opinion diverge from the president’s frame and agenda they can force the president to
change his foreign policies in ways that undermine his policy goals or US interests. As
the United States responded to the post-Cold War period under Bush and then Clinton’s
leadership, their foreign policies elicited different responses from the media and public
opinion that affected how both presidents implemented their national security strategy
and foreign policies.
Presidential Statements, Public Opinion, Media, and German Reunification
As democratic revolutions swept Eastern Europe and Germany, many Americans
viewed them as initiating a period of peace and stability, even as those changes brought
instability and fears. At that time, Americans were focused on a peaceful future, even as
policymakers feared the instability in Eastern Europe posed significant threats to the
United States. As Warsaw Pact members broke away as the Soviet Union refused to
intervene, these events were viewed as evidence that America’s cold war strategy of
containment was successful as against the Soviet Union and communist expansion. In the
months after the opening of the Berlin Wall as Europe supported and opposed German
unification, most Americans supported it. Also, most Americans did not believe a
reunited Germany would attempt to dominate the world again. The broad base of support
for German reunification crossed generational lines, including most of those that had
lived through WWII.342
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Additionally, a solid majority of Americans believed that reuniting Germany was
a good thing for Western security and international security arrangements. Part of this
was because few Americans feared the changes occurring in Europe, or believed the
changes in Europe would weaken the US-European military alliances. Most Americans
also believed that the benefits of reduced US-Soviet tensions outweighed the drawbacks
caused by any instability in Eastern Europe.343
These opinions improved Bush’s ability to successfully carry out his policy to
reunify Germany even as Europe remained reluctant to endorse German reunification.
While Bush enjoyed a high level of public support for German reunification, he still
faced criticisms and opposition to his policies. To offset the influence of the opposition
and maintain public support, Bush made public statements that explained the situation in
Germany in ways that justified his policies, and established that German reunification
was a boon for US interests and security. The high levels of public support also limited
the media’s ability to diverge greatly from Bush’s framing and agenda for Germany’s
reunification.
Bush had to continue to convince the American public that German reunification
was a boon for US interests and European. However, this was not an uphill climb as most
Americans viewed German reunification positively. To maintain public support for his
efforts to reunify Germany Bush had to frame the events in Germany as improving
European security and economy, and describing Germany’s reunification as the German
citizens right to determine the future of their country. Bush did this by issuing statements
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that embraced the German people’s desire for unification, justified the merits of
reunification in terms of American, European, and world interests, and defended the
Germans’ right to self-determination. By doing this and doing it repeatedly, Bush
established a frame and agenda for German unification in the United States that many
Americans accepted, even as strong opposition in Europe and American critics
challenged Bush’s perspective.
Bush’s frame included expressions of confidence in the German people’s ability
to unite under democracy and avoid the militarism and totalitarianism that had led the
country to follow a leader into a second world war and the most infamous case of
genocide. He did this with repeated statements urging the American public and
Europeans not to fear, “and there are some that worry about it…But what I say is as I
tried to the other day: This is 1989. And we can learn from history, but we also can look
to the future. And my view is: Let this matter be determined by the people in Germany.344
He also established that the opening of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany
were positive changes for Europe, the world, and the Cold War environment. 345 He also
connected German reunification with a warming of the Cold War and greater
international peace and security. The day the border opened Bush said, “Clearly this is a
long way from the harshest Iron Curtain days, a long way from that,” and that the world
was closer to a “Europe whole and free,” as Eastern Europe reconnected with Western
Europe, democracy spread among the eastern governments, and enjoyed the benefits of
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the Helsinki Final Act346.347 Bush also succeeded because the media embraced the
celebratory attitudes from Germany during the opening of the border, and presented it to
the American public.
As the Europeans gathered to prepared to reunify Germany, the 57 percent of
Americans that reported that they had followed media discussions about German
reunification. During the same poll 82 percent of Americans believed the American press
had done a good or excellent job covering the events and discussions about Germany’s
reunification. 348 Both percentages remained constant between January and March 1990
as the American public consistently agreed that the media had done either a good or
excellent job covering Eastern Europe and German reunification efforts, and about half
report maintaining current about the situation.349 The high level of public interest in
events in Eastern Europe and Germany encouraged the media to cover events there, and
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report on the process to reunify Germany. However, the media did not completely follow
the frame that Bush set as foreign affairs commentators and experts questioned Bush’s
policy decisions.
As Bush issued statements validating the reunification of Germany, the American
media kept the American public informed about events in Germany, and the various
expert opinions about the developments towards German reunification. The media
focused much of its attention on the opening of the Berlin Wall itself, and then reported
on the reunification process as it unfolded in Europe.350 From 9 to 15 November, the
American public received daily news reports about the border opening and the movement
of East Germans to West Germany. 351 The media’s frame of the opening of the Berlin
Wall and German reunification resembled Bush’s frame that the changes in Germany
demonstrated the success of America’s strategy of containment and that German
reunification was a positive event. Along with news reports about the daily situation,
cable news channels like C-Span and CNN provided editorial style expert analysis of
events. The reports by C-Span and CNN added to the American public’s understanding of
events in Germany. While some experts focused on explaining the events to the
American public others criticized or opposed Bush’s foreign policy decisions towards
German reunification. However, Bush’s critics were unable to overturn Bush’s framing
and agenda.
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In an episode of C-Span’s Current Issues the commentators, Hans-Henning
Horstmann, Counselor of West Germany, Robert Gerald Livingston, and Ulrich Schiller,
bureau chief of Die Zeit, discussed the history of the Berlin Wall and discussed the
ramifications of the wall’s opening. The commentators discussed the history of the Berlin
Wall so that the current generation of the American public could understand the walls’
significance, and better comprehend why its opening in 1989 was so significant. The
commentators spent most of the discussion explaining the ramifications of a future
democratic revolution in East Germany, and connected the opening of the German border
to the larger democratic revolution occurring in Eastern Europe.352 These editorials
combined with the daily reports on the situation in Germany and helped move the
American public support Germany’s future reunification. It did this by having experts
explain the events in Germany as a winding down of the Cold War and introducing a
peaceful transition to democracy in Europe.
However, the media also produced reports and editorials from experts, especially
in major newspapers, that questioned the ramifications of German reunification for US
interests, global security, and Bush’s ability to lead the nation through the changes. Many
of the newspaper criticisms immediately following the opening of the Berlin Wall
focused on Bush’s ability to respond to the changes occurring in Europe. Many experts
and commentators worried that Bush’s reserved and calculated mannerisms threatened
America’s role in Europe moving forward. They were also wary that his policies were illsuited for the growing revolutionary environment. Some commentators, like Walter
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Mossberg and Robert Greenberger feared that Bush’s inactivity would allow the Soviet
Union to dominate future security debates in Europe. They were particularly concerned
the Soviet Union would lead a move to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact with a new
system that did not include the United States or one did not give the United States a
strong presence in Europe.353
These comments reveal that underneath the positive feeling about the changes in
Eastern Europe, there were many experts and policymakers that continued to hold onto
Cold War fears of the Soviet Union and believed that Gorbachev or the Soviet Union
could retaliate or attempt to suppress democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe. There
were also commentators that continued to believe the United States needed to have a
strong presence in Europe to deter any Soviet aggression or expansion. These editorials
feared that Bush did not recognize the gravity of the situation and feared that his policies
were threatening US interests and security. Despite the concerns that foreign policy
analysts and commentators expressed they were unable to challenge the positive attitudes
and framing of the changes occurring in Eastern Europe.
Like the editorials that criticized Bush’s policy decisions, editorials also opposed
German reunification. Those that opposed Germany reunification argued that the
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situation in Germany threatened US and European security. 354 These discussions
attempted to sober the exuberance created by television broadcasts of Germans dancing
on the Berlin Wall or the flood of East Germans to the West. These editorials placed
German reunification in context of the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe, and
reminded the audience that the Cold War continued. However, these editorials did little to
diminish public opinion towards the reunification of Germany. Instead, Bush’s positive
frame and agenda for Germany’s reunification remained steady even as the media
produced reports and specials that did not always follow Bush.
Presidential Statements, Public Opinion, Media, and Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait
The Iraq invasion of Kuwait was the last conflict of the Cold War. Bush’s and his
administration’s diplomatic skills ensured that international cooperation ended Iraq’s
aggression and illegal territorial acquisition. While many Americans opposed the Iraq
invasion of Kuwait, the American public was divided on the appropriate response and
why the United States was involved in resolution efforts. Most Americans believed that
oil was the main reason that the United States was involved, and much of the public did
not support a military intervention in Kuwait. Additionally, the American public still
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suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome and feared the United States would get involved in
a conflict it could not escape.355
As the Iraqi invasion continued into November, Americans increasingly become
wary of the prospects of a US military operation against Iraq. Most Americans continued
to oppose a military intervention to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, Bush
gained much of the population’s support for his policies, though that support had
diminished to 65 percent, from an 80 percent high depending on Bush’s decisions to
deploy US forces to Saudi Arabia. Bush also managed to convince most Americans that
the United States was not involved in the Iraqi situation because of oil by November,
though 38 percent continued to believe the US motivated by oil interests and only 23
percent believed it was to stop Iraqi aggression 356
The changes that occurred in public opinion towards between November and
December followed the UNSC’s decision to use all means necessary to remove Iraq
forces from Kuwait. While most Americans supported the decision to use force, the
public remained divided if Kuwait was worth going to war over. Additionally, 56 percent
believed that “Bush should tailor policy to what polls say.”357 The polls reveal that even
as Bush successfully garnered and kept public support, the public did not completely
accept Bush frames or agenda. Instead the public while supportive continued to hold
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opinions to that diverged from those Bush tried to spread throughout the public. Public
opinion also ensured that the media kept the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the public
agenda, and that the media presented competing frames of the situation.
Along with public opinion polls, Bush also received 198,680358 pages of
correspondence from the American public expressing their support, opposition, fears,
suggestions, and information request about the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the future
Gulf War. This level of correspondence before email was readily available to much of the
public demonstrates the American public’s determination to contact elected officials to
express their opinions. Most of the authors expressed support for Bush’s policy decisions,
a significant portion also made policy suggestions, or asked Bush to clarify policy
decisions. As much of the nation was concerned that the United States was repeating the
mistakes of the Vietnam War, many Vietnam War veterans wrote to express their
support. They also encouraged Bush to provide American forces all the resources they
needed to do their jobs, win any future war, and return home. Many veterans
recommended limiting political and civilian influences on the generals’ abilities to make
military decisions and successfully wage any war. 359
As Bush also received many letters from the family members of military
personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf. These were letters written by children, and
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parents they expressed their support and their fears for their loved one deployed abroad.
One mother wrote:
Dear Mr. President, I want you to know that my family and I stand behind your
decision to send troops to the Middle East. I do not say this lightly since four of
my five children are in military service. My twins are already over there and the
other two could be soon. I fully understand what this conflict could cost my
family and our nation in the lives of our bravest and best young people. But I also
realize that aggression against a peaceful neighbor cannot be tolerated and the
interests of our nation and the civilized world must be protected.360
The letters Bush received followed trends in public opinion polls about the
public’s understanding of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and their support for Bush’s policy
decisions. These letters also provided Bush and his administration with an abundance of
knowledge about American concerns, and what steps Bush needed to take to reduce those
concerns and gain more public support.
During the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Bush’s framed the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as
an act of aggression, and that the United States was involved to end Iraqi aggression in
the Persian Gulf and to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. With
statements like, “We have seen too often in this century how quickly any threat to one
becomes a threat to all. At this critical moment in history, at a time the cold war is fading
into the past, we cannot fail. At stake is not simply some distant country called Kuwait.
At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit.”361 He presented the US mission as
defensive, and argued that he would deploy enough US personnel and equipment to the
region to deter further Iraq aggression.
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As it became increasingly apparent that a military intervention was the only way
to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. Bush promised that US military forces would have the
resources and equipment to defeat Iraq. Bush also countered any arguments that the
United States was involved because of oil. Bush also used the Iraq invasion of Kuwait to
explain his national security strategy that promoted international cooperation to promote
stability, security, and peace around the world. From the beginning of his response to
Iraqi aggression, Bush established that his policies would rely on diplomatic measures
and international pressure to get Iraq to leave Kuwait.362
He also attempted to override any fears the United States would end up bogged
down in the Persian Gulf like it had in Vietnam, by reminding the public that the United
States was working with the international community not unilaterally, “As the
deployment of the forces of many nations shows and as the voted in the United Nations
show, this is not a matter between Iraq and the United States; it is between Iraq and the
entire world community…All the nations of the world are lined up to oppose
aggression.363. He also had to defeat the Vietnam Syndrome364 which was the strongest
barrier against public approval for a US intervention in Kuwait. Bush began by stating
that he did not want to involve the United States in a war in the Persian Gulf, “I want
peace. I want peace not war…No one wants to see a peaceful solution to the crisis more
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than I do. And at the same time no one is more determined that I am to see Saddam’s
aggression reversed.”365 As the deadline to intervene in Kuwait approached Bush
adjusted his, “if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied
behind their backs.”366 In both types of statements Bush reaffirmed the intervention was
defensive in nature and a last resort to Iraq’s aggression.
He framed America’s response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as a way to
establish America’s roles and responsibilities for the future to “forge for ourselves and
for future generations a new world order.”367 Bush’s framing was successful as most of
the media and the public accepted that the US involvement in the Persian Gulf was to
deter further Iraqi aggression. They also supported Bush’s agenda that with the
international cooperation against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait the world could move closer
to deterring aggression and security stability and peace. For the most part, the media
abided by Bush’s frame and agenda for the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. However, this did
not mean that the media did not report on opposition and criticism to Bush’s policies.
Instead, Bush’s frame and agenda were more easily accepted by the public than
opposition. As a result, the media followed Bush’s frames and agendas.
The media played a role developing public opinion towards the Iraq Invasion of
Kuwait. From 1 August 1990 to 16 January 1991, the three broadcast networks aired
1,112 segments on either the Iraq invasion of Kuwait or the Persian Gulf Crisis. In
August the ABC, CBS, and NBC aired 372 news reports on the situation in the Persian
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Gulf. Most of the news reports lasted between one and eight minutes with the longest
lasting thirteen minutes. These news broadcasts provided updates on events related to the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, including diplomatic efforts, the invasions effect on oil prices,
and interviews and press statements by Bush and other foreign leaders.368 Public opinion
polls reveal that most Americans paid attention to the news about Iraq’s occupation of
Kuwait, and a majority agreed that the press was covering the situation well.369 At the
same time most of the public believed the media had kept the public well informed about
the conflict in Kuwait.370
Most of the news reports on the invasion of Kuwait adopted Bush’s frame and
agenda for the Persian Gulf Crisis. Also, some television and newspaper commentary
criticized and opposed of Bush policies. However, these were in the minority, though US
newspapers had more present articles that did not fit or challenged Bush’s frame an
agenda.
National, regional, and local newspapers used titles like “Iraq’s Naked
Aggression,” “Hussein Must Be Stopped,” “Isolate Iraq,” and “The US Stands Up Who
Else,” which ensured that the public understood that Iraq was the antagonist and that the
United States and the world had united to stop Hussein’s aggression in the Persian Gulf.
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These titles also supported Bush’s frame and agenda: that Iraq had illegally invaded
Kuwait, that the United States would respond defensively to protect the rest of the
Persian Gulf from additional Iraqi aggression, that the United States and the world
condemned and opposed Iraq’s actions, and the international community was cooperating
to end the invasion of Kuwait.
At the same time editorials continued arguments that America’s involvement was
connected to oil and easy access to Persian Gulf oil. Gary Sick, former National Security
Council member during the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, argued that
Hussein invaded Kuwait to gain control of Persian Gulf Oil and OPEC. He argued that
the United States had to act to stop Hussein because neither the United States nor its
allies could afford the long-term threat Saddam posed to regional and international
stability.371 While Sick continued the arguments that oil was a strong reason for US
participation he framed it as a defensive measure to defend US national interests from
Hussein’s aggression. In this way Sick’s editorial presented mild deviations from Bush’s
desired frame, while continuing to push’s frames of international cooperation and
defensive actions. Other editorials undermined Bush’s efforts to reduce the Vietnam
Syndrome. They argued that Bush had limited his options by deploying American forces
to Saudi Arabia and dedicated American forces and reputation to ensuring that Hussein
was defeated and no longer capable of threatening the Persian Gulf.372 By challenging
Bush’s frames through critiques of policy decisions the media prevented Bush from
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creating a consensus on his policies even as he gained approval from most of the public.
This lack of consensus forced Bush to constantly argue for his policies in the public
debate, and kept public concerns in the agenda. However, even without a consensus
Bush’s frame and agenda became dominate and allowed him to gain the public support he
needed to carry out his policies.
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Collapse of Yugoslavia
The collapse of Yugoslavia occurred as Germany was reunified and Iraq invaded
Kuwait. In 1989, public opinion polls revealed that only 28 percent of Americans were
paying close attention to news coming out of Europe.373 In 1990, much of the American
public was focused on events and news on the Persian Gulf Crisis.374 It was not until the
conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 that Bush and the American public turned their
attention to the situation in Yugoslavia. However, some members of the American public
with an interest in Yugoslavia contacted Bush to make the situation in Yugoslavia a
higher US priority. Many of these individuals worked for human rights organizations that
had connections in Yugoslavia of these the members of Human Rights Watch were the
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most determined to convince Bush to act in Yugoslavia. 375 These observers described
political purges, and assassinations, attempted to assassinations, and press censorship by
the Serb ultranationalists and hardline leaders in the Yugoslav government. 376 The letters
continued as Bush worked on German reunification and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait.
They described the worsening situation and Serb atrocities against the Albanians in
Kosovo, Croatians, and Muslims.377 Human Rights Watch was also the first to connect
Serb atrocities and human rights violations with a desire to create Greater Serbia out of
Kosovo and Bosnia.378 Along with Human Rights Watch proponents Bush received
letters from Americans of Croat, Muslims, Serb, and Albanian heritage urging Bush to
defend human rights and self-determination for those states that democratically voted to
secede from Yugoslavia.
Despite these pleas Bush did not establish a frame to defend human rights
violations in Yugoslavia or promoting the democratic movement and self-determination
for the Yugoslav states. Instead Bush promoted Yugoslavia’s unity and using diplomatic
measures to resolve the differences between the states. Bush also refused to acknowledge
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that the Serbs perpetrated more human rights violations than the other groups. In a
response to one of the Human Rights Watch letters the administration noted:
“The United States government does not favor the position of any particular
nationality within Yugoslavia. We believe it would be wrong to take sides in a
situation in which rights and wrongs are passionately debated and difficult for
outsiders to discern accurately. Our hope is that the Yugoslav people will solve
their current problems in a way which will protect the rights of all Yugoslav
citizens.”379
On 7 May 1991 Bush issued his first statement on Yugoslavia through his press
secretary Max Fitzwater. This statement and those that followed demonstrated Bush’s
frame and agenda for Yugoslavia. The United States joined the international community
expressing American concerns about the situation in Yugoslavia and condemning the
violence there. Bush also espoused US support for Yugoslavia’s unity, and urged the
parties in Yugoslavia to respect human rights and democracy.380
In another statement released through Fitzwater, Bush announced he had sent a
letter to Yugoslav President Mesic expressing his concerns about the situation in
Yugoslavia and urging Mesic to re-establish civilian control over the military and restore
peace to the country, and to continue cooperating with the United States, EC and others
for a peaceful resolution. In the statement via Fitzwater, Bush expressed hope that all
Yugoslav parties would open a dialogue on Yugoslavia’s democratic future. Fitzwater
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noted that Bush also reiterated American support for EC efforts to resolve the Yugoslav
crisis.381
Of the few times that Bush personally made a statement about the Yugoslav crisis
occurred during a meeting with Italian leaders. In one statement, Bush discussed
European efforts to help the Yugoslav’s resolve their problems peacefully, and that the
United States along with Europe supported a collective resolution of the conflict.382 He
also established that the collapse in Yugoslavia was a European matter.383 As the conflict
in Yugoslavia continued and demonstrated that the federations collapse was inevitable
Bush adjusted his frame to oppose the Yugoslav government’s use of force to keep the
federation together. Throughout the crisis Bush made few references to the human rights
violations Human Rights Watch described in their letters. Bush’s frame and agenda for
the collapse of Yugoslavia connected it to the changes occurring in Eastern Europe as the
Soviet Union lost power and influence opening opportunities for political reform.384
The American media like Bush diminished the importance of the collapse of
Yugoslavia to US interests and national security to the American public. The media did
not add Yugoslavia to the public agenda until the spring of 1992. By that time, the
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republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia had declared their independence
from Yugoslavia through democratic elections. Between 1989 and 1992 satellite
technology improved making it possible for news channels to produce near simultaneous
reports from around the world. However, the media only reported on the crisis in
Yugoslavia in 1989 eight times. These eight broadcasts focused on ethnic and general
unrest and rioting in Yugoslavia, and the longest was two and a half minutes long, while
most lasted twenty seconds.385
Even though the crisis in Yugoslavia was also connected to changes occurring in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the media gave reports on Yugoslavia a low
priority. This included the media’s coverage of the secession votes in BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. It was not until summer of 1991 that the broadcast
networks reported on the situation in Yugoslavia frequently and repeatedly. It was not
until reports emerged that the Serbs were carrying out ethnic cleansing in Bosnia that the
situation in the Balkans was in the American media every day. However, by that point
Yugoslavia no longer existed as a country, and the conflict had become a difference crisis
between the former Yugoslav states.386 The media’s reporting of Yugoslavia framed the
situation as a political conflict with occasional references to ethnic divisions and human
rights violations. The media followed Bush’s framing of the collapse of Yugoslavia
deviating by its focus on the ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia as the source of the conflict.
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One of the ways the media framed the conflict was through special reports on
Yugoslavia where experts discussed the situation that explained the conflict’s
foundations. One C-Span special report “History and Politics of Yugoslavia,” included
discussions between John Lampe, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center,
and Dusan Zupan, Washington Bureau Chief of Tanjug Yugoslavia’s News Agency. At
the beginning Lampe challenged notions that the crisis was caused by an age-old
animosity between the groups. Instead, Lampe argued that Yugoslavia’s conflict was
caused a lack of contact between the parties, political changes that had led to the rise of
secessionist movements, democratic movements, and ultranationalists’ and communist
hardliners opposition to change. Zupan added to by pointing to the fall of communism as
the spark that started the issues Lampe pointed to.387 Special reports like this one did not
stray far from the media’s frame and agenda. They did not discuss human rights
violations by the Yugoslav government, though some attempted to challenge the ancient
hatreds frame. Instead the special reports tended to abide by the media’s frame and
agenda for the collapse of Yugoslavia.
American newspapers also framed the collapse of Yugoslavia as a conflict caused
by ancient ethnic hatreds. They also presented the conflict as a European matter that the
EC was failing to resolve, and were the earliest media source to discuss the humanitarian
violations occurring during the conflict, and pointed to Slobodan Milošević as one of the
main culprits encouraging the conflict. American newspapers also allowed for multisided
discussions of the conflict. In the New York Times, one editorials “Bullying in the
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Balkans,” denounced Milošević for encouraging ethnic hatred for political gain and
endangering Yugoslavia’s stability and existence.388 Three editorials responded to each
from a different perspective. Zivorad Kovacevic, Yugoslavia’s Ambassador to the United
States, criticized the article for painting a misleading picture of developments in
Yugoslavia. Kovacevic contended the situation in Yugoslavia was created by legal and
democratic means, and blamed militant Albanian separatists for the violence in
Kosovo.389 Joseph J. Dioguardi, the President of the Albanian-American Civic League,
agreed with the author of “Bullying,”390 and Jerome Davidovich criticized the author for
relying on the ancient hatreds frame.391 This did not stop other editorials from continuing
to blame ancient hatreds for the violence in Yugoslavia.392 Other editorials debated the
validity of keeping Yugoslavia together, and how to do it. Those that supported unity
asserted that unity granted the member states greater autonomy that secession. They
argued that seceding from Yugoslavia fueled resentments among ethnic minorities within
the seceding states, and encouraged those minorities to make radical demands of the
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states.393 Those that supported Yugoslavia’s dissolution, pointed to the fact that
Yugoslavia existed because Tito had forced the nations into a federation and not because
they had volunteered to form it. The supporters of dissolution also pointed to the political
differences among the Slovenes and Croats that favored non-communist governments,
and Serbs that wanted to remain communist.394
The media’s framing of the collapse of Yugoslavia was similar to Bush’s and
failed to bring the conflict into the American public’s awareness and onto the public
agenda. Thus, the media did not bring any public pressure on Bush to change his policy.
Like Bush, the media argued that ancient hatreds caused the collapse of Yugoslavia, even
as some parts of the media unsuccessfully challenged that frame. Bush’s and the media’s
frames for the collapse of Yugoslavia dismissed the political and economic factors in the
crisis as irrelevant, this allowed the frames to oversimplify the collapse of Yugoslavia.
Additionally, this frame applied universal guilt to the Yugoslavs for the federations
collapse and the violence that followed. This trapped the media as well as Bush and
Clinton when the Bosnian War erupted between the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Bosnian War
The dissolution of Yugoslavia destabilized the Balkans, and gave the Serbs, led
by Slobodan Milošević, an opportunity to carryout ethnic cleanse Bosnia of its Muslim
and Croat populations to create Greater Serbia. While the collapse of Yugoslavia was not
well covered in American media and it was discussed as a political crisis, the Bosnian
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War with Serbs ethnically cleansing Bosnian Muslims and Croats to create Greater Serbia
became a humanitarian crisis. The Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnian incensed American
public opinion which led the media to give on the Bosnian War more attention. The
increased media attention pressured Bush and Clinton to create a policy response to the
war.
In 1992, 37 percent of the American public reported following news reports on
the Balkans,395 and in January 1993, 48 percent noted that they were following news
reports about the war in Bosnia. However, most of these Americans opposed a US
military intervention in Bosnia to end the conflict or defend Bosnia from Serb
aggression.396 However, the 37 percent of Americans aware of the situation in Bosnia
believed the United States had a “moral responsibility to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’,” and 34
percent believed a military intervention was justified if it defended US national security
interests or prevented the fighting from spreading to other parts of the region.397
Additionally, 51 percent of Americans favored increasing America’s role in the
peacekeeping talks.398 The polls also revealed that the American public understood the
crisis in Bosnia as a humanitarian disaster or as a strategic concern. The polls show that
while they supported American involvement ending the war, the public excluded the
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involvement of US military forces. As they confronted the Bosnian War, Bush and
Clinton responded. Bush adopted a humanitarian frame for the war caused by ancient
ethnic hatreds, which Clinton adopted when he became president.
Bush started establishing his frame in the summer of 1992 as reports emerged that
the Serbs were carrying out ethnic cleansing campaigns against Bosnian Muslims. Bush
also set the Bosnian War as part of the European agenda, while the United States
provided humanitarian assistance to Bosnia.399 Bush’s agenda that he did not believe that
US troops show intervene in political problems around the world.400 Especially when the
Bosnian War was caused by an “age-old animosities” or a “century’s-old feuds,” which
Bush used to equally apply guilt to the Bosnians for the violence.401
After winning the presidency in 1992, Clinton began setting his frames continued
some of Bush’s frames that the Bosnian War as a humanitarian crisis, that the United
States should not deploy its military. However, Clinton also gave more publicity to the
ethnic cleansing in Bosnian and placed more blame on the Serbs for the violence in
Bosnia. Clinton also increased America’s involvement in international efforts in Bosnian
and made those efforts part of the agenda US agenda in Bosnia.402
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During the Bosnian War, the media competed with Bush’s and Clinton’s frame
and agenda for the Bosnian War. Unlike Bush and Clinton, the media focused on
presenting the Serbs as the guilty party in the Bosnian War. The media did this by
focusing its reporting of the Serbs human rights violations and policy of ethnic cleansing
against non-Serbs in Bosnia. It did this by reporting on Muslim and Croat efforts to
defend themselves from the Serbs and the suffering of women, children, and the elderly
in Bosnia. It also attempted to link Serb actions to the Holocaust. However, this frame
was mitigated by media frames that focused on ancient ethnic hatreds as the root causes
of the conflict.403 Even as the media emphasized the humanitarian disaster side of the
Bosnian War, it adopted Bush’s and Clinton’s framing of ethnic hatreds causing the
violence in Bosnia.
Television media’s framing of the Bosnian War did not change during Clinton's
presidency. Between 20 January and 31 December 1995, the NBC, CBS, and ABC
evening news reported on events in Bosnia one thousand times.404 The television news
reports continued to describe the Bosnian War as a civil war between the Bosnians,
Croats, and Serbs. The reports also discussed the situations in Bosnian cities under Serb
attack, US policies, peace attempts, and ethnic cleansing. However, most the reporting
was on the civil war, and much of these reports were less than a minute long.405
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During a brief report on the history of Yugoslavia, NBC anchor and foreign
correspondent, Garrick Utley, discussed the history of the Balkans and former
Yugoslavia. In under two minutes, Utley connected the twentieth century ethnic conflict
in the Balkans with the 1914 Serbian assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz
Ferdinand that started WWI, and atrocities the parties committed during WWII. He also
described Josip Broz Tito’s Cold War efforts to suppress ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia
up to his death in 1980, when ethnic tensions returned and caused Yugoslavia’s collapse.
At the end of his report, Utley stated the Europeans refer to the Balkans to as “the
tinderbox” because of the regions repeated ethnic conflicts throughout the twentieth
century. His finished the report saying, “The result is now familiar. History repeating
itself,”406 During this report, Utley delivered few historical details, and provided little
context for the conflict. He also parroted the administration’s views of the conflict the
conflict.
Another news report by NBC’s John Cochran reported on Bush’s and the
international community’s efforts to deliver humanitarian relief to Bosnian. Cochran
noted that most UNSC members and American allies opposed using airpower to protect
convoys delivering aid because they did not believe air power would protect the convoys
from snipers and guerrilla attacks.407 This report demonstrated that the United States was
not alone in its refusal to use military force to resolve the conflict in Bosnia.
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Television reports were not the only source of information the public received
form the media. American newspapers’ editorial sections provided the American public
with more nuanced coverage of events and policy debates. Newspaper editorials
criticized Bush for not implementing a more aggressive policy against to Serb aggression.
Several articles argued that Bush’s response to Bosnia was a failure to uphold his New
World Order standards to deter aggression and encourage international cooperation. Like
some television news reports, newspapers also drew comparisons between Serb actions in
Bosnia to the Nazis and the Holocaust.408 However, these criticisms had little influence
changing Bush’s policies towards Bosnian. Clinton would also receive this criticism as
the media and a significant minority of the public pushed for more aggressive policies to
curb Serb violence.
When Clinton began drafting policy towards Bosnia, he also faced criticisms for
not implementing more aggressive policies against Serbia. However, the media noted that
while some critics desired more aggressive policies from Clinton, most of the public
agreed with Clinton’s less forceful policies. Leslie Gelb wrote:
“While most Americans seem generally content with Clinton’s handling of
foreign affairs, most foreign policy experts, diplomats and pundits mercilessly
accuse him of being clueless about U.S. interests and inept in wielding power.
Where most Americans feel utter relief in the president's reluctance to act tough
and threaten military intervention, professionals warn darkly of presidential
naiveté and dangerous inaction. Where just plain folks applaud the president’s
mainly minding the troubled store at home, the foreign policy elite – children of
American empire, a generation reared in the excitement and primacy of foreign
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policy – feel both disinherited by the Cold War’s end and genuinely alarmed
about a world drifting toward perpetual violence.”409
He continued that Bosnia represented problems with Clinton’s foreign policy decisions:
no ethical ballast, no strategic center, no conviction, no steadiness, and a failure to take
responsibility. Gelb also compared Clinton to Bush and noted that while Bush’s foreign
policy was no better than Clinton’s, Bush delivered on the policy promises he made.410
Samuel Berger responded to Gelb’s article in “What America Needs: Less Gelb.”
Berger argued that US foreign policy was not supposed to satisfy foreign policy experts,
and he also contested Gelb's claim that Clinton was ignoring the world. He pointed to
Clinton’s foreign policy accomplishments that included over one hundred meetings with
foreign leaders in 1993, a dozen foreign policy speeches, and eight country visits. He also
pointed to Clinton’s success obtaining three of his strategic goals: putting the economic
policy back in foreign policy, adapting the US military to the post-Cold War period, and
enlarging the world’s community of free market democracies.”411 The American media
had mixed success challenging Bush’s and Clinton’s frames for the Bosnian War. The
media adopted Bush’s and Clinton’s frames that the war was a humanitarian disaster.
However, the media put more emphasis on ethnic cleansing than either president but only
succeed in pressuring Clinton to increase his efforts to address ethnic cleansing in his
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decisions. The media also challenged Bush and Clinton’s foreign policy. However, Bush
and Clinton enjoyed public support for their policies so the media was only able to exert
limited pressure on the presidents to take more aggressive policies.
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Haitian Coup
The 1991 coup d’état of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide received most of its
press coverage immediately following the coup and once the Haitians began fleeing to
the United States. However, the public’s response to the Haitian were not measured until
two years later when the public was split over their approval or disapproval of Clinton’s
Haitian policies.412 Some Americans noted that the United States would not have gotten
involved in Haiti if not for the Congressional Black Caucus.413 By May 1994, 44 slightly
less than half of the American public was following news reports on Haiti.414 As Clinton
approached the start of the military intervention in September, 60 percent of the public
was following news stories about the intervention.415 However, most Americans opposed
using US military force to restore democracy to Haiti.416
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Following the Carter mission to Haiti that convinced the Cédras regime to resign,
American opinions began to change. Between 19 and 25 September opinion polls
revealed that more Americans supported sending troops to Haiti, and more Americans
approved of the way that Clinton had handled the situation in Haiti. Additionally, of those
surveyed, 51 percent believed the invasion would reduce or stop the flow of refugees, but
only 37 percent thought the intervention would stop human rights abuses. Most
Americans also believed that the United States would accomplish its goals and quickly
withdraw from Haiti.417 The American public’s initial disinterest in Haiti and its
continued opposition to military interventions in political intranational conflicts allowed
Bush to focus little attention on Haiti. However, the Congressional Black Caucus
increased its lobbying efforts to increase US involvement restoring Haiti’s democratic
government. Eventually this pressure would push Clinton to change the frame and agenda
for Haiti to support a military intervention.
Shortly after the coup, Bush began establishing his frame. He denounced the
coup, expressed concern for Haiti’s people, and announced the United States would
support OAS diplomatic efforts to end the coup.418 Bush adopted a similar frame for Haiti
as he had for Bosnia, the United States was concerned about the situation in the country,
but Bush had confidence the regional institutions could resolve the crisis diplomatically
and the United States supported the regional institutions diplomatic efforts. Bush did not
mention the possibility of deploying US forces to restore Aristide or state that any US
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interests were at stake in Haiti. This established that Haiti had little place on the public
agenda and that it was a Latin American-Caribbean problem to resolve, not an American
one.419 Bush’s frame remained in effect through the Haitian crisis though Clinton would
unsuccessfully change the frame in 1994.
Clinton’s initial frame for Haitian crisis differed little from Bush’s, it was not
until CBC lobbying efforts pressured Clinton to change Haitian refugee policies and
stronger diplomatic measures against the Cédras regime that Clinton began to change the
frame and agenda for Haiti. In June 1994, Clinton started by trying to reframe the coup as
a threat to democracy and that restoring Haitian democracy was in US interests, and that
it would stop the flow of Haitian refugees.420 However, the public which continued to
adhere to the frame Bush established in 1991.
Once Clinton made the decision to authorize Operation Uphold Democracy, he
and his administration continued to push and adopt their frame and agenda to gain public
support for the intervention. Clinton added human rights concerns, ending the refugee
flows, and defending democracy to his frame and agenda.421 During an address to the
nation on 15 September Clinton once again attempted to justify his decision and frame
the situation in Haiti to gain public support.422 However, by waiting until the eve of the
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intervention, Clinton’s efforts faced significant hurdles to convince the American public
that the intervention was the correct policy decision and to get their support. By waiting
so close to the beginning of the intervention Clinton also lost the ability to establish the
frame and agenda for Haiti. This put Clinton in an uphill battle to change an established
and well-accepted frame, that only a minority adhered to.
During Bush’s presidency, the broadcast networks produced 125 reports on events
in Haiti. Of those reports sixteen included discussions on the coup, seventy-two discussed
the refugees and refugee policies, four talked about the military, five mentioned Aristide,
and ten discussed OAS efforts to end the coup. US news reports spent more time framing
the crisis in Haiti as a refugee crisis with little time dedicated connecting the refugee flow
to the illegal government change and the junta's rule. The news reports also framed the
refugee flow as a response to economic sanctions against the Cédras regime and
diminished the importance of the Cédras regimes violence as a pushing the Haitians to
flee.423
As the crisis in Haiti extended into Clinton’s presidency, the media’s depictions
of the coup, Aristide, the plight of Haitian refugees, actions by the Cédras regime,
remained the same. Television news media produced another 565 reports on events in
Haiti. Five hundred and five of the reports covered general developments in Haiti, eleven
reported on Clinton’s foreign policies, seventy-one reported on Haitian refugees and
refugee policies, forty-one discussed Aristide, one report discussed the coup itself, and
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five examined the Cédras regime's military leaders.424 However, the media’s frame
deviated little from the frame established during Bush’s presidency.
The media continued to focus on the refugees fleeing to the United States and US
support for OAS efforts. While the television news did not include any overt signs of race
in its frame, race played a covert part of the media’s framing of Haiti. One way this
occurred was during C-Span’s debate on an intervention in Haiti between Representatives
Carrie Meeks and Charles Canaday. Meeks was a Democratic congresswoman and CBC
member and Canaday was a Republican Congressman. Canaday was an outspoken
opponent of the intervention and repeatedly stated that it was not the best way to end the
refugee flow from Haiti, while Meeks, supported a military intervention to return Aristide
to power. Meeks also repeatedly and adamantly disagreed with Canady’s remarks arguing
he ignored widespread violence under the Cédras regime as a source of the refugee flow
and defended Aristide from Canady’s criticisms.425 The Canaday-Meeks debate revealed
the sharp divisions along political and racial lines over Clinton’s Haitian policies
especially his decision to deploy US forces as part of a military operation to restore
Aristide to Haiti. As it had in the C-Span debate, the CBC emerged as one of the main
proponents of Clinton’s Haitian policies and the military intervention to restore Aristide
and democracy to Haiti.
American newspapers also adopted Bush’s frame the same frame. At the same
time newspaper editorials allowed Aristides proponents and opponents to present their

424

Keyword Search on Vanderbilt University Television News Archive,
https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu for “Haiti” date limitation to January 20, 1993 to October 30, 1994
“US Occupation of Haiti, C-Span Live July 13, 1994,” C-Span, https://www.cspan.org/video/?58631-1/us-occupation-haiti
425

250

framing of the coup. Aristide’s detractors focused on charges that Aristide had violated
the human rights of his political opponents in Haiti.426 While Aristide’s supporters
denounced the coup and called for the restoration of Aristides democratically elected
government.427 They denounced Aristide’s opponents for disseminating propaganda and
criticized foreign leaders that listened to Cédras regime supporters.428
Newspaper editorials also criticized US policy towards Haitian refugees. Many
editorials argued the United States should not abide by the 1981 immigration agreement
Reagan made with Duvalier to repatriate Haitian refugee, and that the United States
should apply the same asylum laws to the Haitian refugees. Some editorials compared the
repatriation of the Haitians to America’s refusal to accept the German Jews on the St.
Louis fleeing Nazi Germany.429 Editorials also criticized Bush’s justification that he was
repatriating Haitian refugees fleeing the economic devastation and not political
repression. They called on Bush to end the economic sanctions against Haiti because the
sanctions were not encouraging the Cédras regime or the army to stop violating their
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political opponents’ human rights.430 Others urged the administration to tighten the
embargo against the Cédras junta as long as it continued to obstruct Aristide’s return.431
These editorials showed that the media’s framing of the Haitian refugee crisis was
tenuously connected to the Cédras regime’s atrocities. It also revealed that the public
debate on Haitian policy was focused on the effectiveness of diplomatic pressures against
a military dictatorship.
There was not discussion of US responsibility to defend democracy and restore
Haiti’s democratic government, and there was no connection between Haitian democracy
and US security and national interests. However, when Clinton introduced democracy
into the Haitian frame editorials argued against Clinton’s arguments. Some editorials
argued that it was an impossible mission because the Haitian military and police would
reject international efforts to retrain them.432 Other American commentators argued
against a United States invasion to rescue Haiti’s democracy.433
As the military intervention approached foreign policy analysists like Anthony
Lewis connected Clinton’s inability to gain public approval to the post-Cold War period
and the public’s general opposition to US activism abroad. He noted that without an
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imminent threat like communism it was more difficult to get American support for policy
decisions. He continued that post-Cold War political and humanitarian crisis were more
difficult to convince the American public were threats to US interests.434
After Clinton’s address on 15 September, most editorials mirrored public opinion
and opposed Clinton’s decision to intervene in Haiti. They focused their criticisms on
Clinton quick progression from diplomacy to military options in Haiti, while continuing
diplomatic efforts to end the conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda.435 Other argued that
Clinton had been swayed by a small group of people in Washington—without mentioning
the CBC—who cared about Haiti and pressured Clinton to take more aggressive actions
even though Haiti was not a significant problem to most Americans.436
Bush’s frame for Haiti was similar to his frame for Bosnia. He focused on
supporting regional efforts at a resolution and not using US forces to resolve a political
conflict. Clinton started with Bush’s frame, and then attempted to change the agenda and
frame for Haiti just before he deployed US military forces to Haiti. His efforts were
unsuccessful, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted in his editorial, if Clinton intended to
change US policies in Haiti he should have started framing and setting the agenda months
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before the intervention was to occur to gain public support. 437 This allowed the media to
continue Bush’s frame and increase public opposition to Clinton’s strategies.
Public Opinion, Media, Presidential Statements, and the Genocide in Rwanda
The genocide in Rwanda presented Clinton with several foreign policy and public
relations opportunities. The genocide was the first crisis that Clinton could set his own
frame and agenda for without having to continue, compete, or revise from Bush. It was a
crisis that Clinton could bring into public awareness and quickly get public support for
his policy decisions. A month into the genocide only 34 percent of Americans were
aware that a genocide was occurring in Rwanda and were following news coverage.438
Clinton missed the opportunity to establish a strong frame and agenda for the
Rwandan genocide that garnered public support for his policy decisions. During the
Rwandan genocide, Clinton issued six public statements specifically about Rwanda, but
none of these statements acknowledged that a genocide was occurring in Rwanda.
Instead, Clinton’s described the violence as a civil war. He established America’s agenda
was evacuating Americans from Rwanda, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting
OAU negotiation efforts to get the Hutus and RPF to accept a cease-fire.439 Most of these
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statements were made in response to questions from reporters during exchanges on topics
other than situation in Rwanda.440
Clinton’s first statement to bring attention to the situation in Rwanda expressed
his shock and sadness about the deaths of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana
and Burundian President Cypriean Ntaryamira. Clinton established that their deaths were
tragic blows to the Rwandan and Burundian people. He expressed his horror that the
Rwandan security forces were using their president’s death to murder Rwandan
politicians and others.441 Following this statement, Clinton’s statements discussed US
efforts to evacuate Americans and diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. However,
Clinton did not discuss the ethnically motivated and genocidal quality of the killings the
security forces were carrying out. 442 It was not until July that Clinton acknowledged that
a genocide had occurred in Rwanda as he announced the closing the US embassy in
Rwanda in protest of the new governments support for acts of genocide.443
Throughout the conflict in Rwanda, Clinton’s frame focused on the political
discord causing violence in Rwanda. He established that America’s agenda in Rwanda
was to deliver humanitarian aid for those fleeing the violence and protecting American
lives by evacuating from Rwanda and keeping US forces out. Compared to his remarks
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about Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, Rwanda had a low priority in Clinton’s foreign policy
agenda. While Clinton’s frame and agenda was late acknowledging the genocide in
Rwanda, the American television and newspaper reports introduced genocide into the
frame soon after the violence began and attempted to pushed Rwanda higher on the
public agenda. Part of this was due to television reports from Rwanda and from human
rights observer’s first-hand reports of the violence.
The media’s reporting on the situation in Rwanda repeatedly challenged Clinton’s
agenda for the conflict, but not his framing. The media focused on the killings in Rwanda
and the need for an outside presence to restore peace. Additionally, television coverage of
the fighting and genocide in Rwanda as extensive as some crisis like Persian Gulf Crisis,
and Haiti, as ABC, CBS, and NBC produced 244 segments and specials on Rwanda over
116 days. These segments ranged from ten-seconds to twenty-nine minutes in length,
with most lasting between one and two minutes. Most of the segments described a civil or
tribal war occurring in Rwanda, with only ten reports describing the killings as a
genocide rather than massacres, ethnic slaughter, or tribal violence. While media
coverage on Rwanda at the beginning focused on the plights of Americans there were
mentions of the violence but the focus was on the fighting between the Hutus and Tutsis.
During April, the media reported on events in Rwanda daily though it was not until 28
April that the media first described the killing in Rwanda as a genocide.444 Still the media
beat Clinton to introducing genocide into the frame three months before the president.
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While television news reports added genocide to their frames, American
newspaper editorials were discussing events in Rwanda and describing the violence as a
genocide by mid-April. They also criticized the United States and UN for failing to act to
end the violence. During an interview with Washington Post reporters, Monique
Mujawamariya, a human rights observer in Rwanda who had managed to escape the
genocide in Rwanda, discussed the acts of violence and intimidation carried out by
extremist Hutu. She described Hutu human rights violations back to December 1993
shortly after the last cease-fire was established. Mujawamariya argued that the
international community had failed to prevent the violence from restarting by not
adapting to the changing situation in Rwanda, not accounting for the long-term threat of
violence between the Hutu and Tutsi, and failing to recognize the reality of the situation
in Rwanda. She rejected claims that the violence in Rwanda was inter-tribal fighting or
an ethnic conflict, and that the killings were separate from the civil war.445
Mujawamariya’s interview was one of several articles and interviews that witnesses gave
on the genocide in Rwanda.446
She was also one of many that criticized the Clinton administration and media for
describing the genocide in Rwanda as tribal violence or as an inter-tribal war. Her
interview also contrasted with public statements from Clinton and his administration by
focusing attention to the genocide occurring Rwanda hidden by focus on the resumed
civil war. Mujawamariya and others that argued a genocide was occurring in Rwanda
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challenged Clinton and the media’s framing. Others argued revealed that contrary to
Clinton’s statements Africa remained a low priority for US foreign policy, and African
crises generated little concern within the international community. Editorials that
criticized Clinton’s slow response to Rwanda also pointed to the post-Cold War
challenges related to crises where the president could not easily justify deploying US
military forces to restore peace. 447 One editorial noted that the problem lay with
policymakers’ failure to establish or articulate a clear standard to respond to intranational
brutality and aggression that had low stakes to national interests.448
Other commentators criticized Presidential Decision Directive-25 for enabling the
United States to prevent the UN from acting aggressively or sending a peacekeeping
mission to Rwanda. These editorials argued that despite administration arguments of
supporting international actions to end the violence in Rwanda, Clinton’s policies had
done the opposite by forcing the UN to focus on humanitarian efforts for refugees on the
borders.449 Along with the criticism brought by the policy decisions, the Clinton
administration was also criticized for refusing to describe the violence in Rwanda as a
genocide, despite the numerous reports from human rights observers that it was
occurring. Several commentators noted that the United States refused to describe the
killings as genocide to avoid encouraging calls for a US military intervention as required
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by the 1952 UN Convention on Genocide that called for the signers to prevent the crime
and punish those that committed it.450 While Clinton tried to frame the conflict in
Rwanda as a civil war, media reports and interviews with survivors repeatedly challenged
this frame and Clinton’s agenda for the crisis. The media’s coverage of the situation in
Rwanda demonstrated that the media was capable challenging the president’s frame and
eventually forcing the president to change his frame. However, the media was not able to
generate enough public opinion to pressure Clinton to change his policies towards
Rwanda.
Conclusions
Framing and agenda setting for the American public is a multifaceted mechanism
that includes the president, the media, and the public. The President attempts to establish
the initial frame and agenda. The president’s efforts are challenged by political opponents
and proponents in public debates. The media describes these debates and either adopts all
or parts of the president’s frame and agenda or not. As these crises reveal the president’s
frame is often supported by the media with little or moderate changes. At the same time
the president and the media alter their frames and agenda based on public opinions of the
presidents ‘policies and media coverage of events.
As Bush and Clinton strove to support international stability and security through
international cooperation, and protect the United States from as the international situation
changed in the post-Cold War period they had to get public support for their policy
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decisions. This required Bush and Clinton to describe and explain crises and their policy
responses to the American public using language that fit within the American public’s
world views and foreign policy preferences. The tone, rhetoric, and frequency of their
presidential statements on foreign events reflected the level of importance a crisis had to
the United States, and how much attention the American public and mass media should
pay to those events as well. However, this did not mean that the public or the media
would completely agree with the president’s position. In the post-Cold War period, the
function of public opinion in a democracy to influence, limit, and guide leaders’ policy
decisions ensured that presidents and other policymakers participated in policy debates,
expressed their views on the situation, and justified their decisions in ways that informed
the public.
The media serves to keep the public informed, even if that requires the public to
contradict the government. It is also dependent upon the media’s ability to cover an event
in a way that forces that crisis higher up the public agenda. However, does not possess an
omnipotent ability to equally cover every crisis around the world in a way that sways the
public and policymakers. Additionally, when the media fails to substantially cover a
crisis, or conflict it increases the possibility for the government to develop a policy
vacuum.
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CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSION
In 1993, Bill Clinton stated, “Gosh, I miss the Cold War. We had an intellectually
coherent thing. The American people knew what the rules were.”451 Not just the
American people, but American policymakers understood that during the Cold War the
United States was fighting to preserve democracy and free market capitalism from the
Soviet Union and its desire to spread communism. The end of the Cold War threw those
rules to the wind, and left post-Cold War policymakers searching for a new grand
strategy for US national security and foreign policies. At the same time, American
society was still coming to terms with changes that occurred during the 1960s with civil
rights movements, the rightward turn of American politics, and leftward turn of American
culture. American media was changing in response to telecommunications advances that
enabled instantaneous transmissions of news reports around the world which led to the
rise twenty-four-hour news channels and cable television, and the rise of the internet and
growing popularity of email. These advances changed the way American received news
and information and connected with each other and their elected officials. Internationally,
the United States was re-evaluating its global military presences, responding to antiAmerican attitudes around the world, and responding to increasing numbers of
intranational conflicts that threatened regional and international stability and security.
Following the temporary rise of a unipolar international system, the United States
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emerged as a world super power in multipolar system as regional powers and institutions
balanced America’s global military presence.
Even as the international system encountered rapid change George Bush and Bill
Clinton relied on pre-Cold War US foreign policy and national security strategies from
the early twentieth century to devise a non-containment grand strategy after the Cold
War. Clinton’s and Bush’s national security strategy and foreign policies returned to
cooperative security arrangements that relied on international and regional institutions to
respond to international and intranational conflicts that threatened to world security and
stability and American interests. Their efforts occurred as post-Cold War technological
advances in satellite transmissions, the growth of the internet, and electronic email
increased public opinion’s and the mass media’s ability to influence foreign policy
decisions.
For forty years, the strategy of containment guided the US presidents’ policy
decisions, from the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, Vietnam War, using African
American jazz musicians as ambassadors, to supporting totalitarian governments, the
United States adopted policies designed to protect democracy and capitalism around the
world. In many ways, the Cold War stymied the American diplomacy. It did this by
forcing the government and American policymakers to comprehend international
relations through one lens that simplified international relations to a black and white
issue. While the singular focus made it easier to explain US policy decisions to the public
and to gain public opinion, it also set the United States up for difficult a transition once
the Cold War ended.
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The end of the Cold War made the containment strategy and its singular vision for
US strategies and policies obsolete. Without a similar universal strategy, US international
relations returned to the pre-Cold War emphasis on cooperative security arrangements,
and multinational responses to international crises. This system struggled to respond to
post-Cold War conflicts in areas where the United States or the Soviet Union had
provided governments with military and economic support to counter the plans of the
other. Without the Cold War dichotomy suppressing internal discord, previously
suppressed ethnic or political divisions re-emerged and sparked intranational political or
humanitarian crises that Bush and Clinton found difficult to resolve. As the Cold War
ended, Bush transitioned US foreign policy and national security away from the strategy
of containment and towards cooperative security arrangements. Clinton continued this
direction and added global economic prosperity as another means to defend US security
and interests. Bush and Clinton also broke with America’s postwar tradition of
decreasing US military force and maintained America’s super power military presence
around the world, which they attempted to use to maintain global security and stability.
However, neither president could create a strategy that used America’s military strength
to deter and respond to intranational conflicts that frequently threatened global stability
and security after 1991.
Bush's attempt led to the creation of the New World Order, while Clinton’s
attempt created a strategy of engagement and enlargement. Both presidents believed that
creating a post-Cold War grand strategy provided the government with direction for
foreign policies and the United States future role in the world. They also believed that
like the policy of containment, their strategies could provide the American public with an
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overarching understanding of America’s global mission and foreign policy agenda.
However, neither president's grand strategy was entirely original. Their plans borrowed
ideas and theories from the first half of the twentieth century, at times reenacting past
international events.
George Bush served as the transition president to the post-Cold War period. This
positioned Bush to create a grand strategy that future post-Cold War presidents could use
if his strategy was successful. However, Cold War ideologies were hard to overcome
during the Bush presidency. It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union when Bush
was no longer felt he needed to the strategy of containment that he established new rules
for US foreign policy. Bush’s post-Cold War strategy became the New World Order. It
promoted collective security and international cooperation to maintain global and
regional security and stability. It also encouraged working with international institutions
like UN and NATO to deter aggression and if necessary to create coalitions to end
conflicts. Bush’s New World Order harkened back to the notions of international
cooperation advocated by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Bush’s response
to the Persian Gulf Crisis was the best implementation of his New World Order strategy.
He successfully created international opposition to Iraqi aggression, sustained and guided
that cooperation through the to the end of a successful war that removed Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. Bush also gained the support of the American public for his policy decisions.
This included overcoming the Vietnam syndrome and significant opposition to a military
intervention to liberate Kuwait up to the 16 January 1991.
While Bush favored collective action to resolve crises, he did not support United
States leadership in every attempt to deter aggression and resolve crises. Instead, Bush
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engaged American leadership when a crisis posed significant threats to US national
interests, as he did during the unification of Germany and the Persian Gulf Crisis. When
global crisis did not threaten vital US national interests, such as the Haitian coup and
Bosnian War, Bush encouraged regional powers and institutions to take the lead while the
United States supported their leadership. The disadvantage of this strategy was that it
limited Bush’s ability to influence policy decision and led to policy differences between
the US and the regional institutions. This policy was supposed to encourage collective
action between various states as Bush desired in the New World Order. However, many
of the regional efforts failed to provide the same level of assertive leadership the United
States had traditionally provided, due to internal divisions over policy decisions.
While Bush borrowed foreign policy ideas from the early twentieth century,
Clinton pulled from Wilsonian foreign policies and other mid-twentieth-century foreign
policies. His strategy of engagement and enlargement included the promotion and defend
democracy and supporting global economic prosperity. While communism no longer
threatened democracy, dictators, totalitarian governments prevented countries from
embracing democracy, while and coups threatened new democratic governments. In his
national security strategy, Clinton discussed participating in missions that were relevant
to US national security interests and where the US could do the most good.
Between 1993 and 1995, Clinton attempted to implement a foreign policy strategy
that kept the United States engaged in world affairs, especially in ways that helped to end
crises. Clinton's presidency was less focused on encouraging collective action, than with
maintaining US participation in international developments and supporting the growth of
democracy. Unlike Bush, Clinton was more willing to take aggressive actions when
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international crises were not a threat to international events. Clinton also developed
foreign and national security strategies that were more selective when deploying US
military forces abroad.
Both Bush and Clinton created national security and foreign policies based on the
roles they believed the United States should fill in the post-Cold War period. Bush and
Clinton developed and pursued policies per their strategies, whether that was directing
international cooperation in a new era of peace and security or engaging with the world
and promoting the spread of democratic governments. Their ability to enact that strategy
through policy had varying degrees of success. While both presidents attempted to keep
the United States involved in global events, the rise of intranational conflicts that violated
human rights and created humanitarian crises challenged both strategies. Unfortunately,
neither grand strategy provided a standard rule or set of rules to guide policymakers.
Instead, Clinton and Bush enacted policies that frustrated international efforts by limiting
US participation and with it that of other countries. As the sole super power the United
States had much sway on the international community and when the United States proved
unwilling to act assertively neither did the international community.
While Bush and Clinton differed in their approaches, both presidents adopted
similar responses to intranational crises. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda these men
encouraged regional institutions and states to resolve the conflicts in their neighboring
countries while the United States provided support. In both crises, the United States
retreated from leading resolution efforts even as developments demonstrated that US
leadership was likely the only way to generate a forceful response. Bush was called out
for this strategy and how it undermined his New World Order after executing it so well in
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response to Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. The public also criticized Clinton for this tactic,
but because his foreign policy framework appeared less grandiose, his decisions came
under less attack. Also, Clinton demonstrated that he was willing to adopt stronger
policies against those that engaged in violence as he did against the Serbs in Bosnia and
the Cédras regime in Haiti.
The difference in US responses to international and intranational crises emerged
during the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnian War, and the Rwandan genocide. Following
Iraq's invasions of Kuwait, Bush successfully led a coalition to push Iraqi forces out of
Kuwait. However, neither Bush nor Clinton could unite the international community to
stop the intranational conflicts in Bosnian War and the genocide in Rwanda, where
conflicts were caused by one ethnicity attempting to eliminate the other. As the Persian
Gulf Crisis revealed, it was easier to convince countries united to oppose the aggression
of one state against another than it was to unify the international community against a
state perpetrating violence against its own people.
In a period when the American public was less inclined to pay attention to
international events and less supportive of US involvement in foreign crises, presidents
needed to explain foreign policy decisions in a way that kept the public focus but also
supportive of policy decisions. American attitudes were especially relevant when mass
media reports on global crises informed and influenced public opinion. Both presidents
recognized that intranational conflicts were difficult for outside powers to influence,
while American morality made it difficult to ignore the crises. Also, refusing to
participate in resolution efforts undermined American principles and values. How could
the United States argue it defended human rights and democracy while it stood by as a
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state violated those ideals? In responding to intranational conflicts Bush and Clinton were
questioned about US involvement in intranational crises especially when they did not
threaten US national security interests. Thus, intranational conflicts proved to be the most
significant challenges to both men's grand strategies. American foreign policy makers
were not the only ones challenged by this situation; many Americans questioned
America's role in a world without a global threat.
During the 1990s, while American public supported US participation in
international affairs, the public was less supportive of US involvement in peacekeeping
missions. Many Americans had believed that the end of the Cold War ended would make
the world safer and more peaceful. Instead, they continued to hear about violence and
crises occurring throughout the world and appeals for international aid. During the Cold
War the Soviet Union and the expansion of communism were the greatest threats to the
United States, but in the post-Cold War period, that threat no longer existed. If no other
country was powerful enough to threaten the United States then, what was America's
purpose in the world, and who was the biggest threat to the United States? If there was
not global power strong enough to threaten the United States, then the United States was
not responsible for policing the world. These public attitudes led Bush and Clinton to
frame and justify American interventions around the world in ways that answered these
questions.
After the Cold War, changes in telecommunication technology, the development
of cable television, and twenty-four-hour news networks affected the mass media's role in
American society. However, many Americans continued to get much of their evening,
weekend, and serialized news broadcasts from CBS, NBC, and ABC. These news reports
268

provided the American public with basic information about world events. However, most
regular news broadcasts discussed foreign news for less than two minutes, unless it was a
special report which could last thirty minutes to an hour. Newspapers and editorial
sections provided the in-depth analysis and context that television news reports lacked.
The lack of attention was visible if a crisis did not threaten American interests or had
little relevance to most American’s lives. However, crises that posed significant threats to
US interest or were relevant to much of the American population received much news
coverage.
The Persian Gulf Crisis with over one thousand news broadcasts and special
reports was the most televised event in the early post-Cold War period. The next highest
reported crisis was Somalia and the US intervention there with over 800 reports. The US
intervention in Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda received approximately 500 reports, and the
fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany had less than 400. Many of the
reports on the crises relied on stereotypes, traditional narratives, and understandings of
regions and peoples. In Bosnia, the media described the crisis as an ancient feud, and
often described the genocide in Rwanda as a tribal war or civil war. The ways mass
media described these conflicts and the reasons for them influenced how American public
understood and rated their importance in the same way presidential framing did.
Americans’ expressed their opinions of US foreign policy by corresponding with
the president and writing editorials to newspapers. It is difficult to completely gauge the
influence public opinion had on Bush’s and Clinton’s foreign policy. However, both
presidents took steps to recognize how the American public felt about various issues, and
attempted to gain public support for foreign policy decisions. Sometimes they succeeded
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other times they did, and depending on the crisis and the president’s determination of the
crisis importance to US security he was willing to act without public support. As Clinton
did when he decided to undertake the US intervention in Haiti even though the public’s
opposed a military intervention to restore Haiti’s democratic government. Bush never
faced this problem, though he often faced public opposition to his policy decisions.
After the end of the Cold War, George Bush, Bill Clinton, the American public,
and the American media attempted to understand the world’s changing situation. The rise
of intra-state conflicts and the difficulties the United States faced determining when to
intervene to re-establish stability and peace plagued Bush and Clinton’s foreign policy
and national security strategies. The American public added to the challenges they faced
as the public was reluctant to deploy American military force to police the world, even as
the United States maintained its military preponderance of power. Intranational conflicts
and technological changes combined to change the way the American media reported on
foreign affairs. The increased ability of reporters to quickly describe crises around the
world and the introduction of twenty-four-hour news channels introduced new ways to
influence public opinion and presidential foreign policy decisions.
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